acknowledged truth, it is through inadvertence. People may be very strongly attached to certain doctrines, which, if followed out in their obvious bearings, amount to a denial that God is good to all, in any possible way. What we wish to say is, that, even in such a case, they still do not mean to deny it; they are not aware that they deny it; they would be shocked at the thought of doing so.

There are those who hold that God created some of mankind for endless damnation, or predestined them to that doom before they were born. But they also maintain that God is good to these reprobates, in this life at least. They expatiate on the many blessings he bestows upon this class; they say that he makes his sun to rise on the evil as well as on the good, that he sends his rain on the unjust, that he lengthens out their unprofitable lives, and in mercy long forbears to cut them off; that he makes them enjoy their term of mortal existence while it lasts, filling their hearts with food and gladness. All these favors, it is said, he extends even to reprobates as well as to others; and this fact is regarded as proof that God is good to them, at least for the present. Again, there are those who hold the doctrine of endless misery on the ground of our free-will, denying that there is any foreordination, or decree, to this effect. They believe that God created all for future blessedness, but that some will be eternally punished, through their own fault alone. They, too, hold that God is good to these incorrigible ones. It is pleaded that he was good to them in giving them an existence, because he meant it for their good, howsoever it may actually result; that, when they had sinned, it was in infinite mercy that he provided a Saviour for them, though they may not accept him; the most affecting appeals are made on his astonishing forbearance. and compassion in granting them a day of probation, and in pleading with them, by his spirit, to repent and secure their everlasting welfare.

In short, no Christian will allow it to be disputed that, in some way, God is good to all, though there may be a wide difference on the more definitive questions, How long will this continue to be the case? and in what re

spects, and in what degree, is his universal goodness exerted?

For various reasons, it is important that we should distinctly recognize this unanimity among Christians, as far as it goes. Though somewhat indefinite, it is a common centre in which our religious sympathies can mingle to a certain extent. It serves also as a mutual ground on which our views meet, and from which we start together in forming our several dogmatic systems.

Now taking this fundamental truth, in which all Christians agree, we shall regard it as one of the fixed points in theology, which must not be disturbed, and with which all other opinions must be brought into harmony. Letting it stand simply in the form in which it is universally received, namely, that God is good to all, and keeping it separate from all further definitions, we will try to take its bearings on the common doctrine of endless misery. We think it will appear that this doctrine is absolutely irreconcileable with the truth, that God is good to all, in any sense. To us there seems to be so direct and complete a repugnance between the two, that if we adopt the one in any of its forms, we must reject the other in all its forms. We have thought much on the subject, and, as we trust, with candor, and with an earnest desire to see the matter just as it is. For this purpose, we have sometimes imagined to ourselves the case of one who was to be miserable forever; and then we have sought for some place in the course of his existence, for at least one single spot, in it, here or hereafter, where it would be possible for the divine goodness to come in; and we find that there is no such spot.

Let us go back to the commencement, and begin with man's creation; let us follow him onward, step by step, through the successive stages of his existence. Suppose that God created some who will be forever miserable,say, if we please, through their own fault. But here is a question that we cannot put aside: Did the Creator know, beforehand, that such would be their end, if he brought them into being? We are obliged to answer, Yes; he foresees the end from the beginning; and if such will be their end, he saw it, then, as plainly as he ever will,

And now comes the closing question: Under these circumstances, was it, on his part, an act of goodness to them, to bring them into existence? Was it kind in Him to create them, forseeing at the same time what the result would be? It was optional with him to give them being, or to forbear. Now, we certainly know that, in such a case, it would be mercy not to create them. Indeed, greater cruelty can not be conceived of, than, with such a foresight, to call them up from unoffending non-existence, and to send them forth into the hazards that were sure to ruin them forever. There is no possible way to question this conclusion, short of denying the infinite knowledge of the Creator, and to say that he did not foresee the issue of what he was doing.

