Spanish princess, and trusted to events, his own wit, and posterity, to make this union an accomplished fact.

3. At that time the theory of the Balance of Power was in full swing, and the project of the Grand Monarch was considered to be dangerous to the preservation of a peaceful equilibrium in Europe. A grand alliance of all the states which felt themselves aggrieved was accordingly formed by our William III.; and, on his death, the great Duke of Marlborough became the head and master-spirit of the confederacy. When the throne of Spain fell vacant, on the death of its childless old king, Charles II., the Allies resolved to place thereon an Austrian prince-the Archduke Charleswho, being a younger cadet of the House of Hapsburg, had no apparent prospect of inheriting the dominions of his race. Louis stoutly resolved to maintain the rights of his grandson Philip, whose descent from the Spanish royal family was direct, and thus far superior to that of his rival.

4. After several years of bloodshed, and many terrible battles, it came to pass that the Archduke Charles, contrary to all expectation, succeeded to the Austrian dominions and the Empire as well, so that the Allies were placed in the absurd predicament of contending for the very same object which they had begun a war to prevent, namely, the union of Spain and all her vast dominions with those of another European power of the first rank. The splendid series of their brilliant victories, therefore, simply ended in a fiasco; they were fain to accept the French king's grandson as the King of Spain, although they bound him down by such conditions as were calculated to act as safeguards against the dangers to which, in their opinion, Europe would be exposed by his accession.

5. These conditions broke up the old Spanish monarchy in Europe, and gave great offence to the Spanish people. The consequence was that when the country began to recover itself, under Cardinal Alberoni, resolute attempts

were made to restore the former dominion, and it was only through the firm alliance of England and Holland, with whom France also acted, under a temporary feeling of irritation against Spain, that another general war did not break out in Europe. One of the baits held out by this country to induce Spain to preserve the peace, and abide by the arrangements made, was the offer of Gibraltar.

6. The retention of this fortress by England had irritated the Spaniards more than even the dismemberment of their monarchy, and their statesmen constantly proclaimed their determination to have no settled peace with this country until it was restored. This obstacle to a friendly intercourse was keenly felt by General Stanhope, when he became Minister in 1717; and, as he had contracted kindly feelings towards the Spaniards during his residence as a prisoner of war among them, he was not indisposed to meet their wishes.

7. It should be noted here that, if we judge the case even by the standards of that day, England had no justification whatever for not restoring Gibraltar to its natural owners on the conclusion of hostilities. The war had not been brought about by any, differences with Spain, or by any injuries she had wrought upon our commerce. The sole object of the Allies was to prevent the country falling into the hands of the French Bourbons, an object in which they failed, as was before said. England obtained some compensation for the sacrifices she had made, in the acquisition from France of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Hudson's Bay, and other American settlements; while she received from Spain the island of Minorca, and some valuable commercial privileges for her South American traders. These rewards might have sufficed her at the time, without keeping her foot upon the soil of a free and high-spirited people, against whom she had no alleged cause of grievance.

8. Such ideas of regard for the honour and sensitiveness of nations were, however, beyond the ken of statesmen in the early years of the eighteenth century, if they are not even too lofty for those of our own time. Stanhope's project, therefore, of surrendering Gibraltar to its rightful owners, was not based upon such Utopian principles. He considered the place to be of small value to England, while the Opposition in Parliament was always complaining of the "useless charge" of the "barren rock," and the increase which its garrison made to our standing army.

9. To ensure a clear understanding about the matter, Stanhope went over to Madrid to treat with Alberoni in person. His proposal was that Spain should join in a quadruple alliance with the three Allies already named, and give her final and formal consent to the distribution of her European territories, as settled by the Congress of Utrecht. And in return for this he was prepared to exchange Gibraltar for an equivalent of Spanish territory in the New World, Florida being suggested.

