3 becoming worse than ever. nately not a few instances are on record of attempts to blow up houses, and of many other outrages at Sheffield. In the policy of annoyance and vexatious interference with masters, it is unhappily true, as will appear subsequently, that trades-unions have lately become far more offensive than ever they were formerly. But the days when vitriol used to be dashed in the faces of obnoxious workmen, when men at the point of death were brought into court on stretchers to identify the villains that had shot them, when clothes burnt almost to a cinder were produced to show what vitriol had done, when even young women were blinded for life for going against the rules of the union, and when actual occurrences such as these gave a dread significance to threatening letters from the 'captain of the vitriol forces,' dated from nine miles below hell,' and to the rough representations of pierced hearts, coffins, pistols, death's-heads and cross-bones that embellished them-such days, we trust, have passed away for ever. * Even if no higher principle were in force, the members of trades-unions have common sense enough to see that such atrocities inflict incalculable damage on their cause, and on the very smallest allowance of charity, they must be credited with a sincere desire to prevent their recurrence, although their policy and methods may not be so readily exonerated. In point of numbers, resources, organization, and activity, trade-societies have made marvellous progress. Since the repeal of the Combination Laws, a variety of circumstances has contributed to this result. In forty years the industry of Great Britain has made an amazing stride, and the number of workmen has vastly increased. The application of steam-power has caused the concentration of much larger numbers than in former times, and has thus at once given them facilities for conferring together, and impressed them with a higher idea of their strength. The penny-post, the cheap newspaper, and the railway have bound together the scattered companies and regiments of the army, and greatly promoted unity of sentiment and action. And, rightly or wrongly, the idea has gained a strong hold on their minds, that in the distribution of the profits of production labour has not had its due portion, and that capital has been fattening on the fruits that should have fallen more largely at least, to the workman's share. From the very nature But unfortu- | too of the action which trades-unions have taken, they have necessarily tended to enlarged organization and increasing power. We do not allude here, nor shall we in this article, where space is so limited, to those confessedly benevolent and beneficent objects which most trade-societies embrace, the sick-funds and the aid-funds, by means of which they so laudably strive to benefit their members in distress. It is of their economic bearings on the labour-market that we speak, when we say that continual enlargement has been their necessary tendency. For whatever screw-power they can exercise in raising wages and easing labour, is due to the difficulty they cause in the way of employers obtaining labour on easier terms than those which they propose. It was enough in former times that this difficulty was made to exist in the immediate neighbourhood of the employer's work. But in these days, when communication is so easy, when labour can be transported in four-and-twenty hours from one end of the island to the other, it is necessary for the policy of trades-societies that the same difficulty should exist over the whole country; that employers, when they quarrel with their men in London, should find the workmen of Aberdeen and Inverness, of Dublin and Belfast, as stiff and immovable as those who have been working in their yards or mills. Nay more, wider limits must be contemplated than the boundaries of the United Kingdom. The possibility of obtaining foreign workmen on more favourable terms is becoming an important element in the strife, and to carry out in full the policy of trades-unions, it is necessary to take steps for a common understanding and united action among the labourers of all civilized lands. It is no wonder, therefore, that trades-unions should have been strengthening their position in every possible way. The International Congress of workmen held at Geneva last autumn was an important step towards a union much more wide than the limits of a single kingdom or nationality. And when there are heads clear enough to see, and imaginations active enough to fancy, the terminus ad quem of their enterprise, there floats before the mind's eye the vision of a world-wide confederation of labour, an organization that utterly dwarfs the zollvereins, and leagues, and confederations of all past and present time, and before whose overwhelming might, capital, if such a thing should be able to survive at all, would have no alternative but to'stand and deliver.' See Parliamentary Report on Combination Laws, 1824; and Speech of Sir Archibald Alison at Glasgow at Social Science Conference, Sept. 1860. The increasing power and resources of trades-unions since the repeal of the Com bination Laws has been clearly shown by the