CHAPTER XLVI FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE WAR From the outbreak of hostilities at Fort Sumter, President Lincoln held to the theory that the southern states had not left, and could not leave, the Union, that their attempt at secession had not made them into a different nation. They were still parts of the federal government, and instead of being at war they were merely in a state of rebellion. If this theory were sound, foreign governments would have no concern whatever with the contest. There were a number of difficulties with Lincoln's interpretation, not the least of which was the refusal of Europe to accept it. From their point of view the struggle was a war between two belligerants. Lincoln involved himself in inconsistencies by proclaiming a blockade, an act which virtually recognized Confederate belligerency. Even if he had not taken that step, it would have been impossible to make European nations look upon the struggle as a mere insurrection. Their own interests were affected, and they knew better. SEWARD In making Seward his Secretary of State Lincoln had been actuated and guided more by the necessities of Republican politics than by any deep regard for the foreign service as such. Seward was the most powerful leader in the party, and the administration had to recognize him by giving him the highest place in the Cabinet. Fortunately for the country, he proved to be an admirable man for the post. To be sure, it took him nearly two months to learn that he was not the President. Like many others, he had assumed that Lincoln was an untutored country lawyer, whose elevation to the presidency was due to the peculiar situation that had prevailed in 1860. As the recognized leader of the party, Seward took it for granted that he would continue to lead after March 4, 1861. On April 1, 1861, without apparently appreciating the significance of the date, Seward submitted to his chief a remarkable document entitled "Thoughts for the President's consideration." In this he told Lincoln that no policy had yet been adopted, that the country wanted one, so he had one all prepared. For a domestic policy he urged that the emphasis be shifted from slavery to union or disunion. With reference to foreign affairs, he suggested that England and Russia be called sharply to account, and that Spain and France be presented with an ultimatum and virtually threatened with a declaration of war. His idea was apparently to silence the contest at home by uniting the sections in a popular foreign war. In the war to be provoked, he assured the President, with becoming modesty, that he would not be unwilling to assume full charge. The belligerent secretary also sent communications to some of the American ministers in Europe which simply amazed men who knew anything about diplomacy. But Lincoln showed Seward his place so tactfully that he won his complete confidence and support, and once tamed he became one of the most valuable members of the administration. For minister to England the President selected, on Seward's advice, Charles Francis Adams, son of John Quincy Adams. He had all the ability of his celebrated father and grandfather, without their pugnacity and lack of tact. He was a clear-headed, even-tempered man, cool and distant as befitted a descendant of the New England Puritans, but able, in spite of these traits, to inspire confidence and to make friends. He arrived in London on May 13, 1861, nearly a month after hostilities had begun, and it fell to him to work against formal recognition of Confederate independence. In the English Cabinet of the time Palmerston was Prime Minister, Earl Russell Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Gladstone Chancellor of the Exchequer. Opinion in the country was divided from the beginning. The upper classes were strongly in sympathy with the South. The middle class element was opposed to slavery, but it found the Union policy so lacking in energy at the start that it hardly knew which side to take. English journalists in America were sending back reports of disunion and dissension, with little reference to anything else. The correspondent of the London Times wrote: "Practically, so far as I have gone, I have failed to meet many people who really exhibited any passionate attachment to the Union, or who pretended to be actuated by any strong feeling of regard or admiration for the government of the United States in itself." If this feeling of indifference and uncertainty prevailed in America, it is not surprising that English opinion should have been either puzzled, or sympathetic with the Confederates. The business interests were alarmed at the prospect of a cotton shortage, and feeling that the South was destined to win sooner or later anyway, they suggested that the Union admit the fact in the beginning, and so save endless trouble. The Continental nations usually got their information about American affairs from British sources, and at this time they were ready to let England take the initiative in dealing with the problem of the American war. England therefore became the central factor in the foreign problems of the war. Jefferson Davis was convinced that in cotton he had a powerful weapon to use in dealing with foreign governments, and he assumed that it would bring recognition without delay. On May 3, two of his unofficial agents in England had an interview with Russell, looking toward recognition. A few days later Dallas, Adams's predecessor, received what he interpreted as assurance that no action would be taken until the new minister should arrive. Both sides therefore prepared to wait a few days more. But on May 13, the very day that Adams arrived in London, the British government published its proclamation of neutrality. This was a recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent power, and a formal notice that Great Britain at least considered the contest between North and South as an international, rather than a domestic matter. It appeared that the proclamation had been issued hastily, in disregard of the statement made to Dallas only a few days before. The Lincoln administration interpreted the step as proof of a desire to have the status of the Confederacy settled before Adams appeared. The North generally resented this action, and regarded it as a gratuitous announcement of hostility. Feeling ran high, and all the traditional bitterness against England was revived in full force. Historians, however, have been inclined to look upon the issue of the proclamation at that time as peculiarly fortunate, because it forestalled further action for a considerable period. Had the British government waited a few months, until after the battle of Bull Run, it probably would have gone further, and recognized the independence of the South. Adams felt that the general atmosphere of the British government was one of distinct hostility toward the North, and in May, 1861, he wrote that his mission might be terminated at any THE TRENT AFFAIR 521 moment. Although England preserved neutrality, Earl Russell had favored joining with France in a formal offer of mediation, with the understanding that if the United States refused, she would have to count on English hostility. Palmerston, however, insisted upon neutrality for the time being. THE TRENT AFFAIR That was the situation when the "Trent affair" threatened to bring on war between England and the federal government. The Confederacy had decided to send commissioners to England and France respectively, to urge recognition and aid. James M. Mason and John Slidell were the men selected. Running the blockade, they took passage from Havana on a British mail-steamer the Trent. On November 8, the day after she left Havana, she was overhauled by a vessel of the American navy, the San Jacinto, Captain Wilkes commanding. The San Jacinto fired two shots to bring the Trent to a stop. Then a force of sailors and marines boarded her, and took by force Mason, Slidell, and their secretaries, in spite of the protests of the British officers. Wilkes took his prisoners to Fort Warren, in Boston harbor. On November 16, the news of the capture reached New York, and it seemed that the whole country went wild with enthusiasm. Not only had two prominent Confederates been captured, who might be used as hostages, following the example already set by the Confederacy, but Great Britain had been publicly snubbed. Wilkes was welcomed with a series of receptions, dinners, and votes of thanks, some of which were adopted by the federal House of Representatives. The news was received in England on November 27. A Cabinet meeting discussed the issue at once, and the conclusion was reached that the seizure was in violation of international law, and that reparation must be made. Earl Russell drew up a dispatch to Lord Lyons, the British minister in Washington, which in its original tone would probably have provoked war. Fortunately the message was softened at the suggestion of Queen Victoria. In its denatured form it demanded the liberation of Mason and Slidell, and "a suitable apology for the aggression." The government of the United States was to have seven days in which to make a reply. If none came, or if an unsatisfactory one were given, then Lyons was to leave at once for London. The Admiralty prepared for war, eight thousand troops were sent to Canada, and the government prohibited the export of arms and ammunition. Seward wrote to Adams that Wilkes had acted without orders, and on December 19, Adams imparted this news to Russell. Lincoln's Cabinet had a long discussion of the matter, with Sumner, chairman of the Senate committee on Foreign Relations, present. He reported letters from John Bright and others, showing how anxious the more sensible Englishmen were for a peaceful settlement. The Cabinet finally decided to release the men, and to disavow Wilkes's act. American opinion in general supported the administration. Wilkes had done practically what British commanders had done during the period before the War of 1812, and the United States had always condemned such proceedings. The British demand for the surrender of Mason and Slidell therefore was justified by and consistent with the American interpretation of international law. Under these circumstances, the question was easily settled. Wilkes might have taken the Trent before an admiralty court, but he had no right to stop the vessel and take off certain passengers, no matter who were. ༈ CONFEDERATE COMMERCE RAIDERS As the war progressed other causes of friction arose between the two countries, in which the United States was not the aggressor. Unable to provide themselves with commerce raiders, the Confederates turned to British shipbuilding firms, usually in Liverpool. Vessels were constructed in British yards, equipped in or from British ports, and started on their career of destruction from neutral harbors. Adams kept the British officials fully informed of these matters, and had they been really eager to avoid giving offense they would have prevented the ships from leaving port. In March, 1862, the Florida was allowed to leave Liverpool, where she had been built for the Confederate service. After she got away, the British Justice Cockburn said that she should have been detained. The evidence in the case made it clear that the British authorities were not using due diligence in fulfilling their duties as a neutral. The more famous case was that of the Alabama, which like the Florida, was constructed in Liverpool for the Confederacy. It was common knowledge that the vessel would be fitted out and equipped from a British base, and Adams laid evidence to prove it before the |