mission, under the authority of law, to every individual to profess the religious opinions which he conceives most consonant to Scripture, and to worship God in the manner most agreeable to the dictates of his conscience. Internal faith and external worship comprehend the whole, as far as this subject is concerned, of religious service: and whoever enjoys unrestrained freedom in these two respects, enjoys perfect religious toleration."* Now, it is indeed true, that Catholics are no longer liable to the forfeiture of one hundred marks for being present at the service of their own church, or to the monthly fine of twenty pounds for being absent from the service of the established church. The intolerant statutes, by which these punishments were enacted, have been repealed; and we enjoy the permission of professing our own creed, and practising our own worship. But it should not be forgotten at what price we purchase that permission. It is with the loss of the civil rights possessed by our fellow-subjects; of the common immunities which the constitution supposes to be the birth-right of every Briton. We must either sacrifice them, or abjure our religion. Is this" unrestrained freedom in our worship?" Is this "full and perfect toleration?"

Toleration (if we must use a word which seems to imply, that one man ought to depend for the exercise of religious worship on the sufferance of another,) is the true mean between establishment and persecution. To establish, is to select a particular creed, and to provide, at the national expense, for the support of its ministers. To persecute, is to select a particular creed, and to subject its professors to restraints, privations, or punishments. To tolerate, is to do neither. If, on the one side, the toleration of a religion does not encourage it, on the other it does not molest it. It leaves it to itself, and cautiously abstains from all legislative

* Bishop of Lincoln's Charge, p. 12. Bishop of Gloucester, p. 22. It is only in England, though the Bishop of Lincoln seems ignorant of it, (p. 12) that the exercise of the Catholic worship is protected by law. In Ireland it is exposed to insult from any individual, or set of individuals, who may be audacious enough to attempt it.

interference in its favour, or against it. As, when you establish a church, you do not create the civil rights enjoyed by its members; so, neither, when you tolerate a creed, do you impose civil disabilities on its professors. Every molestation, whether it go to the privation of life, or liberty, or property, or rights previously possessed, is persecution; differing indeed, in degree, but essentially repugnant to the true notion of toleration. Now, what is the situation of the Catholics? Do they enjoy the exercise of their religion free from restraint or privation? Can they unite it with the exercise of the common privileges of British subjects? No: they are condemned to live in a state of perpetual disqualification. This, then, cannot certainly be what the two prelates mean by "full and perfect toleration." If we consider it impartially, it is persecution: not that persecution which sends to the stake or to the gibbet; but a persecution inflictive of mental pain, and indefinite in duration: a persecution most irritating to the feelings of the sufferers, but which is less noticed, and less abhorred, because it is not of a nature to strike the senses of spectators.

We are told by both prelates, that to persecute is to inflict punishment; to compel men to adopt a prescribed faith, or to suffer the loss of liberty, property, or even life."* Now, admitting this definition, I see

not how the adversaries of the Catholics can clear themselves, even on their own grounds, from the charge of persecution. To compel a man to abjure his own faith, or suffer the loss of privileges to which he has otherwise a claim, is much the same thing as "to compel a man to adopt a prescribed faith, or suffer the loss of property." If one be persecution, the other must be persecution also. For the privileges in question are as valuable as property: in many instances they can be exchanged for property. Thus, then, the case stands:-the English Catholic peers have an hereditary right to sit in the House of Lords; by the 30th of Charles II. they cannot exercise this right un

* Bishop of Lincoln, p. 16. Bishop of Gloucester, p. 20.

less they previously abjure their religion. Catholic gentlemen, if otherwise qualified, are of common right eligible to sit in the lower house: by the same act, should they be chosen, they must relinquish their seats, or pronounce their own worship to be idolatrous. Every Catholic freeholder, or freeman, has a right to vote for members of parliament: by the 7th and 8th of William III. he must apostatize, or forego the exercise of that right. Such disabilities, in the estimation of a thinking man, are equal to positive punishments. To be declared incapable of serving his Majesty in any offices of trust, emolument, or power, is the severest penalty, which, in many cases, the law inflicts on delinquents guilty of atrocious offences and will it be said, that the same disqualification, enforced against four millions of subjects for their religious tenets, is not a punishment, but a measure perfectly consistent with the true principles of toleration?

