armistice was executed, and when fifteen millions of the contribution in paintings and supplies, were on the point of being paid. Rome is arming and exciting her people to fanaticism; coalitions which wait only for the proper moment to act, are forming against us on all sides, and they will act successfully if the Emperor's army is slightly reenforced. Trieste is as near to Vienna, as Lyons is to Paris. In a fortnight the troops arrive there. The Emperor has already an army in that quarter. Enclosed you will find all the documents requisite to enable you to form a judgment on our position, and the temper of the public mind in this country. Every thing is mismanaged in Italy. The prestige of our strength is dissipated. They count our numbers. I think it necessary, absolutely necessary, that you take into consideration the situation of your army in Italy, and that you adopt a system calculated to acquire friends as well among princes as people. Diminish the number of your enemies. The influence of Rome is incalculable. It was a great error to break with this power; it all tends to her advantage. Had I been consulted, I would have deferred the negotiation with Rome, as I did those with Genoa and Venice. Whenever your general in Italy is not the centre of all operations, you run great risks. This language will not be attributed to ambition. I have been already too much honoured, and my health is so much impaired, that I believe I shall be obliged to ask for a successor. I can no longer get on horseback. I have nothing left but courage, which, in a post like this, is not sufficient.-Troops, troops, if you wish to preserve Italy."

In the answer to this letter, the directors make no allusion whatever to the imputed blunders in their negotiation with Rome, to the health of the general, or to the prospect of his resignation; but they confer on him plenary powers to conclude a new armistice, and even to settle the conditions of a definitive treaty, which, after being signed by the Pope and the French minister at Rome, was to be transmitted for ratification to Paris.

An extract of their letter he lost no time in communicating to Cacault, the French minister in Rome, instructing him to commence fresh negotiations, and to designate Cremona as a proper place for holding the conferences. The negotiations, though renewed with difficulty, and thwarted repeatedly by the influence of cardinal Albani, who communicated assurances from the

Emperor of sending a powerful army into Lombardy, and of furnishing direct assistance to the Pope, had the effect of allaying the religious clamour and retarding the angry preparations of the Vatican, until the great military events which were approaching put it in Bonaparte's power, to bring this long and vexatious dispute to a conclusion (3).

Thus, on diplomatic matters of the gravest character and deepest interest, the opinions and measures of the directory were found to be as mischievous and untenable, as they had proved to be dangerous and impracticable in relation to the political regulation of the conquered or liberated provinces of Italy, and the military direction of Bonaparte's conduct. And on all these great divisions of public service, after pushing the exercise of their authority with pertinacious jealousy, until it verged upon absurdity or terminated in miscarriage, they were forced to rely on the superior intelligence and more practical judgment of their general. The project of dividing his army and subjecting his movements to the control of the commissaries, though formally and repeatedly announced, they were obliged to relinquish, and to devolve on him the absolute direction of military affairs in Italy. Their determination to discourage and repress the republican impulse, which actuated toward independence the Bolognese, Ferrarese, Modenese, and Reggians, they were compelled to renounce for the opposite policy which he advised and instituted. And now, after taking the negotiation with Rome somewhat invidiously out of his hands, and endeavouring to conduct it on their own principles and through another agency, they found themselves necessitated to entrust it unconditionally to his management; thus completing the delegation of all their power in Italy, and in exclusion of the executive commissaries, to a general just twenty-seven years of age. But in all this there was neither intrigue nor arrogance on his part, nor favour nor condescension on theirs; the process being with them reluctant, and with him involuntary; the effect simply of that intellectual gravitation, which, wherever he appeared, brought the supreme direction of men and affairs under his control; had given him the command of the siege of Toulon, the army of Dumerbion, and the forces of the convention.

Though Bonaparte was aware that Venice was secretly mustering all her strength by land and sea, in conformity with the ad

vice of her minister at Paris, and the instigation of the cabinets of London and Vienna, he deemed it prudent to forbear resenting or even noticing her offensive demonstrations; opposing dissimulation to duplicity, and arguing that the ultimate policy of this state would be determined by the fate of Mantua, and the issue of the contest with Austria (4).

With the duke of Parma, whose fidelity in conforming to the specific terms of the armistice and the general obligations of neutrality, was admitted, the French commander was careful to cultivate a friendly understanding. That prince, having occasion to complain of the misconduct of certain agents of the army who exercised their functions in his dominions, addressed a letter to Bonaparte, desiring that the abuses of which he complained, should be remedied. This letter, the object of which was immediately complied with by an order to the commanding officer at Placentia, received on the 1st of November an answer couched in terms that must have calmed the duke's anxiety, and were dictated doubtless by a desire to dispose him to an alliance with France, which Bonaparte had recommended to the directory. "I have received the letter of your royal highness, dated the 24th of October, and I have hastened to comply with your request. It is the intention of the French government to do every thing that is agreeable to your royal highness; and you will find me ready under all circumstances, to furnish whatever assistance or force you may stand in need of. If the agents of the army misbehave themselves, I invite your royal highness to have them arrested. While they sojourn in your dominions, they must conduct them— selves with that propriety which respect for the authority of the prince requires. Whenever your royal highness shall advise me of their delinquencies, I will cause them to be severely punished.