gigantic strikes which have occurred from time to time in some of the most important and extensive branches of our industry. According to Dr. Watts of Manchester (whose calculations, however, have been challenged by unionists), the great strike of the Preston spinners, which lasted thirty-eight weeks, involved a loss of no less than £627,000. That of the amalgamated engineers cost about half-a-million. The cost of colliery strikes can hardly be put down at less. In regard to the actual number of trades-societies, and the members of each, exact information cannot easily be got. The Daily Telegraph of 28th January 1867 represents the number of associations as having been, a short time ago, 1800 or 2000. The number of towns in which these societies existed exceeded 400. London had then 290 such bodies; now it has probably more. In Dublin, Glasgow, Liverpool, Sheffield, and Manchester, the number ranged from 45 to 97; and it had been estimated by competent authority that the members of each amounted to about 100. The fifteenth report of the 'Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Machinists, Millwrights, Smiths, and Pattern-makers,' shows that during 1865 nearly £28,500 was added to the accumulated fund, the total amount of which, at the close of that year, was £115,357, 13s. 101d. During the year there had been an increase of 3583 members, making a total of 30,978. The expenditure during the year was £49,172, 6s. 2d. The society of carpenters and joiners numbered 5670 members, and had a fund of £8320, 13s. 7d., the expenditure for the year having been £6733, 11s. 54d. At the conference of trades' delegates of the United Kingdom, held at Sheffield in July 1866, there were present 138 delegates, representing nearly 200,000 members. Two things are apparent from these figures: on the one hand, the immense power and resources of the trades-societies of Great Britain; on the other, the fact that their membership is but a small fraction of the total labourers, skilled and unskilled of the country. Much though the bearing of trades-unions on social interests has been agitated, it is surprising how little can be said to have been conclusively settled or placed beyond the reach of controversy. Commonly, when a subject has been long under discussion, there comes to be a general consent on a number of points; either avowedly or tacitly, they are held on both sides to be established, or at least they cease to be objects of contention. In the discussions that have taken place on combinations and strikes, it is remarkable how little there is that on both sides can be said, as yet, to be admitted or established. Whether there is a real call and ground for combinations of workmen, or whether the self-acting rule of supply and demand would not sufficiently regulate the remuneration of labour; whether combinations and strikes have had any effect in increasing wages, or whether wages would not have risen at least as much without them; whether the mass of working men go voluntary into them, or whether they are not coerced by clever agitators, who love pre-eminence and pay; whether or not the labourer has a right to know anything about the profit of the business to which he contributes his share of work and skill, and to adjust his demands accordingly; whether or not courts of conciliation would contribute to the peaceful solution of the differences of masters and men, and if so, how they should be constituted, on all such questions as these, there cannot be said to be anything like agreement between both parties. Such is the mistiness that envelops the subject, that it is almost amusing to observe the differences as to plain matters of fact that sometimes characterize the statements of masters and men when a dispute occurs. One would think it would not be very difficult to agree in a statement as to the wages actually earned by workmen, the rates of pay actually current in a work. Yet in colliery disputes, for example, there sometimes occur, or used to occur, so many deviations, or alleged deviations, from obvious weights or measurements, that very great diversities arose in the statements of masters and men. Thus, in the West Yorkshire coal-strike and lock-out of 1858, Mr. Ludlow alleges that the two statements were irreconcilable, and he accounts for the fact on the supposition that the employer reckoned the ton of coal at twenty-one cwt., both for sale and for wages, while the men asserted that for wages he reckoned it at twenty-five. This, again, would seem to depend on the size of the corves' filled by the colliers, which they asserted had grown 'like an oak-tree out of a sapling,' while the master affirmed that they had undergone no alteration in size during twenty years. * Similar differences in fundamental data have In the chain-makers' strike in 1859-60, no agreement could be come to between the parties either as to what was the average amount of existing wages, the men putting it at less than 158. per week, the masters at 30s; or as to the extent of from 10s. to 12s. for all the higher labourers, the the advance demanded, the masters estimating it men from 5s. to 8s. occurred in many other trade disputes. Nor | pieces. It is easy to say