An attempt has been made to draw a distinction between persecution and exclusion from power. It has furnished the two right reverend Prelates with many an elegent antithesis, but appears to me to bear not on the present question. For it is not of his actual exclusion from this or that place of trust or profit, but of his ineligibility to fill any, that the Catholic complains. Not only does he not possess such places, but he is rendered incapable of possessing them. What is granted to every other class of subjects is denied to him; and the punishment, which the law awards against offences of the most pernicious tendency, is inflicted on him for religious opinions. To keep him in a state of degradation, limitations are imposed both on the elective franchise and the prerogative of the crown. Neither can the people have for their representative, or the king appoint to any office, a Catholic, however his abilities and services may fit him for such situations. Even the country is incapacitated from rewarding the Catholics, who brave every danger in its service, and shed their blood to extend its conquests and maintain its independence.

Χ

But, observes the Bishop of Gloucester, "the Catholics have no reason for complaint. For, though exclusion from power be the consequence of their principles, adherence to those principles, or, in other -words, the cause of their exclusion, is entirely the result of their own free will. To the enjoyment of every blessing in life is annexed some condition: if we do not choose to fulfil the condition, we are not entitled to the blessing."* To talk in this manner has of late been called, to reason: to me, without meaning any disrespect to the right reverend Prelate, it appears to be nothing else than adding insult to oppression. It is the language of the Algerine corsair, when he chains his Christian captive to the oar: "You have no cause," the intolerant infidel may also say, "for complaint. Renounce the faith of Christ, and you are -free. If you refuse, slavery is indeed the consequence: but, adherence to your religion; or, in other words, the cause of your slavery, is entirely the result of your . own free will. Your freedom is annexed to the condition; and, if you do not choose to fulfil the condition, you are not entitled to the blessing."

The reasoning of the Bishop of Gloucester may perhaps hold in matters of convenience. Of such objects, whoever prefers one to another, takes it with both its advantages and disadvantages. He, indeed, may have no reason for complaint. But, in matters of opinion and conscience, the principle is false. The human judgment is not at liberty to assent or dissent, as fancy or interest may suggest. The mathematician cannot reject the axioms on which his science is built, nor can the sincere inquirer into religion disbelieve what in his own mind he is convinced is the truth. He may be induced to profess the contrary words; he may declare, upon oath, that his religious principles are erroneous: but, in that case, he becomes a hypocrite: he is guilty of perjury; he acts in opposition to truth, honour, and religion: he deserves the contempt of man, and the anger of the Almighty.

* Charge, p. 9.

in

Yet, this is the condition, to which Catholics are reduced by penalties and disabilities. It is not of our free choice that we incur these disabilities: but you take advantage of our religious convictions, and of our horror for perjury, to place us in a situation, in which we must either forfeit the common privileges of Britons, or profess, ourselves; traitors to our God. And, shall we be told that we have no reason for complaint?

It appears to me, that of all men, those ought the least to hold such language, who claim to be considered as the apostles of the meek and lowly Saviour. His kingdom is not of this world-why then do they seek to support it by restrictive statutes and civil dis qualifications? Thus are they compelled to act in contradiction to themselves: to preach up the unre-.. strained freedom of religious worship; and yet demand, as the price of it, the surrender of those privileges, which Britons deem most valuable: to denounce against us the vengeance of heaven, if we do not cull our religious faith from the Scriptures, and then very charitably to torment us with the scourge of civil disabilities, if we discover in the sacred volumes doctrines different from theirs.

But the principal argument on which the two Prelates rest their cause, is the right of self-defence. It is a duty, they tell us, which each one owes to himself, to guard against the most distant approach of whatever may be injurious. If the petition of the Catholics be granted, they may possibly acquire political power; and, if they acquire political power, they may possibly employ it for the subversion of the established church.* That the principle of self-de fence will, in cases of real danger, authorize the adoption of lawful precautions, I am not disposed to deny but these precautions must be founded in equity; they must be such as reason will justify, or necessity ex

You are not to invade the rights, or privileges of others on the hare suspicion of future danger, on the mere possibility of a possibility You are not, as

Bishop of Gloucestor's Charge, p. 8. Bishop Lincoln's passim.