"The good understanding which reigns between the two countries, and the good conduct observed by your royal highness under all circumstances, ought to assure you of the friendship of the French republic, and of its protection against all those who may violate your authority and transgress the laws established in your state."

The grand duke of Tuscany, moderate in his character, and mild in his sway over peaceful subjects, with the French garrison at Leghorn on one side, and the republican congress at Modena on

the other, although on one or two occasions he showed a disposition to increase his military power, had no influence beyond his own contracted limits, and with regard to the war in Italy, was considered a cipher (5).

Meantime, in Corsica, the fame of Bonaparte's victories, had excited the national pride of the inhabitants, and brought into action their aversion to the English. They first refused to pay taxes to the government, and when the viceroy Elliot marched with a party of troops against the refractory district, surrounded him with superior numbers, and suffered him to return unmolested, only upon condition that he should withdraw to the seaports the garrisons he had placed in the towns of the interior, and dismiss from his service his two Corsican favorites, Pozzo di Borgo his secretary, and the younger Colonna his aide de camp. About this time the viceroy had taken possession of Porto Ferrajo in the island of Elba, as an offset against the occupation of Leghorn by Bonaparte; and finding that it would be impracticable with his small force, to put down the insurrection and retain military possession of Corsica, he determined to evacuate the island altogether, and to convey his troops, stores, and property to Elba. General Gentili, who had completed his preparations for a descent on Corsica, and was waiting at Leghorn for a favorable wind, received intelligence of the successful insurrection, and on the 15th, communicated the details to Bonaparte, in a letter beginning with words cheering to the heart of a patriot, "The liberty of our country is restored." On the 17th, this letter was answered by an order to pass over immediately to Corsica, and assume the command of that division. The military instructions contained in this order discover an intimate knowledge of the people and the country, which Bonaparte's short residence in Corsica could not alone have supplied, but for which no doubt, he was principally indebted, to the study he had given to the history of his native island.

By those of a political nature, which were designed to confine the reaction of the insurrection within the narrowest practicable limits, Gentili is directed "to grant a general pardon to all persons who have only been misled; but to cause to be arrested and tried by a military commission the four deputies who conveyed the crown to the king of England, the members of the late government, and the contrivers of this infamous treason; among the

rest Pozzo di Borgo, Bartholani, Peraldi, Stefanopoli, Tartaroli, Filipi," and "that one of the chiefs of battalion who may be convicted of having borne arms against the troops of the republic. So that the national vengeance will fall only upon about thirty individuals, who probably will make their escape with the English. You will likewise have the emigrants arrested, should any of them be bold enough to remain in a territory occupied by the republican troops.

"But above all things, I recommend it to you to execute speedy justice on any one who, actuated by lawless resentment, shall go to the excess of murdering his enemy."

It may here be remarked that his sentence against the principal Corsican traitors, whose number, in a subsequent letter to the directors, he reduced to twelve or fifteen, was in his own opinion likely to be what it actually proved to be, ineffectual, except in so far as it carried out the principles of national justice; and that his order respecting such emigrants as might persist in remaining in Corsica, was intended to be, and so it turned out, nothing more than a nominal compliance with the laws of France, and the disposition of her rulers (6).

The civil administration of Corsica, comprehending the measures necessary to reestablish the sovereignty of France in the island, was confided to the commissary Salicetti, who, like general Gentili, was by birth a Corsican, and who sailed from Leghorn with the expedition. But neither in Leghorn nor in Corsica, was this deputy or his colleague, allowed to exercise any military authority. In a letter of the 1st of November to general Serrurier, Bonaparte, founding himself on the despatch of the directory of the 21st of May, said, "I do not recognize the right of the executive commissaries, to make requisitions on the generals of division. I therefore return to you their decree. When general Gentili who is charged with the expedition, shall apply to you for anything, you are at liberty to grant it; if you think it will be productive of no inconvenience to the service. But never allege as a reason for your conduct, a decree of the commissaries, which in my estimation, is perfectly insignificant. This method of proceeding is too liable to abuse, for you not to perceive the importance of forbidding it. When the commissaries send you one of their decrees, send it back with the remark, that you acknowledge no orders except those issued from my headquarters." At the same time