that trade-societies can it be said that there is much to encour- have not the confidence of the working age the hope that the mist which envelops classes, that they are managed by selfish and the whole subject will speedily clear away. interested demagogues, that their conductors The interests, and therefore the feelings, of are utterly blind and unreasoning, ignorant both parties have been so much involved in of the most elementary rules of political ecothe warfare, that it has been almost impossi- nomy, reckless of every ulterior consequence, impossi-nomy, ble for them to take that calm and impartial bent only on obtaining the immediate advanview of the question which is favourable to tage for which they are contending, and that a common understanding; and at the pres- therefore such institutions are unmitigated ent moment, the battle rages with such heat evils. We do not deny that some facts do that we can hardly hope to secure even a give a certain colouring of truth to these patient hearing. We may, however, cherish charges. But in dealing with the subject, the belief that there are not a few earnest we are willing to admit that it is alike untruth-seekers on both sides, to whom views fair and inexpedient thus to characterise the which have been formed after much investi- supporters of combination. We will admit gation and reflection, and which are offered that, with exceptions, working men are in not in the spirit of the partisan, but in that favour of combinations as being, in their of the mediator, will prove neither unwel- view, beneficial to their interests; that the come nor useless. delegates whom they choose generally enjoy their confidence; and that the measures which they devise are those which they consider best fitted in the circumstances to promote the welfare of the class. We will admit that there is some ground, more or less plausible, for each of the positions which trades-unions maintain in their conflict with employers; and we will endeavour to state, as far as possible in their own terms, and in the most favourable way for them, the reasons they have for all that they claim. One thing about trade combinations may be held as sufficiently established-they are a great fact. Whether they ought to exist or not may with some be a question; that they do exist, and have every likelihood to continue to exist, is about as certain as that standing armies and navies will continue ever so long among the institutions of civilized nations. No one seriously proposes the re-enactment of the Combination Laws, or fancies that it would be possible to administer them if they were again placed on the Statute-book. Mr. Edmund Potter of Manchester, though a decided enemy of unions, admits that strikes, as the action and the almost inevitable result of commercial bargaining for labour, will always exist.' Mr. T. J. Dunning, whose pamphlet on trades-unions and strikes is a very creditable specimen of calm and sober reasoning on the workman's side, and who deprecates strikes as a state of moral warfare, and productive of that mutual bitterness which ensues from all war while it lasts, is notwithstanding clearly of opinion, from long experience of their results to journeymen, both of success and defeat, that there is no proper alternative, in certain cases, but the position of a strike.' It were Quixotic, therefore, to raise the question at present, whether there ought to be combinations of any kind. The tug of war must be on their practical administration, the ends they contemplate, and the means they employ for the attainment of these ends. It is to these that we propose to devote the remainder of our article. No good can arise from those sweeping and unqualified denunciations of either side which have been common even in our higher classed periodical literature. It is easy to set up a man of straw, and tear him to The avowed object of trades-unions and combinations, then, is to secure for the workman that share of the profit of production which is due to labour. That labour in past times has not obtained its fair share is inferred by the advocates of these unions from the fact that many employers have made large fortunes, and that most of them live in a style of comfort that indicates an abundant profit. It is not actually denied that the law of supply and demand is that by which the remuneration of labour ought to be regulated. It is rather maintained that the different circumstances of capitalists and labourers prevent that law from operating freely, and from determining equitably what the one ought to give, and the other to take, for his labour. If the law of supply and demand is to work fairly, the pressure, so to speak, on buyer and seller ought to be equal. If one of the parties be subject to a pressure which the other does not feel, the fair action of the law will be interfered with. If the one requires to sell his commodity immediately, but the other does not require to buy immediately, the advantage is on the side of the purchaser. The owner of an estate, or of a house, or of a horse, may sometimes be so situated that he must sell at once, for whatever the article will fetch. But in such a case he does not get the proper