be separated from his centre by the whole breadth of the lake of Guarda, and next, to be divided into three corps and directed upon three different points. But in regard to the first charge, it may be doubted whether, in the same circumstances, any other commander would have been more prudent, or would have confined his plan of invasion to the single object of relieving Mantua. Had he done so, and with a superiority of force exceeding two to one, suffered Bonaparte undisturbed in his rear, to meet him at the passage of the Mincio, or to retire at leisure behind the Oglio or the Adda, falling back upon his garrisons and his reenforcements, the defeat of the Austrian general would have been probable, and his censure certain and severe. The division of his right column into three corps, the foundation of the second charge, seems altogether inexcusable. But his capital error consisted in halting at Mantua. Upon finding the siege raised, he ought to have marched instantly to form a junction with Quasdonowich, sending at the same time a detachment from the garrison to pursue Serrurier with orders to detain him on the Oglio. By this mode of operating, he might have met Bonaparte in the plains of Castiglione as early as the 2nd of August, with fifty thousand men against twenty four thousand; which, while Serrurier was at Marcaria, and the detachments of Despinois, Sauret, Guyeux, and Herbin, were employed against Quasdonowich, was the highest amount of force that the French general could bring against him. Instead of this, after allowing Bonaparte to drive Quasdonowich from Brescia on the 1st, he suffered him to defeat half his remaining force on the 3rd, and on the 5th to engage the residue; which, as the column of Serrurier was permitted to fall by surprise upon their rear, "came like sacrifices in their trim," and made but a nerveless resistance.

But the radical cause of Wurmser's failure, was the same which produced the disconfiture of his predecessor; his personal inferiority to Bonaparte. He possessed courage, capacity, and experience, but not a sublime genius for war; and of course, was unable to contend against the original combinations and unexpected designs, which the mind of the French general readily evolved. Mistaking the crouching of the lion for a sign of fear, he was filled with emotions of triumph at Bonaparte's sudden abandonment of the trenches and guns before Mantua. Consequently, every disadvantage which he sustained afterwards, had the effect of sur

prise, surprise engendered dismay, and dismay produced imbecility; so that his spirit was subdued before he exerted his strength at Castiglione; and collapsing under the pressure of disappointment and consternation, he returned a pigmy to those mountains, from, which a fortnight before, he had stalked forth a giant (27). The mind of Bonaparte being superior by its native force to difficulty and danger in all forms and dimensions, was roused to the exertion of greater fortitude and resources, by the increasing exigencies of the contest. The decision by which with one hand he raised the seige of Mantua, while with the other he shivered to pieces the corps of Quasdonowich, must ever be regarded as the most adroit and at the same time most athletic effort of intellectual vigour, of which the annals of war can boast. When its force was, in some measure, eluded by the flight of Quasdonowich from Brescia, his rapid countermarch and instantaneous resumption of the offensive against Wurmser, like the survivor of the Horatii turning back upon his foes, furnishes an example of generous enterprise and skilful audacity, for which no terms of praise convey adequate approbation. His presence of mind when surprised and surrounded by a division of Austrians, in not only escaping but capturing them, though an incontestable fact, bears the appearance of a marvellous fiction. His constant activity, his unwearied vigilance, his energy of purpose, unrelaxed by the errors of Sauret, the imbecility of Despinois, or the cowardice of Valette; the promptitude and manliness with which he headed and handled his troops, were all equally honourable to his conduct and his valour, corresponded with the vastness and excellence of his combinations, contributed to render their success infallible, and being exerted against successive masses and overwhelming numbers, filled the short space of a week, with a greater variety of action and a series of more important results, than are usually found recorded in long campaigns, of celebrated generals and powerful armies.

For seven days of incessant activity he was exposed to the heat of an August sun or the damp of unwholesome dews, his only sustenance a crust of bread from his pocket, and wine and water from his canteen; his only slumber occasional nods on horseback. In this time, besides continual marching and the care of ordering all the movements of his various corps, he commanded personally in three actions, gained as many victories, and deprived the enemy

VOL. I.

