II. To do it with quickness.

Secondly, Men fail of conveying their thoughts with all the quickness and ease that may be, when they have complex ideas without having any distinct names for them. This is sometimes the fault of the language itself, which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification; and sometimes the fault of the man who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would show another.

III. Therewith to convey the knowledge of things.

Thirdly, There is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, when their ideas agree not to the reality of things. Though it be a defect that has its original in our ideas, which are not so conformable to the nature of things as attention, study, and application might make them ; yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too, when we use them as signs of real beings, which never had any reality or existence.

IV. How men's words fail in all these.

First, He that hath words of any language, without distinct ideas in his mind to which he applies them, does, so far as he uses them in discourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification; and how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard words or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge than he would be in learning, who had nothing in his study but the bare titles of books, without possessing the contents of them. For all such words, however put into discourse, according to the right construction of grammatical rules, or the harmony of well turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds, and nothing else.

Secondly, He that has complex ideas, without particular names for them, would be in no better case than a bookseller, who had in his warehouse volumes that lay there unbound, and without titles; which he could therefore make known to others only by showing the loose sheets, and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas, which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them; and so is fain often to use twenty words, to express what another man signifies in one.

Thirdly, He that puts not constantly the same sign for the same idea, but uses the same words sometimes in one, and sometimes in another signification, ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as fair a man, as he does in the market and exchange, who sells several things under the same name.

Fourthly, He that applies the words of any language to ideas different from those to which the common use of that country applies them, however his own understanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by such words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known, and easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them; yet standing for other ideas than those they usually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the minds of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus uses them.

Finally, He that imagines to himself substances such as never have been, and fills his head with ideas which have not any correspondence with the real nature of things, to which yet he gives settled and defined names, may fill his discourse, and perhaps another man's head, with the fantastical imaginations of his own brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.

CONSEQUENTIÆ.

INTRODUCTION.

HAVING introduced those practical principles of the mind, and language, which may be considered useful for those who wish to acquire a knowledge of the same, I shall proceed to draw such inferences from them, as shall tend to substantiate the mode of acquiring a good style of writing and of thinking by transcription; first, however, stating the system, which I would advocate.

Each inference will be headed with the chapter from which it is drawn; so that one may be considered as a part of the other.

SYSTEM.

In the first place,

Let every scholar attentively read his Lesson, requiring his particular attention, to the punctuation, orthography, choice of words, structure of sentence, &c.

In the second,

Require a transcription of the sentiments contained in the lesson, in the scholar's own words.

-And in the third,

Exercise the memory of the scholar, by requiring him to restore the chapter to its original form.

That the principles of this system have been known and practised by the most learned, there is no question, for we not only have instances in Voltaire, Demosthenes,

and Franklin, but in others. In many numbers of the Spectator we see this principle supported, as being the most reasonable and natural. On this principle, though in another branch of education, is Sheridan's " Lectures on Elocution" predicated. (A book which I did not have the pleasure of reading, till after this was finished.—A remark, which, in justice I owe to myself, as there is in some cases a very clear coincidence of sentiments.)

Dr. Beattie it seems was well aware of the utility of such exercise. He says: "To transcribe literally from books is of little use, or rather none for it employs much time, without improving any of our faculties. But to write an abridgement of a good book may sometimes be a very profitable exercise. In general, when we would preserve the doctrines, sentiments, or facts, that occur in reading, it will be prudent to lay the book aside, and put them in writing in our own words. This practice will give accuracy to our knowledge, accustom us to recollection, improve us in the use of language, and enable us so thoroughly to comprehend the thoughts of other men, as to make them, in some measure, our own."

CHAPTER II.

THOUGH much depends upon the natural endowments of the mind, its growth and refinement,

"Yet much depends, as in the tiller's toil,

"On culture and the sowing of the soil.'

I have, to obviate the difficulties usually arising with man, in the comprehension of the mind and its operations, introduced as analogous, the Earth, and the various phenomena discoverable therein, in the bringing forth of plants. It is a point that requires no discussion to substantiate,

that if we do not sow we shall not have to reap,-and moreover, of that kind, whatsoever it is that we sow, we must gather for our harvest. Hence the importance then, of studying the quality of the soil, its nature, and what fitted for; and of making choice not only of the most profitable seed to sow, but the best of its kind. If land be sterile and unproductive, and healthy seed will not germinate therein, the only resource is to chemical analysis: so with the intellectual powers-if they are uninventive and dull in their operations and do not bring forth ideas with ease and utility, the soil is not in proper culture, the seed defective, or improperly deposited, and consequently the product is small, and inferior in quality.

CHAPTER III.

Ir it be true, that our knowledge is derived by sensation, and reflection, it is equally so, that in order to obtain knowledge, it is requisite in the first place, that there should be something to produce sensation in the mind. In the second, that there must be sensation before reflection-for upon the effects of sensible objects, in a great measure, is the operation of the mind denominated reflection- and it is easy to infer, that, as is the particular sensation produced by external sensible. objects, whatever may be their nature, so must be the⚫ reflection of that sensation-the one corresponding with the other. Thus :-If I am a spectator to the execution of a criminal, the spectacle causes a painful sensation; and when I turn from the scene, my reflection on the same is more or less painful, or, as according to the sensation first produced. So with regard to any thing else, whether of an opposite or different nature.