ters is regarded as necessary to restore the equilibrium which the union of workmen has disturbed. If a union of workmen be necessary to prevent the individual workman from having to sell his labour at a disadvantage, a union of masters is necessary to prevent the individual master from having to purchase his labour at a disadvantage. The master's union is the result of the workmen's; and the lock-out is the consequence of the strike. We are reasoning at present on abstract principles, and without reference to actual cases, where particalar circumstances may render our logic inapplicable. But undoubtedly there is a point at which the necessity which urges the workmen to unite is transferred from them to the em market value for it. To enable him to do so, he must be in no greater haste to sell than the other to buy. To apply this to workmen and capitalists, labour is the commodity which the one wishes to dispose of to the other. But it is affirmed that singly labourers are not on an equality in entering the market. The labourer lives on his earnings from week to week, and usually supports a family on them, and therefore cannot wait. The capitalist has other means of living, and does not require to buy at once. The labourer is thus exposed to the risk of selling his commodity through necessity for anything it will fetch at the moment. To remedy this evil he combines with other labourers. By this means a fund is accumulated which gives him support if the employers. Some employers, however, compliployer and he differ as to terms, and he is saved the necessity of parting with his labour at a sacrifice. By this means, too, he is enabled to frame other conditions for the disposal of his labour. He believes that he then, and only then, enters the market on equal terms with the employer, when he can say, without fear of being undersold,"Here is my labour, here is the price at which I will sell it, and here are the conditions on which I will yield it.' To place him in this position is the avowed object of trades-unions. Without either admitting or questioning the soundness of this reasoning, let us mark one inevitable result of the policy which it suggests. The individual labourer forms a union with other labourers, and with such success, we shall suppose, that the great mass of his fellow-craftsmen agree to support him, and to support one another in bargaining for the disposal of their labour, and subscribe large funds for the purpose. How does this affect the position of the employer? Very clearly, when he goes now into the labour-market as an individual, the tables are completely turned. The pressure of necessity which formerly was presumed to bear upon the labourer now bears upon the employer. The labourer can now bide his time. But the individual employer cannot wait indefinitely. His capital is limited, and it will soon be wasted, if it be not employed. Or let us suppose that he has certain contracts in hand. Heavy penalties are incurred if the contracts are not fulfilled within a limited time. It is evident that it is he that must now go into the labour-market at a disadvantage, and buy the labour he needs at whatever price, and on whatever conditions may be demanded. Such at least is his position if he act singly, and without combination with other employers. It is therefore in self-defence that he tries to form such combination. A union of mas men. cate matters by combining for the avowed purpose of breaking up the union of the It may be that they are driven to this. But it looks as if the masters claimed to themselves a right which they denied to the men. With the intense sensitiveness of the men as to equal rights, the avowal of such a purpose, sought in such a manner, must be exasperating. Each party has a right to combine to obviate the necessity of going into the market at a disadvantage; but neither has a right to combine to break up the combination of the other. But it is time to advance from the abstract to the concrete. What, in point of fact, is the policy of trades-unions, when they try to make their own bargain,-what are the conditions they impose, or seek to impose, when they offer their labour to capitalists for sale? The answer to this question may be comprised in some half-dozen particulars:-1. They seek to establish certain standard rates of wages, beneath which no employer shall be at liberty to pay his men. 2. To limit the hours of labour, and especially to discourage or do away with the practice of working over-time. 3. To discourage or do away with the practice of piece-work. 4. To limit the number of apprentices. 5. To prevent the employment of non-union men along with or in room of unionists. 