CHAPTER XIII.

From the 3d to the 21st of July 1796.

Mantua blockaded-Massena's attack on the Austrian works-His success, and the satisfaction of Bonaparte-Sickness of the troops, and want of reenforcements - Bonaparte visits Verona, and Milan - Warlike preparations of Venice-Bonaparte occupies all the strong places on the Adige -His confidence-He meets Josephine-Expedition to Corsica preparedThe count de Marsan-Bonaparte returns to Mantua-Failure of his attempt to surprise it—Opens trenches-His correspondence with Josephine -Goes to Castiglione-His correspondence with the directory-Affairs at Leghorn-Bonaparte's dissatisfaction-His letters to Vaubois and GarrauThe Grisons-Bonaparte sends a minister to Rome-His suggestion to the directory-His order respecting the extortions of the army around Mantua -Figment of the aulic council.

From the time that four of the causeways issuing out of Mantua were taken possession of by the besiegers, Serrurier, incapable from the want of artillery of making a serious impression on the place, had contented himself with pressing it by a close blockade. The month of June passed over without his being able to do more than strengthen his posts by fieldworks, at eligible points, and keep the Favorita and the citadel, under the strict observation of an adequate force. At length the heavy artillery from Urbino and Milan began to arrive in successive convoys; so that upon Bonaparte's return to Roverbello, he found the troops of Serrurier almost prepared to commence the siege in form. His presence, it may be supposed, did not relax their spirit, nor slacken their exertions.

But as the army of observation was liable to be attacked by the fresh Austrian forces, it was important that he should inspect its positions; and, returned from a distant excursion, show himself again to the troops. Accordingly, after passing a night in the camp of Serrurier, he set out in the forenoon of the 4th of July for Roveredo; a town on the Adige, a short distance above the lake of Guarda, where Massena, after a successful assault on the enemy's lines, had posted his light brigade under general Joubert.

The Austrians, with a view of closing the passes into the Tyrol against their enterprising enemies, and of defending Trent from a second insult, had constructed with great labour, and fortified with equal care, a line of intrenchments across the strip of mountainous land between the head of the lake of Guarda and the Adige. The fosse was deep, the rampart high, the commanding points crowned with artillery, and huge rocks suspended at other places, were ready to be precipitated on the assailants. Two Austrian regiments and four hundred Tyrolian riflemen defended this strong work, which, as the lake and the river flanked its extremities, they hoped to render impregnable. But Massena, desirous probably of proving that fortune had not changed sides, either because Bonaparte was absent or Wurmser had arrived, resolved upon the daring attempt of breaking through this barrier (1).

At ten o'clock in the morning of the 28th, general Joubert, at the head of four hundred carabiniers, supported by six hundred of the 4th light infantry, moved against the right of the Austrian line, and without firing a gun, passed the ditch, scaled the rampart, and drove the enemy from their work at the point of the bayonet, killing more than three hundred of them. So successful was the attack that, besides two hundred prisoners, Joubert took four hundred tents, with all the baggage, mules, and ammunition, of Lattermann's regiment. At the same time, lieutenant colonel Recco, with four companies of grenadiers, supported by the 11th light infantry, though he was ordered only to make a diversion, dislodged the Austrians from the left of their intrenchment, slew a hundred of their men, and took seventy. The loss of the French was very slight. Bonaparte was delighted with the result of this affair, and so much so with the spirit of the officers and men, that he reported the particular instances of their good con

duct to the directory, with this observation, "Such is the result of the first action between the troops of the adverse armies, since the new general has taken command of the Austrians" (2).

Pleased with the situation of affairs in this quarter, he returned on the 6th to the army of the siege, where he found that a sortie of the garrison against the suburb of Pradella had been repulsed in the course of the morning. The same evening, he made a close reconnaissance of the town, and, during the night, having visited all the posts of the besiegers, he gave orders to the commanders of the several corps, to prepare for opening the trenches without a moment's delay. It appeared that the insalubrity of the season began to be felt by the troops, and that, out of Serrurier's seven thousand men, fifty fell sick daily of fever. In this state of things, the necessity of drawing assistance from the army of observation, became imperative, and he accordingly caused Massena to retire from the position he had so gallantly carried, and to take up a line considerably in its rear, extending from Torre on the lake, to Rivalta on the river.

These facts he communicated to the directory, and urged upon them the expediency of sending forward at once the long promised reenforcements of ten battalions from the army of the ocean; assuring them that while his force, exclusive of the garrisons, which he was obliged to maintain in Piedmont, Lombardy, and at Leghorn, did not exceed forty thousand men, that of the Austrians already amounted to fifty seven thousand (3). So strong was his sense of deficiency on this point that, before leaving Bologna, he had obtained from the executive commissaries a requisition on General Kellermann for an immediate reenforcement of two regiments from the army of the Alps, suggesting that their place might be supplied by an equal number of the local militia, for the pay of which he offered a remittance of one hundred and fifty thousand francs; but the requisition was not complied with (4).

