the maximum of public spirit.

Monarchy is unsafe,

because the temptations to a selfish misuse of absolute power are so great. Mixed forms of government, that is, modifications of the three simple forms, have been devised with a view to keeping the government in due dependence on the sovereign. Organized communities are possible only when, after supplying the wants of individuals, a surplus remains for public expenses. Monarchy and aristocracy are more expensive than democracy. This is to be taken into account in considering what form of government is best for a given country. Governments degenerate because they usurp the functions of the sovereign people. Since laws are the expression of the will of the sovereign people, provision should be made by law for frequent meetings of the people. The stronger the government is, the more frequently should the sovereign people show itself. When the sovereign people assembles, the powers of the government, its delegate, are in abeyance. Frequent assemblies, therefore, being a check upon governments, are a protection to the body politic. The weakness of states comes from this, that people, instead of performing their civic duties themselves, prefer to pay to have them done by deputy. Public spirit is the life of the state. Sovereignty cannot be alienated. The people, therefore, cannot be represented. It is only during the period of elections that the English people are free. The moment the people allows itself to be represented, it ceases to be free. If liberty is to be preserved, states must be small, for liberty implies meetings of the whole people. Meetings of the sovereign people should open with these two questions—(1) Is the sovereign pleased

to continue the existing form of government? (2) Is the people pleased to continue the administration in the hands of those who are at present charged with it? It is by the approach to unanimity in popular assemblies that we are to judge of the predominance of the general will over particular interests. When patriotism and public spirit are strong, the state is moved by one will. The public interest is not generally hard to discern, if we will look for it. Nor is it generally hard to secure, if individuals are willing to sacrifice their own interests to it. The only law which necessarily requires a unanimous vote is the Social Contract itself. For no man can limit the natural freedom of another. When the state is formed, residence in the territory is to be regarded as a virtual recognition of the sovereignty of the state. All subsequent regulations, passed by the majority, are binding on all, because they express the general will. The minority, therefore, suffers no loss of freedom. They vote against a measure only because they are mistaken as to the general will. The larger the majority is, the greater is the chance that the minority is mistaken.

Nothing so much weakens the state as the rival dominion which priests try to set up. This divides men's interests, and divorces piety from good citizenship. The pure religion of the gospel, excellent as it is, affords no life or strength to the state. One of its main commands is obedience. Its goal is spiritual perfection. It is utterly indifferent to the affairs of this world. The citizenship of the Christian is in heaven. The power of the sovereign in the matter of religion is limited, as it is in all matters, to enforcing what is for the public good.

There are certain "sentiments of sociability" which all, who are capable of being good citizens, must believe in. They are, the belief in the existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, divinity and providence, in the life to come, in the happiness of the just, and the punishment of the wicked, and in the sanctity of the social contract and of the laws. Whoever denies any of these principles must be banished from the state, not as irreligious, but as unsociable, that is, as incapable of being sincerely attached to the laws and to justice, and of sacrificing his life, in case of need, for duty's sake. All religions, the dogmas of which contain nothing which is incompatible with civic duties, are to be tolerated. The existence of a church, which proclaims that salvation is only possible to those who accept its creed, is impossible except when ecclesiastical is to be substituted for civil rule.

With regard to these treatises of Rousseau, as with regard to those of Locke and Hooker, it is easy to point out difficulties of detail. There is the difficulty of securing the freedom of minorities. It is only by a fiction that the present generation can be said to have consented to the unrepealed acts of past generations, or that mere residence in a country can be said to imply acquiescence in the acts and orders of the government of that country. Strictly speaking, Rousseau's principles would demand the establishment of small selfgoverning communities, or of federations of such communities, in place of the existing nations and empires. Still all the treatises are valuable because they insist that the state rests, not upon force, but upon principles essentially rational. The state, according to Rousseau,

combines, or ought to combine, safety with freedom. The ideal state is one in which public interests are directed by a well-informed public will. It is especially to be noticed that Rousseau is not properly chargeable with enunciating abstract propositions about rights of men and forms of government. He asserts, what we should all allow, that might is not right. In his view, quite as much as in that of Burke, the state is justified by what it does for the individual; and he insists, quite as strongly as Burke, that the form of government must be relative to the circumstances of a country, and to the needs of a people. That his doctrines were revolutionary need not be disputed. The immediate practical deduction from them was that the French government had no right to exist. But if we justify Locke and the Revolution of 1688, it is hard to see why we should condemn Rousseau and the Revolution of 1790. The truth is that speculations, such as those of Rousseau, have been common enough in history. They do not produce revolutions, except when they are addressed to a people who are already ripe for revolution. What is truly admirable in Rousseau's political writings is his sympathy with man as man. To such sympathy governments and privileged classes can never be too sensitive. In France it did not exist. Rousseau's humanitarianism ought to have exacted a tribute of respect from one who devoted so much time and labour to the championship of the oppressed in India, and to the advocacy of the cause of the young communities of America in their rightful struggle for freedom.

As yet we have said nothing of the church. Yet the attack upon the church, and the general hostility to

religion, or at least to theology, are prominent features of the Revolution. We must remember, in the first instance, that the church occupied a privileged position in the matter both of property and political power. The most lucrative offices in it were held by men of noble birth who enjoyed the same privileges, in exemption from taxation, that the lay nobles did. The clergy were large landed proprietors, and as such the same odium fell upon them which fell upon the lay nobility. Many of the highest ecclesiastics were notoriously men of profligate lives. They took part in, instead of denouncing, the debauchery of the court. The spirit of Catholicism was in direct hostility to the spirit of the age. The Catholic church rests upon tradition and authority. It had always been, when it had the power, a persecuting body. It still did what it could to stop the free prosecution of inquiry, and the diffusion of sceptical opinions. Amongst those who led the attack upon the church and upon theology by far the most prominent man was Voltaire.* He was a man who knew exactly how to catch the ear of the public. He was, too, always before the world. He was a man of great ingenuity and keen wit. His favourite weapon was ridicule. He was impatient of the intolerance of the church, and disgusted by the frivolousness of the questions and controversies by which it had disturbed the peace of the world. His humanity revolted at the sight of suffering. He was opposed to the church because it divided men's loyalty with the state. He rejected the evidences of revelation. He was convinced, like most men of his time, that man's

* Born 1694, died 1788.