gent representation of this frightful state | the French. They lost ten thousand men of things, the Emperor Alexander took at Malo-Jaroslawitz; they abandoned the the most vigorous steps to check these active pursuit one march beyond Krashorrors, by prohibiting the murder of noi, and yet reached Wilna only thirtyprisoners under threat of the severest five thousand strong. Upon these points punishment, and by ordering a ducat in all are agreed. Should Sir Robert's estigold to be paid for every prisoner handed mate be correct, the Russian army hardly over safe to the civil authority-unfortun- fell off at all between Malo-Jaroslawitz ately, however, with too little effect. and Krasnoi, while it was engaged with and pursuing the enemy; but suddenly after it had given up the pursuit, and was slowly moving on Wilna, it sank.down from eighty thousand to thirty-five thou sand; in other words, suffered a loss of forty-five thousand men. This is quite incredible. Boutourlin's estimate, who makes it leave Malo-Jaroslawitz eighty thousand, reach Krasnoi fifty thousand, and Wilna thirty-five thousand strong, bears internal evidence of probability and truth. Eugene's cross-movement towards Witepsk proved most unfortunate. Harassed by the Cossacks, decimated by the cold, he had to abandon his whole artillery, baggage, and sick, on the swollen banks of the Wop, and soon after learned that the point of his destination was in the hands of the enemy. He then returned to Smolensko, where he arrived on the 13th in the most miserable plight. Napoleon meanwhile had arrived on the ninth at Smolensko, and occupied himself in reorganizing and feeding his army from the magazines there. But no protracted stay could be made. Kutusoff was sweeping round his right flank, and might anticipate him on the Dnieper. Victor and Oudinot had been unable to arrest Wittgenstein's movement, and Tchichagoff was rapidly approaching the town of Minsk, on his direct line of retreat, and where all his principal stores and magazines had been collected. On the fourteenth, accordingly, he set out from Smolensko with his Guard. Eugene was to follow next, then Davoust, Ney to bring up the rear, each upon successive days. The army now numbered about forty-two thousand men present with the eagles, and thirty thousand stragglers. The direct road from Smolensko to Wilna passes through Orcha on the Dnieper. Less than half-way between Smolensko and Orcha is situated the small town of Krasnoi. Through this point Napoleon must retire - upon this point Kutusoff was now marching. Here the two main armies would come into collision, and Napoleon might be utterly destroyed, for he was advancing by successive corps, while Kutusoff moved as a whole, and the latter had fifty thousand regular troops, the former not more than forty thousand. The force of the Russian army we have put down at fifty thousand, being the number which Boutourlin gives it at. Wilson says it was eighty thousand strong. This, however, seems evidently to be a miscalculation. The Russians suffered greatly during their pursuit of Napoleon reached Krasnoi on the fif teenth November with his Guard, and Kutusoff brought his whole army up to Jourowa, on his right, within a short march of that place. He could easily have anticipated Napoleon, but he would not to so, and would only allow Milaradowitch to advance and cannonade his flank. The next day Kutusoff brought up his army to Chilowa, close to Krasnoi, where Napoleon lay; while Milaradowitch, on the high-road between that place and Smolensko, almost destroyed Eugene's corps. On the seventeenth, Napoleon sallied out from Krasnoi to meet Davoust, and offered battle to the whole Russian army. Kutusoff, whose men were drawn out in complete array, waiting with impatience for the signal to engage, would not give the order. Hour after hour passed by. Davoust, severely pressed in flank and rear by Milaradowitch, came up. Gallitzin, who commanded in the Russian center, executed some vigorous charges without orders. But Tormasoff's column on the left, which might have occupied the Orcha road, and intercepted the French line of retreat, was not allowed to stir. In vain Benningsen, from the Russian center, sent aidede-camp after aide-de-camp to Kutusoff to report It was not till two o'clock in the afternoon that he would allow Tormasoff to move, and the general advance to take place. But it was then too late. Napoleon, who had offered battle only to save Davoust, the moment that officer joined him commenced his retreat, and filing rapidly out of Krasnoi, his rear-guard only fell into the hands of his opponents. The French lost in these actions two eagles, forty-five guns, above five thousand killed and wounded, and about seven thousand prisoners, mostly stragglers. There can be no doubt that Kutusoff here threw away a certain opportunity of utterly destroying the army of Napoleon. But he was essentially cautious in disposition; he feared the great name of Napoleon; he would not believe in the exhausted state of the French army; and he distrusted the number of young soldiers and recruits in his own. Ney's corps still remained to come up from Smolensko, and by Napoleon's retreat and the Russian occupation of Krasnoi, it was entirely cut off. Its destruction appeared inevitable. But Ney had a soul which no difficulties could overcome, and no dangers could daunt. He endeavored