19

290

THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. [CHAP. XIV.] of a multitude of warlike and well disciplined troops, equal in number to his own entire army. Yet throughout this toilsome and sanguinary period, his manner, though animated, was never vehement, and his mind, though intensely employed, seemed neither absorbed by affairs, nor oppressed by solicitude, nor agitated with hope, nor tumultuous with elation (28).

CHAPTER XV.

From the 25th of August to the 1st of September 1796.

Blockade of Mantua renewed-State of the public mind in LombardyFirmness of the French party in Milan-Letter of Bonaparte-Revolt of Casal Maggior-Bonaparte's order-Public sentiment south of the PoThe jesuits of Bologna-Proceedings of the Pope-Cardinal MatteiLeghorn-Good conduct of general Vaubois-Naples-Lucca-The Barbets-Murder of general Dujard—Pusillanimity of the paymasters-Letter of Bonaparte-The expedition to Corsica-Bonaparte's correspondence while at Brescia-His opinon of his generals-His soothing letter to general Sauret-Colours presented to the directory-The addresses and answers on that occasion-Progress of Jourdan and Moreau-Efforts of Austria to raise a new army-Bonaparte prepares for fresh operationsArrives at Verona.

The garrison of Mantua, as soon as the siege was raised, had applied themselves to completing the demolition of Serrurier's halfdestroyed works and batteries, and to conveying within the walls the immense train of artillery which he left behind. Wurmser had revictualled the place on his first arrival, and during the halt which he made on the left bank of the Mincio in retreating, had introduced in lieu of the diseased and enfeebled corps of Wukassowich and Roccavina, two fresh divisions from the Rhine, raising the garrison to fifteen thousand men (1). But his precipitate flight to the mountains was soon followed by the unwelcome return of the besiegers to the suburbs, and the painful beginning of a new in

vestment. For although in the short interval of its absence, the division of Serrurier had lost at least a third of its strength, it had gained a full equivalent in reputation, and therefore struck the dispirited Austrians with dismay (2).

If the want of artillery had not rendered an immediate renewal of the siege impracticable, the increasing malignity of the climate around Mantua would have induced Bonaparte to decline it. Wherefore instead of exposing the troops to service in the trenches, he ordered general Sahuguet, to limit his operations to the maintenance of a strict blockade.

This officer lost no time in executing the directions of the commander in chief. As soon as he was joined by general Dallemagne, whose brigade was ordered to reenforce him, he dislodged the Austrians from Governolo and Borgoforte, the two angles of the Seraglio which rest upon the Po; and having succeeded by the 24th of August, in regaining possession of that island and all the exterior posts, he laboured diligently in fortifying his line of countervallation, and in keeping the garrison restricted to their works. Thus situated, the contest subsided from the bloody assaults and combats of a siege, into a trial of patience under the inflictions of the season, which, as the besiegers were the exposed party, fell with more fatal influence on the French (3).

The entrance of Wurmser's columns into Verona and Brescia, and the sudden disappearance of the French from the line of the Adige and the trenches before Mantua, brought into view the latent dispositions of the people of Lombardy. A marked division of parties was perceptible; but the preference of a precarious freedom under the protection of France, to a hopeless subjection to the despotism of Austria, clearly prevailed. In Pavia, Cremona, and Casal Maggior, an important town near the mouth of the Oglio, the imperial party had the ascendancy; but in the country generally, and in the capital particularly, a great majority of the inhabitants manifested a decided attachment to the cause of the French, and professed to regard it as their own. This sentiment was strongly and honourably displayed by the people of Milan, among whom Bonaparte had been oftenest seen, and to whom he was best known. When it was ascertained that the Austrians had taken Brescia, and when it was rumoured that, after defeating the French, they had entered Cassano and were approaching the gates of Milan, a large concourse of citizens,