Thus while the general is carefully to abstain from encouraging an existing insurrection in one part of the emperor's dominions, for fear of having to abandon the insurgents to their sovereign at the conclusion of peace, he is called on to excite one in another province of the same empire, although it would be morally impossible to conclude peace, without withdrawing from the insurgents all support or protection.

From this retrospect of the correspondence between Bonaparte and his government, on a subject of frequent consideration and prominent importance, it is apparent that the instructions of the latter on political matters, fell short of the sagacious views of the former, and lagged behind the march of events, as wofully as they did on military affairs; and that in both these main branches of the public service, the surest way to defeat the objects of the directory, would have been to execute their orders. Had Bonaparte consented in May, to divide his army with Kellermann and to march with one half against Rome and Naples, the destruction of his corps and the loss of Italy, would have been almost inevitable. Had he now in October, not only refused to sanction, but attempted to repress, the popular movements on the south bank of the Po, his influence in Italy would, in all probability, upon the imposing advance of Alvinzi on Verona, have been destroyed. But in a few days after his letter of the 24th was written, the renewal of military operations brought into view subjects of more pressing interest, and the succession of Barras to the head of the directory, probably introducing some slight variation of views into their councils, no further objection was ever expressed to the propulsion that had been given to the independence of the people on both banks of the Po. So that the creation of the Cispadan and Transpadan republics was soon completed, under the auspices of the French general, his military policy coinciding perfectly, with the ardent wishes of his new allies.

In the meantime affairs in Germany continued to deteriorate. The successor of Jourdan was found to be of far less capacity than that general (10); Kleber and Collaud two of his best officers had been sent home for insubordination, and Marceau, the darling of the troops, was killed. The directory at one time expressed a hope, that their armies on the Rhine would be able to establish winterquarters on the German side of that river. But

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[CHAP. XVII.] in this hope they were disappointed; the archduke drove them to the left bank, and in spite of the exertions of Moreau, laid siege to the fort of Kehl and to the head of the bridge of Huninguen; two points which, if carried, would expose France rather than Germany to invasion.

THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

CHAPTER XVIII.

August, September, and October, 1796.

Political situation of the Italian states-Genoa forms an alliance with France -Bonaparte opens negotiations with Sardinia for the same object-His letter to the Sardinian minister of state-Its good effect-The king of Naples marches across the Roman frontier-Intimidated by Bonaparte's victories and menaces, he retires-Negotiations with Rome-Broken off at Florence-The Pope suspends formally the execution of the armistice of Bologna-Vexation of Bonaparte-Intimates a wish to be relievedCorrespondence with the directory-They give him full powers to treat with Rome-The indiscreet diplomacy of the French government-Venice secretly arms-Bonaparte prudently dissembles-His good understanding with the duke of Parma―The Grand Duke of Tuscany-Insurrection in Corsica-The English evacuate that island-It is reannexed to FranceBonaparte's satisfaction-His instructions to general Gentili-His advice to the directory-Sickness of the troops-Despair of the sick-Bonaparte encourages them-Makes war on the thievish commissaries, contractors, and paymasters-His remarkable letter on that subject-His strenuous application for reenforcements-- His discontent with general Willot.-His opinions on military government-Strengthens his position by fortifications on various points.

Since the observation of Bonaparte was as perfectly true as it was often repeated, that the face of political affairs in Italy, affected by the state and prospects of the war, changed at least every fortnight, it is time, after beholding two republics rise up in the centre of that still contested country, and under the patronage of France, to consider, somewhat retrospectively, the attitude of the other Italian states.

Genoa, vibrating in her domestic councils between the incli

nation of the people to a fraternity with France, and the disposition of the nobles and their immediate vassals, to side with the coalition; and fluctuating in her external policy, according to the degree in which her fear or her resentment was excited, by this or by that belligerent, had, on more than one occasion, roused the indignation of the French general and provoked the menaces of the French government. At length, on the 11th of September, commodore Nelson, sailing from the harbour of Genoa, cut out a French vessel from under the guns of a Genoese fort in the vicinity, and by that act of violence, excited among all classes, an irritation, which gave a preponderance to the friends of France in the senate, and threw the republic, from her position of neutrality, into an alliance with France. This treaty, which was signed at Paris on the 9th of October, had been repeatedly advised, and was warmly approved by Bonaparte: whose sage and steady policy it was, in opposition to the grasping and impraticable views of his government, to endeavour to reduce belligerents to peace, and to convert neutrals into allies (1).

The treaty with Sardinia, which was concluded in May, by detaching that state from the coalition, and placing in possession of the French army all the great fortresses of Piedmont, had left the king at the mercy of the directory; with little power for external defence, as little authority for internal government, and with no other fruits of the war in which he was one of the first potentates to engage, than an empty treasury, a heavy debt, and discontented subjects. It was the opinion of some among French statesmen at the time, that advantage of this state of things should be taken, to effect a revolution in Piedmont, which would remove all apprehension of disturbance from that quarter, and add to the military means of France, the resources of the dethroned king. Against this harsh and unjust operation Bonaparte protested, alleging that he had not troops to spare for its execution; that it would lead to a civil war in Piedmont, which it would be dangerous to tolerate and difficult to extinguish ; and that it would be offensive to their allies the kings of Spain and Prussia; who could not see without alarm, the French government dethrone with their own hands, a prince with whom they had just signed a treaty of peace and friendship. Instead of depriving the king of Sardinia of his crown, Bonaparte counselled the formation of an alliance offensive and defensive

with that prince, a measure which he affirmed was recommended by the following considerations. It would suppress the designs of the malcontents in Piedmont, and the country being consequently quieted, a division of ten thousand fine old troops might be procured to reenforce his army. The example of the court of Turin in coming into the alliance, would influence the senate of Venice to seek a guarantee for the integrity of their dominions, in a similar connection with France. The Piedmontese troops, united to the army of Italy, would catch its bold spirit, and become devoted to the general who led them to victory; while they would be so many hostages for the good feeling of the people, and the good faith of the king.

His advice in favour of this alliance, Bonaparte had repeatedly offered to the directory in the course of the campaign. At length, having found himself authorised by a despatch of the 20th of September, to open a negotiation in relation to it, he despatched the secretary of legation at Genoa, with instructions to sound the disposition of the court of Turin. His anxiety to conclude a treaty of the kind was so much increased by the outrages of the Barbets, who again infested the maritime Alps with a renewal of robberies and murder, that he was inclined to procure a personal interview with the Sardinian minister for foreign affairs; a wish which, from the importance and multiplicity of other engagements, it was not in his power to gratify.

The king of Sardinia, under the terror of the campaign of Cherasco, having made unmeasured concessions in the treaty of peace, determined to stand up for high terms as the price of his alliance. Pouissielgue the French agent, after a negotiation of several weeks, transmitted to headquarters the project of a treaty, by which, in consideration of an alliance offensive and defensive, and a contingent of eight thousand men, the king was to receive the whole of Lombardy; a cession which would have doubled the extent and power of his kingdom. This exorbitant demand Bonaparte the more peremptorily rejected, that before it was submitted to him, he was apprized that peace with Naples, and an alliance with Genoa, had been concluded at Paris. His letter to Pouissielgue referring to these facts is dated the 25th of October. "I have received your letter of the 21st. The propositions are not acceptable. The whole of Lombardy, for a succour of eight thousand men, or rather five, for they will never exceed that number,