forth, who can prove to me, I should have said to this assembly, that I have asserted these things falsely; or that they whom he hath deceived in former instances, will confide in him for the future; or that the Thessalians, who have been so basely, so undeservedly enslaved, would not gladly embrace their freedom. If there be any one among you, who acknowledges all this, yet thinks that Philip will support his power, as he hath secured places of strength, convenient ports, and other like advantages; he is deceived. For when forces join in harmony and affection, and one common interest unites the confederating powers, then they share the toils with alacrity, they endure the distresses, they persevere. But when extravagant ambition, and lawless power (as in his case) have aggrandised a single person; the first pretence, the slightest accident, overthrows him, and all his greatness is dashed at once to the ground. For it is not, no, Athenians! it is not possible to found a lasting power upon injustice, perjury, and treachery. These may perhaps succeed for once; and borrow for a while, from hope, a gay and flourishing appear ance. But time betrays their weakness; and they fall into ruin of themselves. For, as in structures of every kind, the lower parts should have the greatest firmness, so the grounds and principles of actions should be just and true. But these advantages are not found in the actions of Philip. I say then that you should dispatch sucCours to the Olynthians; (and the more honourably and expeditiously this is proposed to be done, the more agreeably to my sentiments) and send an embassy to the Thessalians, to inform some, and to enliven that spirit already raised in others; (forit hath actually been resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasa, and to assert their claim to Magnesia.) And let it be your care, Athenians, that our ambassadors may not depend only upon words, but give them some action to display, by taking the field in a manner worthy of the state, and engaging in the war with vigour. For words, if not accompanied by actions, must ever appear vain and contemptible; and particularly when they come from us, whose prompt abilities, and well-known eminence in speaking, make us to be always heard with the greater suspicion. Would you indeed regain attention and confidence, your measures must be greatly changed, your conduct totally reformed; your fortunes, your persons, must appear devoted to the common cause; your ut most efforts must be exerted. If you will act thus, as your honour and your interest require; then, Athenians! you will not only discover the weakness and insincerity of the confederates of Philip, but the ru inous condition of his own kingdom will also be laid open. The power and sovereignty of Macedon may have some weight indeed, when joined with others. Thus, when you marched against the Olynthians, under the conduct of Timotheus, it proved an useful ally; when united with the Olynthians against Potidæa, it added something to their force; just now, when the Thessalians were in the midst of disorder, sedition, and confusion, it aided them against the family of their tyrants: (and in every case, any, even a small accession of strength, is, in my opi nion, of considerable effect.) But of itself, unsupported, it is infirm, it is totally distempered; for by all those glaring exploits, which have given him this appa rent greatness, his wars, his expeditions, he hath rendered it yet weaker than it was naturally. For you are not to imagine that the inclinations of his subjects are the same with those of Philip. He thirsts for glory; this is his object, this he eagerly pursues, through toils and dangers of every kind; despising safety and life, when compared with the honour of atchieving such actions as no other prince of Macedon could ever boast of. But his subjects have no part in this ambition. Harassed by those various excursions he is ever making, they groan under perpetual calamity; torn from their business, and their families, and without opportunity to dispose of that pittance which their toils have earned; as all commerce is shut out from the coast of Macedon by the war. Hence one may perceive how his subjects in general are affected to Philip. But then his auxiliaries, and the soldiers of his phalanx, have the character of wonder ful forces, trained completely to war. And yet I can affirın, upon the credit of a person from that country, incapable of false hood, that they have no such superiority, For, as he assures me, if any man of experience in military affairs should be found among them, he dismisses all such, from an ambition of having every great action ascribed wholly to himself; (for, besides his other passions, the man hath this ambition in the highest degrec.) And if any per son, from a sense of decency, or other virtuous principles, betrays a dislike of his daily intemperance, and riotings, and obscenities, he loses all favour and regard; so that none are left about him, but wretches who subsist on rapine and flattery, and who, when heated with wine, do not scruple to descend to such instances of revelry, as it would shock you to repeat. Nor can the truth of this be doubt ed: for they whom we all conspired to drive from hence, as infamous and abandoned, Callias the public servant, and others of the same stamp; buffoons, composers of lewd songs, in