Such was the rate of union expenditure upon the relief of the poor during the severest period of the distress. The worst had been realized, but that the crisis was past could not then be so generally known as it is now. Making an allowance of thirty per cent. for uncollected rates, it will be seen that the charge upon manufacturing establishments-now to a very great extent standing unproductive -was exceedingly onerous, and equivalent to an addition of thirty per cent. upon their assessment to the relief of the poor. Nor can it be doubted, that upon a fair and impartial review of the very depressed condition of the industry and trade of the cotton district-regarding the severe though temporary depreciation which the value of manufacturing property was at this time enduring, and the fact that these rates were for the most part paid in respect of such property, out of capital and not from profits, or upon cottages from which but little rent could be collected--the honest verdict of unbiased minds will be, that the incidence of the poor-rate was never so oppressive over an equal extent of the kingdom as in the cotton districts during the months which included the crisis of the Famine.

CHAPTER X.

JANUARY--FEBRUARY 1863.

Ar the beginning of 1861, the consumption of cotton in Great Britain was estimated at 50,000 bales per week ; at the close of 1862 it had fallen to 20,000 bales, of very inferior weight. The question of the cotton supply was now all-important. During the Famine, Lancashire has been subject to repeated accusations of negligence of this question. But there is much less ground for the imputation of neglect than is commonly supposed; and this may be said altogether apart from the fact that it is generally the practice of the consumer to trust to the interests of the producer for the provision of supplies. For years before the secession of the Confederate States was imminent, this question had engaged the attention of many of the leading men in Lancashire. They observed how the increasing competition for the American crop had enhanced the price of the raw material, enriching the Southern planters at the expense of manufacturing profits. They had not failed to remember that in 1845 cotton could be bought at 4d. a pound, and that no subsequent year had witnessed a return to that low price. Long since, it had been remarked by Mr. Bazley that mills were growing faster than cotton. In 1847, at the instance of Mr. Bright, a Committee of the House of Commons had inquired into the subject of the cotton supply. In 1850 he had endeavoured, but without success, to obtain a Royal Commission for the purpose of investigating the question of cotton cultivation in India; and from that time to the present the matter had engaged the earnest attention of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Cotton

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Supply Association. Mr. Henry Ashworth, the President of this Chamber, who is deservedly respected as an authority upon the subject, had never been inactive in promoting the establishment of more reliable and extensive sources of supply. For years past he had seen that the growth of manufacturing power was fast outstripping the increase of the supply of cotton, and thereby creating a competition most injurious to the interests of his neighbourhood. In 1857 he addressed the then President of the Manchester Chamber from Cincinnati, predicting that the planter would continue to absorb the manufacturer's profits until the yearly product of America should rise to 4,000,000 bales. It is some proof of how this question of the cotton supply is beset with difficulties and uncertainties; it is some evidence with how little accuracy its future can be predicted, that this increased production should so soon afterwards have been more than accomplished, but without the realization of Mr. Ashworth's calculations. The crop of 1858 produced 4,370,000 bales, while that of the succeeding year amounted to 5,500,000 bales; yet the price of Middling Orleans, which had been 64d. in 1857, rose to 7d. in 1858, and made a still further advance to 7 d. in 1860.

When, upon the occurrence of a deficient crop, attention was periodically diverted to the resources of India, and Government periodically urged to take measures for increasing the production of cotton in that vast dependency, Manchester was always told by those who have no sympathy with the cotton trade, to do it herself—to transplant some of her surplus energy and capital to the soil of Hindostan, and by the unaided exercise of her abilities to raise an Indian supply. Yet it was not from want of will, but from absolute want of the necessary opportunity, that so little progress had been made in this direction by the Lancashire capitalists, when the outbreak of the American war forbade the possibility of further delay. Hitherto it had been a question of price. It was not possible, even to English energy and capital, to revolutionise Indian agriculture to introduce new plants, with improved methods of cultivation-to establish irrigation works, and means of easy communication with the coast-to do all this upon land of which but an unsettled tenure could be obtained,

and at a time when they must compete with a supply from the neighbouring shores of America, already sufficient for the demand of the world,-with a climate and soil equal in natural adaptability to the cultivation of cotton and superior in facilities,-with a long-established system of production, aided by slave-labour, and assisted by a peculiarly ready access to the seaboard. On the other hand, it was not possible for the East India Company to force the native farmers to produce cotton, which, for ten successive years perhaps, must be allowed to rot, in order that in the eleventh it might rescue Lancashire from the consequences of a deficiency in the cotton crop of America. The whole population of the Indian peninsula must have been enslaved before they would have submitted thus to labour only for the benefit of the English cotton districts. Nor had the financial position of the East India Company ever been so prosperous as to enable them to carry out very extensive public works, such as would materially cheapen the cost of production, of conveyance, and shipment of cotton. It was partly for this reason they had called upon private capital to do that which they were powerless to accomplish. On the other hand, Lancashire would not submit to the imposition of a protective duty upon the import of American cotton, such as should make cotton an equally profitable crop to the ryots with coffee or tea or jute; and the inevitable consequence was, that though India had always been a large producer of cotton-second only at any time in this respect to the Southern States-yet her products could not maintain a competition with American cottons in the European markets.

So long as the Southern States could increase their production of cotton with all the advantages they possessed in 1860, and so long as their slave-labour market did not fail them, it was indeed impossible for India to compete with them successfully upon equal terms in the cotton markets of Europe. The cost of cultivation in Broach was certainly less than in Louisiana; but this was as nothing in comparison with the fact, that while one acre of American soil produced 300 lb. .of clean cotton, the production of India amounted only to 70 lb. of very inferior quality; and so imperfect were the means of conveyance that it has been estimated that an extra product of 2,000,000 In

dian bales would require the services of 5,000,000 bullocks and 1,000,000 attendants.

Whether or not India would now become to any great extent a source of supply depended upon the power of the Government to assist in developing the resources of the country, and the continued stoppage of supplies from America. Fortunately for India, one of these circumstances had fallen upon the other. The Mutiny, by a cruel but decisive process, had performed the necessary ophthalmic operation upon English statesmen, and they were now fully awake to the importance of public works. The sequel of this tragic event was the transfer of the Empire of India from the enfeebled hands of the 'Coompany Bahadoor' to the crown of the Great Ranee of the Sahebs,' and for the first time in the world's history, a European monarch reigned over all Hindostan. So it happened, that when the American war gave a premium to the growth of cotton in India, vast sums had already been spent in establishing those means of communication so necessary to rulers who hold by conquest a wide territory with an inferior force. Railways were now pushing their lines across India from Calcutta to Bombay. But want of water is the main difficulty of Indian cultivation, and hence it is that in Dharwar, which is moistened during both monsoons, the growth of the American species of cotton has been most successful. The cardinal faults of Indian cotton are that it is short in staple and harsh in quality; but with the choice of that broad peninsula for soil-with the energy of the British people to facilitate production—with their untold capital to promote its cultivation and improvement-with the assurance that for years to come America cannot be a producer to the same extent that she was in 1860, there is not room to doubt that India will establish a firm and abiding place among the cotton-exporting countries of the world. But the error of that influential class which makes up the English cotton trade, with reference to Indian production, has been one to which a very prosperous and important industry is always liable. They have regarded the world as being composed of producers of the raw material and consumers of their manufactures, and have beheld themselves as the central ornament of this simple design.