6. In certain cases, to oppose the introduction of machinery, or the employment of unskilled labourers in the working of machinery. Other points may occasionally be insisted on, but, speaking generally, we may say that these six embrace the chief demands which trades-unions have been wont to make. In order to sift thoroughly the character and the tendency of these, or any other conditions of a similar kind, it will be proper to inquire-I. Whether or not it be a right thing to trammel the labour-market with any artificial restrictions, instead of allowing a perfectly free trade in labour; II. What the precise merit or demerit is of each of the restrictions contended for, especially as regards the workman, and whether or not, ac cording to the recognised laws of political economy, they tend to secure the end for which they are designed; and III. What their bearing is on the position of employers -whether or not they are compatible with that freedom and self-respect, and with that sense of responsibility for the right conduct of his undertaking, without which the position of a master is but a mockery, and the management of business a worry not to be borne. I. Nothing, it has often been said, succeeds like success; and the marvellous success of free-trade, as recently carried out in this country, has made it necessary for persons who contend for restrictions in any branch of business to stand on the defensive. But it does not follow, as a matter of course, that because free-trade has succeeded in one sphere, it ought to be applied out and out in every sphere. In the main, free-trade is a question of expediency. The only principle of a moral or religious nature applicable to it is, that it is the will of God that the superabundant products or commodities of one region should be readily available for the supply of other regions, and that it is a sin to frustrate this benevolent purpose by artificial restrictions, designed to promote the interests of a class. Now, it will hardly be contended that this principle has to do with this question whether labourers are entitled to place any restrictions on the sale of their own labour. What remains to be pleaded in favour of free-trade is, its great expediencythe remarkable comfort, certainty, quickness, and expansiveness of commercial transactions untrammelled by restrictions. It is this expediency that has received such marvellous illustration in the commercial policy of recent years. But although it is certainly very desirable that all business be transacted with as few fetters as possible, it is not imperative that there be no fetters. In fact, a higher expediency may render the imposition of some fetters indispensable. The interests of public health, or of public safety, or even the demands of national revenue, may be regarded sufficient to justify restrictions in trade. For such reasons the sale of poisons, of gunpowder, and of intoxicating drinks, is subjected to somewhat rigid restrictions. The free-trade expediency is checked by higher expediencies; and fetters condemned by the one are restored at the demand of the other. But perhaps the case of the labour-market itself furnishes the best illustration of the propriety of occasional restrictions in the exchange of commodities. For, side by side with the advance of our free-trade policy, there has been carried out a policy of limitation in the employment of labour. The Ten Hours Act is one result of this policy; so is the prohibition of female labour in certain employments, and of infant labour; so also is the half-time system; and indeed the whole arrangements connected with the public inspection of factories and mines, and the provisions which such inspection is designed to enforce. This is no doubt true; and, under shelter of such precedents, trades-unionists sometimes argue that they are entitled to lay upon the sale of labour the restrictions which they contend for. But before this conclusion could be justified, they would require to make out that a higher expediency than that which calls for free-trade demands such restrictions, and especially that such restrictions are called for in the interest of the public. For restrictions in the interest of public health, or public safety, or public morality, are one thing, and restrictions in the interest of a section of the community, are another. Restrictions of the nature of protection, going to constitute a monopoly, contracting the energies of industry, clipping the wings of enterprise, are those of which our freetrade experience has made us most jealous. Trades-unions would require to show that the restrictions which they propose are not of this character, and they would need to be the more particular in their proof, from the circumstance that our past experience of guilds and other protected industries has not been favourable. Our history shows that it is not in the old seats of protected industry, not round the dull and venerable halls where hammersmiths and cordwainers have held their lifeless meetings, that our modern industry has gathered its resources and achieved its matchless triumphs, but in new, unheard-of places-in Manchester, Leeds, Rochdale, Birmingham by Warwick' (as letters have been addressed within the present generation); not in Dublin, but Belfast; not in Edinburgh, but Glasgow; not in the fair city of Hal' o' the Wynd, but its parvenu neighbour, Dundee. The onus probandi is thrown upon the advocates of restriction, and proof must be brought forward that the measures which they plead for are not calculated to paralyse industry, or to promote the welfare only of one class. The restrictions themselves must then be examined individually, and their true character and bearing ascertained. |