CHAPTER XVI.

From the 1st of September to the 1st of October 1796.

Wurmser resolves on a second invasion—His plan of operations—That of Bonaparte-He moves against Davidowich-His precautions-Combat of the Sarca, of Serravalle, of Mori and Marco-Death of general DuboisBattle of Roveredo-Defeat and loss of the Austrians-The French enter Trent-Bona parte advances to the Lavis-Forces the passage of that river, and defeats Davidowich-Consternation of the Austrians-Bonaparte returns to Trent-His proclamation to the Tyrolians-Its effect-His prophetic letter to Josephine-Movement and views of Wurmser-Bonaparte leaves Trent, and pursues him down the Brenta-Combat of Primolano, of Covolo, of Solagno-Battle of Bassano-Defeat and flight of Wurmser— Affecting night scene - Mezaros attacks Verona- Repulsed — Critical situation of Wurmser-He reaches the Adige-Gets possession of the bridge of Porto Legnano-Bonaparte endeavours to intercept him—Combat of Cerea-Narrow escape of Bonaparte-Wurmser passes the Molinella— Effects his retreat to Mantua-Augereau retakes Porto Legnano-Combat of Due Castelli-Battle of Saint George-Wurmser defeated and driven into Mantua-The blockade reestablished-Bonaparte goes to Milan— Comparative loss of the contending armies—The trophies of the campaign presented to the directory-Letter of Carnot to Bonaparte.

Marshal Wurmser, unaccustomed to defeat and burning with shame at the disastrous issue of his attempt to retrieve the reprobated misfortunes of his predecessor, lost no time in endeavouring to justify the original preference and continued confidence of his government, by making a second effort for the relief of Mantua. His plan on this occasion, which there is reason to believe was

prescribed by the cabinet of Vienna, differed from the former one, both in the distribution of his force and the direction of his march. Instead of dividing his army into three columns, and invading Lombardy by as many routes, he was to separate his force into two divisions, and to act offensively with one only; which instead of operating on either side of the lake of Guarda was to direct its course down the valley of the Brenta and across the plains of the lower Adige (1).

While the marshal, taking this route at the head of thirty thousand men, was to pass the Adige at Verona, and push forward to the relief of Mantua, general Davidowich with a corps, consisting of twenty five thousand, was to occupy the passes of the Tyrol. Should the French attempt to penetrate these defiles, either for the purpose of recalling Wurmser from his march down the Brenta, or of forming a connection with the right wing of Moreau in Bavaria, Davidowich was to remain on the defensive. But should Bonaparte attempt to withdraw his troops from the upper Adige in order to oppose Wurmser on the Brenta, Davidowich was to assume the offensive, and prevent the project by attacking Massena, or take advantage of it, by moving on directly to Mantua.

As soon as Bonaparte discovered the nature of his adversary's plan, he formed his own, and determined to throw himself first on one division of the Austrians, and then on the other, trusting by the vigour and celerity of his movements, to disable both before either could gain a decisive advantage. Having first routed Davidowich, he was to fall swiftly on Wurmser; the destruction of whose army he hoped in this manner to accomplish, and after effecting his proposed combination with Moreau, to complete what he had left unfinished at Lonato and Castiglione. Leaving at Verona general Kilmaine, who had recovered strength sufficient to return to duty, with three thousand men, composed of cavalry, artillery and infantry, to defend the passage of the lower Adige, and by doing so to cover the blockade of Mantua, he caused the fortifications of Verona on the left bank of the river to be strengthened, so as to be capable of resisting a sudden as sault. The duty thus confided to Kilmaine, who stationed advanced parties in the plain of Verona, and had a garrison at Porto Legnano, was thought to be of such great importance, in comparison with the small force placed at his disposal, that Bonaparte gave him minute written instructions, pointing out the

proper mode of defending his line and frustrating the attempts of the enemy, in whatever direction or numbers they might approach (2).

Having thus thrown in the way of Wurmser's immediate success in this quarter, an obstruction of no little difficulty, Bonaparte prepared to move against Davidowich, whose headquarters were at Roveredo. On the 1st of September, the divisions of Vaubois and Massena constituting the left and centre of the French army, were put in motion. The former broke up from Storo and Salo; Vaubois marching from Storo, around the head of the lake to Riva, and Guyeux lembarking in the flotilla at Salo, and steering his course also for Riva, where after passing the Sarca, the united division was to direct its march to the Adige, and form a junction with the centre. The division of Massena supported by the reserve of cavalry, and superintended by Bonaparte in person, crossed the Adige at the bridge of Polo, and moved up the high road leading from Verona to Trent. The next day Augereau, whose division was yet sore from its toils and wounds at Castiglione, followed from Verona, as the right wing and second line of the army; having its light brigade thrown out upon the ridge of mountains, which command the valley of the Adige, and run parallel to its course.

