CHAPTER XII.

From the 5th of June to the 3d of July 1796.

Causes of Bonaparte's return to Milan, and to the right bank of the Po-The quarrel with Rome-Armistice with Naples-Alarm of the Pope-The executive commissaries-The extent of their powers-The Directors adopt the policy of Bonaparte-His occupations at Milan-Converts the blockade of the castle into a siege-His correspondence-His attention to the family of general Laharpe-Insurrection of the Imperial Fiefs-Atrocities of the Barbets-Suppressed and punished-Bonaparte writes to the Senate of Genoa-The Senate promises to comply with his demands-His proclamation to the inhabitants of the Tyrol-He dismantles the fort of FuentesThe expeditions to Bologna, and Leghorn-He goes to Modena-Reduces the fort of Urbino-Enters Bologna-Releases the cardinal legate on his parole-An example of ecclesiastical honour-Disposition of the Bolognese -Their reception of Bonaparte-The Spanish Jesuits-Overtures of the Pope-Armistice of Bologna-Faux pas of the commissaries-Bonaparte joins the column of general Vaubois-The armistice of Brescia ratified— Bonaparte writes to the Grand Duke of Tuscany-Marches upon LeghornArrests the Tuscan governor-The English cruisers, and merchant vessels escape from the harbour-The English merchandize seized-Vaubois appointed governor of Leghorn-Bonaparte visits his relative the AbbéRepairs to Florence-Dines with the Grand Duke-Visits the galleries of the Fine Arts, and of Anatomy-The castle of Milan surrenders-Bonaparte returns to Bologna-Thence to Roverbello-Revolt of Lugo-Suppressed by Augereau.

The affairs which engaged Bonaparte's attention during this second occasion of absenting himself from the front of his army, are deserving of attention, as much on account of their multiplicity, as of their importance. The time proposed for his absence

was of necessity short; for the fragments of Beaulieu's force were gathering strength from the accession of recruits and detachments in the Tyrol; and Wurmser who was about marching his columns from the Rhine, might be expected to be felt on the Adige, as early as the middle of July. This interval of four or five weeks during which the main action of the campaign was to be suspended, it was the purpose of the French general to employ it despatching the series of secondary matters, which had been brought by the instructions of his government and the progress of his arms, within the sphere of his duty; and which weighty, various and complicated as they were, he appears to have transacted, with as little difficulty as their narration will require.

Among the most urgent of these intervening objects, was the necessity of securing the rear of his army from annoyance on the part of Rome and Naples, before his front should be again engaged with the Austrians. From the moment of Basseville's unatoned murder, an open rupture had existed between the French republic and the Papal government; although, the want of means on one side and of opportunity on the other, had hitherto prevented actual hostilities. Nevertheless the Pope had not failed to employ the arms peculiar to his office, the weapons of superstition, in seconding the more palpable strength of the coalition, denouncing with sanctimonious horror, the progress and objects of the French revolution, and calling on the faithful, time after time, to defend from one common demolition, the thrones of Princes and the altars of God. The thunders of the Vatican, having almost exhausted their force in the dark ages and the incipient stages of the reformation, no longer struck statesmen with perplexity and nations with awe. Still, the exhortations of the head of the catholic church, were not without influence on the kings and people of Europe, emboldening their hostility, or discouraging their favour, towards the new republic. This influence, which was naturally strongest in Italy, was most authoritative in the southern states of that peninsula, which were darkly shaded by the wing of superstition, and remotely secluded from the general intelligence of Europe.

The temporal power of the Pope was so much more circumscribed even than his declining spiritual sway, that, sharing the alarm and following the examples of the Dukes of Parma and Modena, he would probably have made overtures for peace to Bo

naparte, upon learning that he had entered Milan, but for the encouragement and support of the Neapolitan cabinet; which was in a great measure directed by the passions of the queen, a sister of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette.

The kingdom of the Two Sicilies, though not large, was fertile and populous; so that besides the contingent of cavalry furnished to the Austrian army, the king was able to bring into the field, fifty thousand infantry at least. His geographical position at the foot of Italy, while it very much shielded him from an enemy on the Po, gave him certain facilities of annoying that enemy by expeditions directed through the Roman states. But events of a political and military character were now in progress, which were calculated to effect a thorough change in the policy of Naples, and to strike from the rash but trembling hand of the Pontiff, this staff of support.