which they ridicule their companions: these are the persons whom he entertains and caresses. And these things, Athenians, trifling as they may appear to some, are to men of just discernment great indications of the weakness both of his mind and fortune. At present, his successes cast a shade over them; for prosperity hath great power to veil such baseness from observation. But let his arms meet with the least disgrace, and all his actions will be exposed. This is a truth, of which he himself, Athenians! will, in my opinion, soon convince you, if the gods favour us, and you exert your vigour. For as in our bodies, while a man is in health he feels no effect of any inward weakness; but, when disease attacks him, every thing becomes sensible in the yessels, in the joints, or in whatever other part his frame may be disordered; so in states and monarchies, while they carry on a war abroad, their defects escape the general eye, but when once it approaches their own territory, then they are all detected. If there be any one among you who, from Philip's good fortune, concludes that he must prove a formidable enemy; such reasoning is not unworthy a man of prudence. Fortune hath great influence, nay, the whole influence, in all human affairs; but then, were 1 to chuse, I should prefer the fortune of Athens (if you yourselves will assert your own cause, with the least degree of vigour) to this man's fortune. For we have many better reasons to depend upon the favour of Heaven, than this man. But our present state, is in my opinion, a state of total inactivity; and he who will not exert his own strength, cannot apply for aid, either to his friends or to the gods. It is not then surprising, that he who is himself ever amidst the dangers and labours of the field; who is every where; whom no opportunity escapes; to whom no season is unfavourable; should be superior to you, who are wholly engaged in contriving delays, and framing decrees, and enquiring after news. I am not surprised at this, for the contrary must have been surprising: if we, who never act in any single instance, as becomes a state engaged in war, should conquer him, who, in every instance, acts with an inde fatigable vigilance. This indeed surprises me; that you, who fought the cause of Greece against Lacedemon, and generously declined all the many favourable opportu nities of aggrandizing yourselves; who, to secure their property to others, parted with your own, by yourcontributions; and bravely exposed yourselves in battle; should now decline the service of the field, and delay the necessary supplies, when called to the defence of your own rights; that you, in whom Greece in general, and each particular state, hath often found protection, should sit down quiet spectators of your own private wrongs. This I say surprizes me; and one thing more; that not a man among you can reflect how long a time we have been at war with Philip, and in what measures this time hath all been wasted. You are not to be informed, that, in delaying, in hoping that others would assert our cause, in accusing each other, in impeaching, then again entertaining hopes, in such measures as are now pursued, that time hath been entirely wasted. And are you so devoid of apprehension, as to imagine, when our state hath been reduced from greatness to wretchedness, that the very same conduct will raise us from wretchedness to greatness? No! this is not reasonable, it is not natural; for it is much easier to defend, than to acquire dominions. But, now, the war hath left us nothing to defend: we must acquire. And to this work you yourselves alone are equal. This, then, is my opinion. You should raise supplies; you should take the field with alacrity. Prosecutions should be all suspended until you have recovered your affairs; let each man's sentence be deter mined by his actions: honour those who have deserved applause; let the iniquitous meet their punishment: let their be no pretences, no deficiencies on your part; for you cannot bring the actions of others to a severe scrutiny, unless you have first been careful of your own duty. What indeed can be the reason, think ye, that every man whom we have sent out at the head of an army, hath deserted your ser vice, and sought out some private expedition? (if we must speak ingenuously of these our generals also,) the reason is this: when engaged in the service of the state, the prize for which they fight is yours. Thus, should Amphipolis be now taken, you instantly possess yourselves of it: the commanders have all the danger, the rewards they do not share. But, in their private enterprises, the dangers are less; the acquisitions are all shared by the generals and soldiers; as were Lampsacus, Sigæum,and those vessels which they plundered. Thus are they all determined by their private interest. And, when you turn your eyes to the wretched state of your affairs, you bring your generals to a trial; you grant them leave to speak; you hear the necessities they plead; and then acquit them. Nothing then remains for us, but to be distracted with endless contests and divisions: (some urging these, some those measures) and to feel the public calamity. For in former times, Athenians, you divided into classes, to raise supplies. Now the business of these classes is to govern; each hath an orator at its head, and a general, who is his creature; the THREE HUNDRED are