10. The utmost secresy was observed in these negotiations, for although Stanhope's colleagues, as well as the king, their master, fully approved of the exchange, it was felt that the transaction would not be favourably regarded by the nation at large. In a letter written soon after this Madrid journey, Stanhope, being then at Paris negotiating with the French Government about the matter, acknowledges this public feeling to Sir Luke Schaub, the British Minister at Madrid. He writes:-"We have made a motion in Parliament relative to the restitution of Gibraltar, to pass a Bill for the purpose of leaving to the king the power of disposing of that fortress for the benefit of his subjects. You cannot imagine the ferment which the proposal produced. The public was roused with indignation on the simple suspicion that at the close of a successful war, so unjustly

begun by Cardinal Alberoni, we should cede that fortress. Many libels were published to alarm the nation. . . We were accordingly compelled to yield to the torrent, and to adopt the wise resolution of withdrawing the motion, because if it had been pressed it would have produced a contrary effect to what is designed, and would perhaps have ended in a Bill which might for ever have tied up the king's hands. Such being the real state of this business, you will endeavour to explain to the Court of Madrid that if the King of Spain should ever wish at some future day to treat concerning the cession of Gibraltar, the only method of succeeding would be to drop the subject for the present."

11. The ambassador's task was not an easy one. The King of Spain had joined the Quadruple Alliance, and dismissed his restless minister, and he expected his reward in return. To calm his irritation it was then agreed that the question of a fair exchange should be referred to a Congress which was about to assemble at Cambray, for the satisfactory settlement of all the differences which had sprung from the treaty of Utrecht in the short space of six

years.

12. But before this Congress met, it was considered to be an essential point by the British Ministry that both England and Spain should go into it with a settled arrangement, satisfactory to both parties, and that the other powers should not have the opportunity of discussing the question. The letter in which Stanhope explains his views is a most remarkable one, and points with significant aptness to the negotiations which have occupied the public attention since the commencement of the current year. The letter is dated from Hanover, where Stanhope was residing in attendance on the king. It is written in French, for the convenience of George I., who did not understand English, and is addressed to Mr. Secretary Craggs, in London, with a request that he

would lay it before the Lords Justices, who acted as Regents during the king's absence.

Monsieur,

A Hanovre, ce 1 Octobre, 1720.

A mesure que le Congrès de Cambray approche et que le Roi considère le tour que prennent les affaires de l'Europe, sa Majesté se persuade que ses intérêts et ceux de la nation exigent, que ce que nous pouvons avoit à régler avec l'Espagne, soit réglé avant ce Congrès, ou de manière, au moins, que les demandes respectives entre nous et l'Espagne n'y puissent pas être discutées. Sa Majesté croit que rien ne nous est plus essentiel, à tous égards, que de ne laisser aucune prise sur nous aux autres Puissances qui assisteront au dit Congrès. La France, jalouse de notre commerce, s'intriguerait à nous rendre difficiles les choses les plus claires, lorsque nous viendrions à en traiter sous ses yeux; et il est fort à présumer, qu'elle s'efforcerait à nous susciter bien d'autres embarras, si elle voyait jour à nous commettre avec l'Espagne. Nous avons contenu jusqu'à présent le Régent; mais il ne nous a ménagé qu'autant qu'il craignait pour lui-même; et au milieu des démarches publiques de bonne foi que nous lui extorquions, il n'a cessé de travailler sous main à détourner de dessus lui les vues du Roi d'Espagne en lui présentant d'autres objets. Nous devrions naturellement faire fond sur l'Empereur. Mais non-seulement il ne croit point nous devoir de la reconnaissance pour les secours que nous lui avons fournis en vertu de nos engagemens; il paraît même nous savoir mauvais gré d'avoir plus figuré que lui en le sauvant et ajoutant la Sicile à ses autres états. Il en use mal avec nous dans le Nord. Il se cache à nous de ses inten ions, et élude nos instances, tantôt sous un prétexte, tantôt sous un autre. Il fait même des démarches qui le feraient plutôt croire dans les intérêts du Czar, que dans les nôtres. Nos liasons avec les Puissances Protestantes lui font ombrage; et tandis qu'il reste spectateur tranquille de nos embarras dans le Nord, quelque urgent intérêt qu'il ait à y prendre part, peut-être verrait-il volontiers qu'il nous en survint dans le Sud, afin que nous en fussions moins en état de soutenir les Protestans opprimés dans l'Empire.

Non-seulement traiterions nous avec beaucoup de désavantage au Congrès de Cambray; mais nous y perdrions aussi tout notre poids, en ce que les autres Puissances traiteraient ensemble, s'il fallait que nous eussions recours à elles pour nos propres affaires.

Mais s'il nous est essentiel d'arrêter incessament avec l'Espagne tout ce qui doit entrer dans notre paix particulière avec elle, sans en

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