The Neapolitan cavalry had participated in the numerous defeats suffered by the Austrian army, and being generally thrown into the rear to break the pursuit of the French grenadiers, had been subjected to a full proportion of the loss and discouragement, which fell to the lot of the vanquished. These mortifying disasters, so different from the promised pleasures of a successful inroad into France, while they rebuked severely the pride of the troops, abated sensibly the confidence of their monarch. The Spanish government at the same time, continued its exertions to detach Naples from the coalition, being naturally anxious to fortify the side which it had almost espoused in the great European quarrel, and to bring the policy of a kindred throne into accordance with its own. While these causes were strongly operating to dispose the cabinet of Naples to peace, the battle of Borghetto, in which half the Neapolitan cavalry was captured or destroyed, took place, and gave them a decisive effect. The feeble king, finding at last that the counsels of hope and of resentment were equally desperate, despatched the prince Belmont Pignatelli, to the headquarters of Bonaparte, with instructions to propose as a preliminary to the conclusion of peace, an immediate suspension of hostilities. The prince in coming from Milan, to which capital he had first repaired, met Bonaparte on his way thither at Brescia; and after a conference, which was neither tedious nor unfruitful, signed an armistice on the 5th of June. The conditions, besides the essential one of an immediate cessation of arms, provided that the

king should send envoys to Paris, to treat for peace, and should withdraw his cavalry, now reduced to two thousand four hundred, from the Austrian army, and place it in quarters around Brescia. This condition seemed to offer a good assurance for the faith of Naples, in as much as should the King refuse to ratify the treaty which might be concluded at Paris, his cavalry would be at the mercy of the French army.

But besides securing these advantages, and detaching from the enemies of France, the only remaining branch of the family of her exiled kings, this convention, by insulating the holy see and exposing it unassisted to the whole force of the French army, accomplished, at the very outset of Bonaparte's excursion, one of the chief objects for which it was undertaken.

The change of policy on the part of Naples, though suddenly adopted, was, it would appear, not concealed from Pius the 6th, who as suddenly altered the tone of his patriarchal exhortations; and, instead of preaching up a crusade with a view of forcibly reinstating his clergy in France, with that flexibility of principle of which the most orthodox princes are not the least capable, set about fulminating bulls against all catholic priests, who should endeavour to excite or prolong civil war in the Republic (1). Resolved also to try the efficacy of Spanish intercession, he prevailed on the Chevalier Azara, resident minister of Spain at Rome, to sound the disposition of the French commander. From these circumstances it was evident that, in consequence of the convention with Naples, there would be little difficulty in dealing with Rome. But as no contribution had been exacted from the former state, Bonaparte was not without apprehensions, that a proceeding, so much at variance with the wants, wishes, and habits of the directory, would incur their disapprobation. His letter, announcing the armistice of Brescia reveals these apprehensions, by the earnest distinctness with which he explains the solid advantages of that convention.

"You will find enclosed a copy of the armistice concluded between the armies of France and Naples.

"1st. We deprive the Austrian army of two thousand four hundred cavalry, and place that force at our mercy.

"2nd. We take, from the English, five ships of the line and a number of frigates.

"3rd. We continue to break up the coalition against France.

"If you make peace with Naples, the armistice will be useful, as it will before hand have reduced the strength of the Austrian army. If, on the contrary, you do not make peace, the armistice will still be useful, by putting in my power two thousand four hundred of the Neapolitan cavalry, and inducing the king of Naples to take a step displeasing to the coalition. This leads me to consider the military question-can we, and should we go to Naples ?

"For the siege of the castle of Milan, the occupation of the Milanese territory, and garrisoning the fortresses we have conquered in Italy, fifteen thousand men are necessary.

"The defence of the line of the Adige, and the maintenance of our positions on the Tyrolian Alps, require twenty thousand (2). There remain, including the reenforcements on their march from the army of the Alps, not more than six thousand.

"But had we twenty thousand, it would not be advisable for us to undertake a march of twenty-five days, in the months of July and August, in search of sickness and mortality (3). In this interval, Beaulieu would repose and recruit his army in the Tyrol; strengthen it by reenforcements which come in daily; and take from us, in autumn, all that we took from him in spring. Whereas, by means of the armistice, we can impose what terms we please on Rome. For already the papal government is preparing to issue a bull against those who, under pretence of zeal for religion, are preaching up civil war in France.

"From a communication I have had this morning with M. Azara, the Spanish minister, who has been sent to me by the Pope, I gather that he has been instructed to offer a contribution. I expect soon to be at Bologna; would you like my accepting as an equivalent for an armistice, twenty five millions in money, five millions in provisions, three hundred paintings, statues and manuscripts in proportion, and that I cause to be liberated all the patriots who have been arrested for revolutionary acts? I shall have full time to receive your orders on the subject, as I shall hardly get to Bologna before ten or fifteen days. Then, should the six thousand men of general Chateauneuf Randon come, there will be no difficulty in pushing on as far as Rome. At all events, I beg you to rest assured that, when you have once informed me of your decided intentions, they must be very difficult of execution indeed, if I do not accomplish them" (4).