assistants to these, and the rest of you divide, some to this, some to that party. You must rectify these disorders: you must appear yourselves : you must leave the power of speaking, of advising, and of acting, open to every citizen. But if you suffer some persons to issue out their mandates, as with a royal authority; if one set of men be forced to fit out ships, to raise supplies, to take up arms; while others are only to make decrees against them, without any charge, any employment besides; it is not possible that any thing can be effected seasonably and successfully; for the injured party ever will desert you; and then your sole resource will be to make them feel your resentment instead of your enemies. To sum up all, my sentiments are these! -That every man should contribute in proportion to his fortune; that all should take the field in their turns, until all have served; that whoever appears in this place should be allowed to speak: and that when you give your voices, your true interest only should determine you, not the authority of this or the other speaker. Pursue this course, and then your applause will not be lavished on some orator, the moment he concludes; you yourselves will share it hereafter, when you find how greatly you have advanced the interests of your state. Leland. §3. The second Olynthiac Oration: pronounced in the same year: INTRODUCTION. To remove the impression made on the oration, that other speakers had arisen state, state, they breathed nothing but indignation against the enemy, and possibly, with some contempt of his present enterprises, proposed to the Athenians to correct his arrogance, by an invasion of his own kingdom. Demosthenes, on the contrary, insists on the necessity of self-defence; endeavours to rouse his hearers from their security, by the terror of impending danger; and affects to consider the defence of Olynthus, as the last and only means of preserving the very being of Athens. I AM by no means affected in the same manner, Athenians! when I review the state of our affairs, and when I attend to those speakers who have now declared their sentiments. They insist, that we should punish Philip: but our affairs, situated as they now appear, warn us to guard against the dangers with which we ourselves are threatened. Thus far therefore I must differ from these speakers, that I apprehend they have not proposed the proper object of your attention. There was a time indeed, I know it well, when the state could have possessed her own dominions in security, and sent out her armies to inflict chastisement on Philip. myself have seen that time when we enjoyed such power. But, now, I am persuaded we should confine ourselves to the protection of our allies. When this is once effected, then we may consider the punishment his outrages have merited. But, till the first great point be well secured, it is weakness to debate about our more remote concernments. been reduced to the extremity of distress. I think it necessary, in the first place, to recal sonte late transactions to your thoughts.-You may remember, Atheni ans, that, about three or four years since, you received advice that Philip was in Thrace, and had laid siege to the fortress of Heræa. It was then the month of November. Great commotions and debates arose. It was resolved to send out forty gallies; that all citizens, under the age of five-and-forty, should themselves embark; and that sixty talents should be raised. Thus it was agreed that year passed away; then came in the months July, August, September. In this last month, with great difficulty, when the mysteries had first been celebrated, you sent out Charidemus, with just ten vessels unmanned, and five talents of silver. For when reports came of the sickness, and the death of Philip (both of these were affirmed) you laid aside your intended armament, imagining, that at such a juncture, there was no need of succours. And yet this was the very critical moment; for, had they been dispatched with the same alacrity with which they were granted, Philip would not have then escaped, to beI come that formidable enemy he now ap And now, Athenians, if ever we stood in need of mature deliberation and counsel, the present juncture calls loudly for them. To point out the course to be pursued on this emergency, I do not think the greatest difficulty: but I am in doubt in what manner to propose my sentiments; for all that I have observed, and all that I have heard, convinces me, that most of your misfortunes have proceeded from a want of inclination to pursue the necessary measures, not from ignorance of them. Let me intreat you, that, if I now speak with an unusual boldness, ye may bear it: considering only, whether speak truth, and with a sincere intention to advance your future interests: for you now see, that by some orators who study but to gain your favour, our affairs have I pears. But what was then done, cannot be amended. Now we have the opportunity of another war: that war I mean, which hath induced me to bring these transactions into view, that you may not once more fall into the same errors. How then shall we improve this opportunity? This is the only question. For, if you are not resolved to assist with all the force you can command, you are really serving under Philip, you are fighting on his side. The Olynthians are a people, whose power was thought considerable. Thus