Under these circumstances, his anxiety to disembarrass himself of Mantua, where, while the enemy's relieving force, was constantly accumulating by reenforcements, his own besieging force was daily diminishing by sickness, became so strong that he adopted a plan for surprising the place; and, in order to prepare for its execution, directed Austrian uniforms to be got ready for the grenadiers, flat boats to be provided for their conveyance across the lake, and gun boats, with furnaces for heating shot, to

be equipped, by the 16th, the time he fixed on for the attempt. In the interval he determined to visit Verona and Milan; the first, for the purpose of examining its fortifications and the line of posts on the lower Adige, as well as to observe the approaches of the enemy, and to ascertain the value of intelligence, which imported that Venice was making active preparations for war; the second, with a view of promoting the change of political organization which the people of Lombardy were assuming, and of confirming the influence of his name and arms, to the end that, in the vicissitudes of the approaching contest, the rear of his army and his communications with France, might be free from disturbance. At Milan too he had a hope of meeting Josephine, from whom he had been separated since a very few days after their marriage.

Upon arriving at Verona, he soon found there was ample cause for apprehending hostile movements on the part of Venice. In the neighbouring villages, his soldiers had been assassinated by the peasants, and the Sclavonians in garrison in the citadel, had of late engaged in frequent brawls and conflicts with the French troops in the town. These indications of animosity, connected with the sudden activity which the senate had given to the recruiting service, in their Istrian and Dalmatian provinces, promised any thing but a continuance of peace between the two republics.

He remonstrated warmly with the Proveditore on the murder of his soldiers; and demanding the punishment of the assassins and the immediate removal of the Sclavonian garrison, announced his intention of comprehending the forts of Verona in his line of defence. He sent at the same time a courier to Venice, with a letter to the French minister, requiring him to demand of the senate the immediate discontinuance of their warlike preparations (5). Of these, intelligence had been conveyed to him through an indirect channel, at Bologna, which had occasioned his urging Lallement to be more active in obtaining information both as to the movement of the Austrians, and the intentions of Venice. The senate immediately repeated in writing, assurances of good faith, protesting that their levy of troops was solely a precaution for preserving tranquillity in the capital and the adjacent territory, the population of which was likely to be more or less agitated by the military conflict about to commence within their borders. To give colour to their professions, they transferred the Sclavonian gar

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rison to Padua. This measure, with these explanations, satisfied the French minister; but Bonaparte, as the event showed with more reason, retained his impression that it was their design to take advantage of any reverse which he might sustain. He persisted therefore in his plan of occupying all the strong places on the Adige, and after visiting his posts below Verona, and reconnoietring the country in front, he reported to the directory the result of his observations, and the dispositions of his troops, in the following letter of the 12th of July. "General Sauret, with three thousand men, defends the country from Salo, on the lake of Guarda to the lake of Iseo. General Massena, with twelve thousand, defends a line from Torre on the lake of Guarda, to Rivalta on the Adige, and he defends the passage of the Adige from this last place to San Giovanni, three miles below Verona. The city of Verona is fortified with the artillery which was found in it. General Despinois, with five thousand men, holds the ground from San Giovanni to Ronco. General Augereau prolongs the line of defence from Ronco to Castanira, where there are sluices by means of which all the country below can be inundated. With two thousand cavalry and twelve pieces of light artillery, General Kilmaine is at Valeze, ready to fly to any point at which the enemy may attempt a passage. Porto Legnano, where there is a bridge. over the Adige, is fortified with the Venetian artillery it contained. Independently of the bridges which we have at Porto Legnano and Verona, I am causing one of boats to be constructed opposite the Chiusa, and strong batteries erected to cover it. By means of these three passages, the army will be able to cross the Adige rapidly, and assume the defensive or offensive at the first movement of the enemy. His advanced posts are at Alla and Malsesena, and he is now pushing columns of considerable force down behind the Brenta. At Bassano there are nearly eight thousand men. In these relative positions we have been observing each other for several days. Woe be to him, who shall calculate falsely !"

Errors of calculation it is evident he was not apprehensive of falling into, for he observes in the same letter-" In the course of a fortnight, our situation in Italy will be so decided that I shall be able to execute without difficulty, from point to point, whatever directions you may give me respecting Genoa and Venice. This latter republic," he adds, "is arming strenuously, but I am master of all her strong places on the Adige." Thus confident was he of