at first to force a passage. But, says Wilson— "Forty pieces of cannon loaded with grape simultaneously on the instant vomited their fiames, and poured their deadly shower on the assailants. The survivors intrepidly rushed forward with desperate energy; part reached the crest of the hill, and almost touched the batteries. The Russians most in advance, shouting their huzza, sprang forward with fixed bayonets, and without firing a musket. A sanguinary but short struggle ensued: the enemy could not maintain their footing, and were driven headlong down the ravine. The brow and sides of the hill were covered with dead and dying; all the Russian arms were dripping with gore, and the wounded, as they lay bleeding and shivering on the snow, called for 'death!' as the greatest mercy that could be ministered in their hopeless state."- Wilson, 279. That night, (nineteenth November,) Ney, even in these desperate circumstances, disdaining to surrender, set out with three thousand combatants and as many followers (all that remained able to march out of seven thousand soldiers and as many stragglers who had left Smolensko,) and turning to his right, moved through the darkness to the Dnieper. Abandoning on its banks all his artillery and wagons, he was able to pass most of his men on the thin and bending ice, and pressing on down its right bank, after enduring the most frightful hardships in forcing his way across country enveloped by hordes of Cossacks, he succeeded on the twenty-first in joining Napoleon near Orcha. "I have two hundred millions in the vaults of the Tuileries," said the French Emperor on hearing of his arrival; "I would have given them all to save Marshal Ney." Napoleon, who had meanwhile crossed the Dnieper unmolested at Orcha, endeavored to rally his army there, and restore some order to its ranks by means of a regular distribution of provisions from its magazines. But it was all in vain. The stragglers would not rejoin their colors, and the most alarming intelligence came in from the rear. Tchichagoff had captured Minsk, with all its immense stores, and was advancing straight on Borissow, on the Berezina, where was the only bridge by which Napoleon could pass; while, on the other side, Victor and Oudinot had made a joint attack on Wittgenstein, and been defeated. There was not a moment to lose. Setting out on the twentieth from Orcha, Napoleon on the twenty-second received at Toloczin the frightful news that Tchichagoff had made himself master of Borissow, and was in possession of the only bridge by which the deep stream of the Berezina could be passed. All hope seemed now over. The Caudine forts, in all their bitterness, appeared inevitable. But Napoleon's vigor shone brightly out. Orders were dispatched to Oudinot to move by forced marches on Borissow, and endeavor to recover the bridge; while Victor was directed to cover the flank of the Grand Army against Wittgenstein, and when it had filed past, follow as rear-guard. dinot's advanced guard, attacking with vigor, drove the Russians out of Borissow and over the river, but they destroyed the bridge as they crossed, and drew up on the other bank of the Berezina, to defend the passage of the stream, and bar the road to France. Ou Napoleon's position was now all but desperate. In his front was the broad, deep, and bridgeless stream of the Berezina, guarded by Tchichagoff with 32,000 men. Descending on his right was Wittgenstein with an equal force; on his rear hung Milaradowitch, detached by Kutusoff, with 10,000 men; while the main Russian army, which had discontinued its direct pursuit at Krasnoi, lay at Kopys, on the Dnieper. His own force did not exceed 40,000 combatants, and as many stragglers, including the two fresh corps of Victor and Oudinot. His measures were taken with all his early genius and vigor. He fixed upon Studianka, about twelve miles above Borissow, as the point of passage. Thither General Eblé, with all the engineers of the army, was sent to construct bridges on piles. But the whole mass of the troops were directed on Borissow, while ostentatious preparations were made for throwing a bridge below that place. This fortunately entirely deceived the Russians. Kutusoff having got, as he thought, certain information that the French intended to pass at Berezino, on the lower Berezina, ordered Tchichagoff to keep his troops in that direction to oppose them. This drew him off from the upper course of the river, and enabled Eble to construct his bridges unmolested. Oudinot, whose corps now formed the vanguard of the army, crossed on the twenty-sixth. On the twenty-seventh, the main body of the French passed, but Partonneaux's division of Victor's corps, which had been left as a rearguard in Borissow to impose upon the enemy, was assailed when on its march to Studianka, and entirely destroyed. The next day the Russian general, who had now got certain information of the passage, assailed Napoleon on both banks of the river. Wittgenstein fell upon his rear-guard, under Victor, on the left bank. Tchichagoff assailed his main body, and more especially Oudinot and Ney, on the right. Tchichagoff was repulsed after a severe contest; but towards evening Victor was driven back on the bridges by Wittgenstein. At nine o'clock in the evening he passed the river. The two bridges had frequently broken during the passage of the troops, and thousands of the