We are aware of a reply, sometimes made, that his knowing what their end would be, did not oblige them to incur it. We grant this; but we do not see that it has any thing to do with our present subject. The point of inquiry now before us, is, with respect to the goodness of God towards these miserable castaways, in creating them, and not with respect to their folly, which is another matter. Admit, without examination, all that we ever heard pleaded on this ground, that he gave them free-agency enough to shun the final doom, though he still knew that, as matter of fact, they would not shun it. Admit that he warned them of the danger, that he opened a way of escape, and entreated them to turn. It may be said that, if they persist in the face of all this, and rush with open eyes into eternal perdition, the blame is theirs. Certainly; we grant, at least, that they would be to blame. We are not trying to take off from them their share of the folly and guilt. But what we wonder people do not see, is, that all this does not in any way alter the case with respect to the part imputed to their Creator. It does not go to show that, in consideration of their subsequent perversity, he would be good to them in bringing them into an existence which he knew would be wretched for ever. This plea of free-agency abused by man, and of gracious opportunities neglected by him, may indeed serve to condemn the creature; and were his character, or his deserts, the subject of inquiry here, the plea would be in place.

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But it is out of place, when we are considering what preceded, and was independent of, all human agency,-we mean the divine act of creation. Here, it can serve only to call off attention from the fundamental truth proposed, and to make us overlook its bearings, by turning our thoughts to a foreign matter,-to the part that man has acted. We must remember, also, that to criminate the creature ever so deeply, does nothing towards proving the goodness of any original disregard of his welfare. Let us illustrate the case. Suppose I awaken a little child from his innocent sleep, and send him forth on a perilous way, full of covered pit-falls, and beset with fatal precipices on each side, where a false step would plunge him to a horrible death, as it is said that a wrong course in human life will plunge us into endless woe. Suppose that I warn the child of all the dangers, give him maps of the narrow path, and every means of guidance; and that if he only use them as he may, and heed my directions, turning this corner, and shunning that half-concealed abyss, till he reaches the end, he will be safe. But suppose, at the same time, that, when I send him forth, I am so well acquainted with the heedlessness, and presumption, and impulsive temper, of the little creature, as to know, with moral certainty, that he will not go a dozen steps before he forgets every thing I told him, and that in the chase of butterflies he will stumble over the edge, and be dashed in pieces. And it turns out so; it is just what I expected; it is what I foresaw from the beginning. Now, the child was a free-agent in the same sense that we are, and he was to blame that he did not take better care; but does this excuse me? And what would be thought of my sincerity, should I have the hardihood to pretend that I was good to the child, in calling him up from his slumber, on such an errand! even though I had offered ever so magnificent a reward to him, in case of success,— knowing all the while that destruction, and not success, awaited him. There is not a plainer principle in morals, than that the expected result of a deliberate and voluntary act determines what is the nature of the motive. And if it were a fact, that our Heavenly Father had created any in clear knowledge that they would be wretched for ever, no piety could suppress the conviction that he was not

good to them in so doing. Yet, this is what the doctrine of endless misery asserts that he has done.

It is not in their creation, then, that any goodness is shown them. Let us look onwards, and see whether it is to be found in any subsequent stage of their existence. It is not uncommon to hear declamations on the astonishing mercy and long-suffering of God, in sparing the lives of that numerous class, who are supposed to be making their eternal perdition sure. But according to the doctrine in question, the longer they are suffered to live in this world, the greater will be their misery hereafter. They are heaping up wrath to themselves; and they are preserved, with this fact in clear view. It cannot be pretended that they are spared in hope that they will repent; for it is known that they will not repent. Is it any mercy to them, thus to prolong their probationary career? It is said that, every year, day, and hour, they are adding to the weight which will sink them deeper in the pit of everlasting despair. It is a horrible thought! and if true, it certainly is not good for them to live; better for them, altogether better in this case, to cut them off, in mercy, as soon as they are born, and prevent the accumulation of wrath. To protract their lives, under such conditions, is like neglecting to call a child to account, in order that he may grow wicked enough to require tenfold punishment in the day of retribution. And, in the supposed case, the punishment is endless.

Will it now be said that God may be good to such a class, in giving them at least the comforts of this life,health, prosperity, friends, social advantages, sunshine, rain, and other worldly enjoyments? It might indeed seem so, were it not for a further consideration that here comes into view, we mean, their responsibility for the gifts thus bestowed. Where much is given, much is required. Now, according to the doctrine of universal salvation, this responsibility belongs to the system of discipline that is always working to their good; but, according to the doctrine of endless misery, it will only aggravate their eternal woe. Not one of those favors, so called, not a glimpse of sunshine that breaks for a moment into the darkness of their lot, but will be called up against them, as an additional item in their condemnation, at that bar.