open opposition developed, up and down the frontier, from Pennsylvania to Georgia. This tax on stills was looked upon as an unnecessary deduction from incomes which were altogether too small. In western Pennsylvania the disaffection came soon to a head. In 1791 and again in 1792 mass meetings were held, denouncing the law. In 1794, when the federal authorities tried to serve writs on some unlicensed distillers, open rebellion broke out. This became so bad that Washington called out fifteen thousand troops; by the time they reached the western counties of Pennsylvania the rioters were ready to scatter, and order was soon restored. Hamilton was inclined to welcome the outburst, because it gave the federal government an opportunity to display its authority in effective fashion. In order to make a lasting impression upon other potential rebels, Hamilton was ready to urge drastic punishments. Here Washington overruled his impetuous secretary, and pardoned the two culprits who had actually been convicted of treason. THE RETURN OF PROSPERITY When judged by results, the only safe standard for testing matters of statecraft, either diplomatic or financial, Hamilton's policy was eminently successful. At home property owners and business men were inspired with confidence for the future. Abroad, American credit which had gone down almost to the vanishing point was suddenly brought up to the top. Jefferson reported that in Amsterdam the credit of the United States stood first of all the nations needing to borrow money. American bonds, which had risen to ninety-nine, were eagerly sought by European investors. All this confidence received further support when American commerce showed a marked change for the better. Even before 1789 trade had begun to recover, and by 1790 the evident movement toward prosperity was everywhere apparent. After 1793, when the European war opened up for all commercial neutrals unheard-of possibilities in money making, the United States could feel that the critical period was finally closed. And yet, in giving Hamilton all the credit which he deserves, it must be remembered that in one respect financial ventures are like revolution: they are good or bad in proportion to the success or failure. Hamilton took tremendous chances, staking everything on the resources and opportunities of the country. Had he lost, he would THE NORTHWEST INDIANS 249 have gone down as one of the spectacular failures of history. But good fortune was with him. The wave of prosperity was already flowing strongly when he entered office, and it carried his measures along on the crest. It was not the Constitution which brought prosperity; prosperity made possible the success of the new government. In handling its frontier and foreign problems the Washington administration was almost as successful as in matters of finance. The frontiersmen in Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee, who had been noticeably indifferent to the United States, were given encouragement when the three regions were respectively admitted as states in 1791, 1792, and 1796. Of course mere admission did not clear up the troubles of the frontier, but it was at least evidence of interest and good intentions. The pioneers were appreciably encouraged when in 1790, in spite of the vigorous efforts of Spain to prevent it, the federal government signed a treaty of peace with the Creek Indians. THE NORTHWEST INDIANS In the Northwest Washington was making an effort to solve the Indian problem in similar fashion, but the British forces were still supreme in that quarter, and their influence was being used to prevent any agreement. The President then appealed to Congress for money enough to prosecute an effective campaign, but Congress was hard to convince, and the Northwest was left without adequate protection. For a time, the situation looked bad. In 1790, General Harmar, not infrequently so drunk that he was irresponsible, suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Indians. The next year General St. Clair, with a force of two thousand men, was subjected to a still more decisive defeat. His men became panic stricken, and throwing away their arms, they retreated a full thirty miles. Out of the two thousand, fifty came through uninjured. By that time the Indians were naturally becoming more and more bold. They made almost continuous raids upon the scattered American settlements and, encouraged by their victories and by British agents, they were demanding a large slice of the Northwest territory for themselves. Realizing how critical the situation had become, Washington appointed General Wayne, the "Mad Anthony" of Revolutionary days, to take charge of the section. After spending a full year in drilling a new army, in 1793 Wayne made an effort, fruitless as it proved, to settle the trouble without further war. But British agents broke up whatever peace sentiment there might have been, and Wayne was forced to fight. Alarmed at the very methodical preparations, the British proceeded to concentrate their forces thirty miles south of Detroit, so that, no matter what Wayne did to the Indians, he would find it difficult to attack the northwest posts. Furthermore, Lord Dorchester, the governor of Canada, made a speech to a delegation of Indians, in which he asserted that the Americans had no rights in the territory. It mattered little that Dorchester was officially reprimanded for his ill-advised utterances. The Indians understood the speech, and never heard of the censure, so naturally they persisted in defying Wayne's army. In June, 1794, the American force began to move. In August, Wayne came upon a large force of Indians, all assembled within two miles of the British position south of Detroit. In the battle of Fallen Timbers he won a brilliant victory over them, and then followed it up by destroying their supplies and property for miles around. Just about a year later, in 1795, Wayne negotiated the Treaty of Greenville with the Indians, removing that particular menace in the Northwest, and opening up to settlement the parts not occupied by the British. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION In the meantime, while the federal government was solving some of its Indian problems, the outbreak of the French Revolution and its attendant wars threatened to plunge the nation into the very midst of the life and death struggle of Europe. The danger was real, even though American interests were absolutely at variance with those of both sets of belligerents. If the United States could select its own policy, common sense pointed to neutrality, but there were various factors which threatened to make such a course impossible. The border difficulties, with England in the Northwest, and with Spain in the South, were both serious enough to drag in the United States. Then too, in past wars maritime nations had found neutrality impossible; at this time, with its steadily expanding carrying trade, the United States was certain to be involved in disputes with belligerents. Also, there were the Franco-American treaties of 1778. American public opinion was divided, although the majority clearly favored France. To the popular mind the situation did not even THE GENÊT AFFAIR 251 present a problem. France had aided the struggling colonies in their Revolution. Did not common decency require payment of the debt? The people were quick to show their enthusiasm for the French cause. The Marseillaise was published in the newspapers, people began to address each other as "Citizen" instead of "Mister," and even women were saluted with a French title, curiously Americanized to "Citess." This popular feeling, however, found very little reflection in the government. Jefferson favored France, but Washington and Hamilton had developed into level-headed statesmen, with nothing of the crusader about them. So cool had they become that, in the picturesque phraseology of the French, their attitude toward liberty, formerly that of lovers, had changed into that of husbands. They could be depended upon not to plunge into any Quixotic enterprise, which might turn out to the detriment of the country. THE GENÊT AFFAIR In March 1793, Washington, then at Mt. Vernon, wrote Jefferson that the government of the United States should see to it that the citizens did not embroil the country in war. Neutrality, he concluded was the wisest course. Soon afterwards, word came of the departure of the newly appointed French minister, Citizen Genêt, with instructions calculated to make American neutrality impossible. Washington had already asked his Cabinet for advice and suggestions, and in April, 1793, the members made known their views. All agreed that a proclamation of neutrality should be issued, and that the new French minister should be received. Concerning the treaties of 1778, Hamilton argued that they had become obsolete, because of changes on both sides since they had been made, and that even if they were still in force, they would not compel the United States to become an ally of France. The treaties, he said, called for American help only in a defensive war. Jefferson, on the other hand, argued that the treaties were agreements between nations, rather than governments, and he concluded that they were still in force. The French government, however, as the Americans soon learned, preferred to have the United States remain neutral, because then she could supply France with provisions. On April 22, 1793, Washington issued his neutrality proclamation, announcing that the government would keep out of the war, and warning all American citizens to refrain from any hostile act against either belligerent. So the American republic announced that it would not, as in times past, be a party in a European war. This was the first official announcement of the famous American policy of isolation. On the very same day that this proclamation was published, the administration learned that on April 8, Citizen Genêt had landed in Charleston, South Carolina. Paying no attention to the accepted courtesies of diplomatic intercourse, which would have required him to present his credentials and to wait for an official reception, the young Frenchman plunged at once into his work. Acting under instructions, he planned with American help to organize two military expeditions in the United States, one against Louisiana, the other against Florida. Then he commissioned privateers, and sent them out to prey upon British commerce. All this was in clear violation of the neutrality of the United States, as well as in violation of the Treaties of 1778. These did not authorize the French to make a recruiting ground of the United States, and there is serious doubt as to their granting the right to send out privateers. If he were allowed to pursue any such course, the United States could not avoid war with Great Britain. Finally Genêt organized a Jacobin Club in Charleston, and then started north, to begin direct negotiations with the State Department. His trip soon became a great triumphal journey, and as he moved from place to place, he took pains to stir up hostility against Great Britain. Once in Philadelphia, he was officially received, with a coolness in sharp contrast to the enthusiasm before shown. Naturally the impulsive minister concluded that the government did not represent the people, and that, in view of all the evidence of popular support, he could ignore the imperturbable Washington and his suave Secretary of State. His manifold activities drove the State Department to desperation. French privateers were bringing in prizes, and finally the French seized a British vessel, the Little Sarah, in American waters. The State Department promptly demanded her release, but Genêt, denying the right of the government to act, christened her "La Petite Democrate" and sent her out as a privateer. When Jefferson read him a sharp lesson on the elementary decencies of foreign intercourse, he denounced the federal government for its "cowardly aban |