In this disposition, it is obvious that the left column of Bonaparte under general Vaubois, was on the 1st of September, separated from his centre, by as great an extent of space and obstruction as had, just a month before, divided the right wing of Wurmser from his centre.

. It might seem to follow, that the same strictures which are directed by Bonaparte himself, as well as by less liberal and less competent critics, against the plan of Wurmser's first invasion, would be applicable to this march into the Tyrol. A little reflection however will bring to view important distinctions between the two operations. When Wurmser and Quasdonowich commenced their movements from the mountains to the plain, they were united. When Massena and Vaubois began their advance from the plain to the mountains, they were divided. Each march separated the Austrian general further and further, until on the third day, one was at Rivoli, and the other at Brescia, thirty miles apart. Each march brought the French generals nearer and nearer to one another, until, on the third day, they were fighting

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in connection at Serravalle and Mori, and separated only by the Adige, over which there was a bridge. As the Austrian columns proceeded, they penetrated into open plains, where the effect of a superior force would be more decisive against them. As the French columns advanced, they entered into steep mountains and narrow passes, where superiority of numbers would be of less advantage.

But notwithstanding this substantial difference between the two operations, and in favour of that directed by Bonaparte, he did not think the movement of Vaubois unattended with danger. He therefore sent special instructions to this general, and also to general St. Hilaire, who commanded the vanguard of the division and in whom he placed great confidence, urging upon them the necessity of keeping light parties to a distance in their front, and their artillery and baggage far in the rear, so that if approached by a superior force, the column might fall back a day's march, without inconvenience (3).

In addition to the slightness of the danger to which Vaubois' movement was exposed, and to the great prudence with which that danger was provided against, may be taken into consideration the incalculable superiority which both parties felt had been exhibited in the late contest by Bonaparte and his troops. Animated by the confidence which this conviction inspired, the French columns, winding along under the eye of their great commander, dived into the gloomy gorges of the Alps with no other anxiety than a fierce impatience to meet the foe who was to dispute their possession.

At two o'clock on the 3rd, the vanguard of Vaubois, upon reaching the bridge over the Sarca, found it defended by a brigade of the prince de Reuss, who with the rest of his division was stationed in an intrenched camp at Mori, five miles nearer to the Adige, and who trusted that the bridge would be maintained until he could bring his whole force to its defence. But St. Hilaire relying on the bayonet, attacked the Austrian brigade with a charge so furious, that it was dislodged in a moment, and retreated precipitately, leaving the bridge and fifty prisoners in possession of the French. Giving the enemy no time to rally, St. Hilaire pursued close on their heels, and forced them to take refuge in their intrenchments at Mori.

At the same hour, Massena's advance attacked the outposts

of Wukassowich at Alla, sabred a few dragoons, took their horses and drove their comrades up the Adige to Serravalle. Late in the afternoon, general Pigeon, who was in charge of the light brigade, having reported to Bonaparte that the enemy was in force at Serravalle, received instantly and executed without delay directions to dislodge them. With the post, he took three hundred prisoners. Here the commander in chief, with the main body of the troops, bivouacked; Pigeon pursuing the foe he had beaten, as far as Marco, where Wukassowich with his whole division was intrenched.

At day break, the next morning, the two armies, each consisting of two divisions, were confronted on both sides of the Adige, the Austrians occupying the fortified camp at Mori, and intrenchments in a strong and narrow defile at the village of Marco. On the side of Massena, the attack was commenced by general Pigeon, who at the head of a party of light infantry scaled the heights to the left of Marco. With another party thrown into loose order, adjutant general Sornet skirmished with the Austrians on the right, while general Victor at the head of the 18th of the line, in close column, attacked them by a direct charge up the main street of the village. Notwithstanding the violence of the assault, the Austrians, encouraged by the gallantry of their commander and the strength of their ground, made a firm resistance, and held their position for two hours. At last, under the repeated and headlong efforts of the French, they betrayed marks of unsteadiness in the centre. Bonaparte instantly ordered general Dubois, an officer who had served with distinction on the Rhine, to charge them with the 1st hussars. The charge was bold, brilliant and victorious; but Dubois, after seeing his aide de camp shot at his side, fell mortally wounded. As he lay extended on the field, Bonaparte approached to speak to him, when collecting his last breath, he said: "I die for the republic; oh! let me live long enough to know that the victory is complete" (4).

Wukassowich, though hotly pursued, disputed sternly each turn of the road and point of the mountain, as he fell back upon his main position at Roveredo. Allowing him no time to rest or to rally, Bonaparte ordered general Rampon with the 32nd to get upon his flank, by advancing along the flat between the town and the river; and general Victor with the 18th in column, to charge him a second time in front. These movements