stragglers who had accompanied the army had perished in their endeavors to cross; but when night came, a sort of torpor seized upon the helpless multitude, and nothing would induce them to move. "The next morning," says Wilson, "Eblé had orders to destroy the bridges at eight o'clock, but he protracted the execution for half an hour. cended a wailing shriek of anguish and despair The flames then burst forth, and with them asto the skies. Some sprang forward on the fiery platform, and were engulfed or consumed: some dashed into the river, and, crushed by massive blocks of ice, rolled down the stream, calling in vain for succor. It was a commingled herd of men, women, and children, doing they knew not what, flying they knew not whither, and in All was madness and indescribable woe. their delirium adding to each other's calamity. About nine, the Cossacks darted down upon their prey, and several thousands who were still frantically cleaving to the idea of an escape, found themselves thus forever cut off from all hope."— Wilson, 336. Henceforth the retreat of the Grand Army was little but a flight to Wilna: cannon and baggage were abandoned at every step. The cold increased to such a frightful pitch that the bonds of discipline and subordination were entirely broken in every corps except the Old Guard. The bivouac - fires each morning were marked by a frozen circle of dead men. "The cold," says Wilson, " was intense-the thermometer 27° and 30° below freezing point, with sky generally clear, and a subtle, keen, razor-cutting, creeping wind, that penetrated skin, muscle, and bone to the very marrow, rondering the surface as white and the whole limb affected as fragile as alabaster: sometimes there was a foudroyant seizure that benumbed at once the whole frame, and stiffened motionlessly the still breathing carcass, from which feet and hands were snapped off at the joints with the slightest degree of wrench, but without any pain.”— Wil son, 342. On the fifth December, Napoleon quitted the army at Smorgoni, and set out for Paris. The ninth, the miserable crowd of fur-covered and tattered stragglers, representing the invading hosts, reached Wilna. The next day they abandoned the place en route for the Niemen. Four thousand five hundred men in arms alone were grouped round the colors. Twenty thousand sick, wounded, and enfeebled were left behind in the town. Five miles beyond, a steep ice-covered hill at Ponari, impassable to carriages, caused the last of the guns and the last of the treasure to be abandoned. On the evening of the thirteenth December, Ney, with the rearguard, recrossed the Niemen, and the next day there mustered on the Polish plains four hundred infantry and six hundred cavalry around the eagles of the Grand Army. Six hundred thousand men | commanded Napoleon's line of retreat, he had crossed that fatal river to pour into the Russian territory. แ Thus," says Sir Robert, "terminated the severest campaign of six months on record in the annals of the world. The Russians calculated that 125,000 of the enemy perished in the different combats; that forty-eight generals, 3000 officers, and 190,000 soldiers were captured; and that 100,000 were destroyed by cold, hunger, and disease that only 80,000, including the Austrians and Prussians, repassed the frontiers; and that they (the Russians) captured seventyfive eagles or stands of colors, and 929 cannon, buried; and this calculation as to totals can not be impugned as exaggerated."-Wilson, 368. exclusive of those thrown into the rivers or With regard to Kutusoff's conduct in this campaign, men will probably be forever divided. The young and ardent, the vigorous in character, the hopeful in disposition, will condemn it in no measured terms, and point with triumph to the great results which would have followed a more vigorous course at Wiazma and Krasnoi. The old and cautious-those whom know. ledge of the world has rendered distrust ful of fortune, and experience of war doubtful of battle-will commend the prudence which produced such great results at so small a risk, and secured the destruction of the greatest army ever prepared by man without the hazardous chance of a general engagement. To us it appears that, in the general conduct of the campaign, the highest credit is due to Kutusoff. We know no more masterly exhibition of strategical skill than is afforded by his circular march round Moscow to the strong position of Taroutino, whence he both menaced his enemies' communications and covered his own; or his still more able pursuit of Napoleon by the parallel route of Medynsk and Jelnia, which both conducted his own army through a country abounding with supplies, and rendered any halt on the French Emperor's part impossible, from his constantly outflanking him. But, on the other hand, he twice showed a decided want of nerve when it was necessary to stake the issue of the war on the result of a general engagement. Once at MaloJaroslawitz, when he fell back towards Kalouga, abandoning the Medynsk road to Smolensko to Napoleon, had he chosen to take it. Again at Krasnoi, when, having established himself in a position where, with a decided superiority of force, he would not throw himself frankly on. His caution here became timidity. He evidently feared to risk his army, composed, after Borodino, in great part of young soldiers and recruits, in a contest with the wasted