were the circumstances of affairs: Philip could not confide in them; they looked with equal suspicion upon Philip. We and they then entered into mutual engagements of peace and alliance: this was a grievous embarrassment to Philip, that we should have a powerful state confederated with us, spies upon the incident of his fortune. It was agreed, that we should, by all means, engage this people in a war with him: and now, what we all so earnestly desired, is effected: the manner is of no moment. What then remains for us, Athenians, but to send immediate and effectual succours, I cannot I cannot see. For besides the disgrace that must attend us, if any of our interests are supinely disregarded, I have no small apprehensions of the consequence, (the Thebans affected as they are towards us, and the Phocians exhausted of their treasures) if Philip be left at full liberty to lead his armies into these territories, when his present enterprises are accomplished. If any one among you can be so far immersed in indolence as to suffer this, he must chuse to be witness to the misery of his own country, rather than to hear of that which strangers suffer; and to seek assistants for himself, when it is now in his power to grant assistance to others. That this must be the consequence, if we do not exert ourselves on the present occasion, there can scarcely remain the least doubt among us. But, as to the necessity of sending succours, this, it may be said, we are agreed in; this is our resolution. But how shall we be enabled? that is the point to be explained. Be not surprised, Athenians, if my sentiments on this occasion seem repugnant to the general sense of this assembly. Appoint magistrates for the inspection of your laws not in order to enact any new laws; you have already a sufficient number; but to repeal those, whose ill effect you now experience. I mean the laws relating to the theatrical funds (thus openly I declare it) and some about the soldiery. By the first, the soldier's pay goes as theatrical expences to the useless and inactive; the others screen those from justice, who decline the service of the field, and thus damp the ardour of those disposed to serve us. When you have repealed these, and rendered it consistent with safety to advise you justly, then seek for some person to propose that decree, which you all are sensible the common good requires. But, till this be done, expect not that any man will urge your true interest, when, for urging your true interest, you repay him with destruction. Ye will never find such zeal; especially since the consequence can be only this: he who offers his opinion, and moves for your concurrence, suffers some unmerited calamity; but your affairs are not in the least advanced: nay, this additional inconvenience must arise, that for the future it will appear more dan gerous to advise you, than even at present. And the authors of these laws should also be the authors of their repeal. For it is not just that the public favour should be bestowed on them who, in framing these laws, have greatly injured the community; and that the odium should fall on him, whose freedom and sincerity are of im portant service to us all. Until these regulations be made, you are not to think any man so great that he may violate these laws with impunity; or so devoid of reason, as to plunge himself into open and foreseen destruction. And be not ignorant of this, Athenians, that a decree is of no significance, unless attended with resolution and alacrity to execute it. For were decrees of themselves sufficient to engage you to perform your duty, could they even execute the things which they enact; so many would not have been made to so little, or rather to no good purpose; nor would the insolence of Philip have had so long a date. For, if decrees can punish, he hath long since felt all their fury. But they have no such power; for, though proposing and resolving be first in order, yet in force and efficacy, action is superior. Let this then be your principal concern; the others you cannot want; for you have men among you capable of advising, and you are of all people most acute in apprehending: now, let your interest direct you, and it will be in your power to be as remarkable for acting. What season indeed, what op portunity do you wait for, more favour able than the present? Or when will you exert your vigour, if not now, my countrymen? Hath not this man seized all those places that were ours? Should he become master of this country too, must we not sink into the lowest state of infamy? Are not they whom we have promised to assist, whenever they are engaged in war, now attacked themselves? Is he not our enemy? Is he not in possession of our dominions? Is he not a barbarian? Is he not every base thing words can express? If we are insensible to all this, if we almost aid his de signs; heavens ! can we then ask to whom the consequences are owing? Yes, I know full well, we never will impute them to ourselves. Just as in the dangers of the field: not one of those who fly will accuse himself; he will rather blame the general, or his fellow-soldiers: yet every single man that fled was accessary to the defeat. He who blames others might have maintained his own post; and, had every maintained his, success might have ensued. Thus, then, in the present case, is there a man whose counsel seems liable to objec man tion? |