remains of Napoleon's veterans, who might, were they driven to despair, be joined by the great mass of stragglers who followed their columns. Alexander was highly displeased with his timidity; and the following extract shows clearly his opinion both of Sir Robert Wilson's services and those of the veteran Marshal. At Wilna, on the twenty-sixth of December, the Emperor's birthday, Alexander sent for the English Commissioner, and said: "You have always told me truth-truth I could not obtain through any other channel. I knew that the Marshal has done nothing he ought to have done nothing against the enemy that he could avoid: all his successes have been forced upon him. He has been playing some of his old Turkish tricks; but the nobility of MosIn half an hour I must cow support him. therefore decorate this man with the great order of St. George, and by so doing, commit a trespass on its institution; for it is the highest honor, and hitherto the purest, of the empire. But I will not ask you to be present-I should feel too much humiliated if you were; but I have no choice-I must submit to a controlling necessity. I will, however, not again leave my army, and there shall be no opportunity given for additional misdirection by the Marshal."Wilson, 356, 357. It is now ascertained beyond all doubt that the frightful losses sustained by the French in Russia were not owing to the cold. The following facts, upon which all writers of all parties are agreed, decisively prove this. Napoleon crossed the Niemen with 420,000 men; left Witepsk with 180,000; abandoned Moscow with 100,000; and could only muster at Dorogobouge, before the deadly cold set in, 50,000 combatants in the ranks. Allowing for 120,000 detached during the advance to the flanks, this makes the loss of combatants from the ranks amount to 250,000 in the army under Napoleon in person, before the winter set in. The cold aggravated frightfully the sufferings of the 50,000 who remained, but had nothing to do with the destruction of the main body, (the 250,000.) To what, then, was it owing? To three causes. 1. The immensity of the distances to be traversed. From the Niemen to Moscow is above six hun dred miles. No human efforts were capable of conveying provisions for 420,000 men over such a distance. An English army almost perished because it could not procure land-transport sufficient for six miles of bad road, during inclement weather, from Balaklava to its camp before Sebastopol. Napoleon had six hundred miles of road to bring his supplies along. No power could accomplish this. 2. The barren nature of the country through which they had to pass. The rich lowlands of Italy or Germany will afford sustenance to any number of men marching through them in an ordinary manner. All that is there required is a store with the army of six or seven days' provisions, for the case of its concentrating to fight. But the vast Lithuanian and Russian plains, thinly inhabited, covered with pine forests, where towns are rare and cultivation sparse, could provide sustenance for no considerable body. The first corps exhausted their resources-the succeed ing ones starved. 3 The immense superiority of the enemy in light horse. The Cossack cavalry, almost impotent on the field of battle, are unrivaled for the light duties of a campaign. Their immense numbers, and the patriotic devotion of the peasantry, enabled them to destroy all the villages before the French reached them-to cut off all small parties sent out to forage-to capture all convoys, unless guarded by immense escorts. The innumerable cavalry, artillery, and baggage animals of the French army speedily devoured all fodder near the road; if they went to a distance in search of it, they were captured; if they did not, they died of want. This frightfully aggravated the difficulty, already overwhelming, of transport, and soon destroyed the efficiency of the allied horse. These three causes, combined with the heroic devotion of the Russian people, which led them to shrink from no sacrifice, however great, in the defense of their country, shivered to pieces the whole power of banded Europe, even when concentrated by the iron will and directed by the unrivaled genius of Napoleon I. From Bentley's Miscellany. RIVERS, AND THEIR ASSOCIATIONS. -SEE the rivers how they run Through woods and meads in shade and sun, Sometimes swift, sometimes slow, Wave succeeding wave, they go A various journey to the deep Like human life to endless sleep!" SOUTHEY has remarked that rivers may | but although we propose to glance at be considered Physically, geographically, and mathematically; Politically and commercially; Poetically and pictorially; Morally and even religiously. Were we to say all that might be said on these various heads, our readers (if any should remain) would be provided with enough fluviatile reading to last for a voyage up the Rhine, or the Nile itself; rivers under these several aspects, we intend to do so within the compass of this article, and to suggest rather than to discuss some considerations presented by rivers. First, then, PHYSICALLY and GEOGRAPHICALLY. In the earth's structure, rivers have been aptly enough called its veins, just as the mountains and the mighty masses of granite represent its bones, and, like mountain-chains, rivers mark out Nature's kingdoms and provinces, and are the physical dividers and sub-dividers of |