vailed. He then contended, 1st. That the offence had been committed; 2d. That the defendant was knowingly concerned in committing it; and 3d. That the indictment was founded on the proper section of the act of Congress.

1st. There is evidence, that the vessel sailed from the wharf with the guns that she brought into port; that four other guns with military stores were afterwards put on board of her, and that she had a crew of thirty or forty persons. It is arming a vessel, when arms are put on board, she being on her passage; and it cannot be material, that those arms should be arranged in a particular manner. As to the design of the equipment, there is no proof of an actual cruise; but the jury will decide, whether it was any other than that charged in the indictment. There is no attempt to prove that she had a cargo, or carried passengers; on the contrary, it is in evidence that she sailed in ballast; and the subdivisions of interest in the vessel are in the nature of all ownership of privateers.

2d. The defendant was knowingly concerned; as furnishing arms, knowing them to be designed for an unlawful purpose, constitutes the crime; and as an interpreter was the necessary instrument on the occasion; even if the defendant had appeared in no other character, this would have been sufficient to convict him. But he was not merely an interpreter; he appears to have interfered on various other occasions; and his account is conclusive evidence of a confidential and important agency in accomplishing the illegal outfit of the vessel. It might afford some colour of defence, to say, that he only attempted to send the cannon on board from South Street Wharf, if this account did not demonstrate that he was concerned in the equipment from the beginning. There is nothing to justify an idea, that it arose from paying drafts, after the vessel had sailed; but on the contrary several items are for money advanced; and the charge for commissions, &c., has relation to the very moment of commencing the repairs. The agency proved by the account is corroborated by the purchase of cannon from Mendenhall & Co., which is evidently connected with the general plan for equipping this vessel.

3d. The indictment is well laid; the 2d section is the only one to which the case is applicable. The 4th section refers only to the augmentation of the force of the vessel, which on her arrival in our ports, was, in fact, a vessel of war, either public or private. If, therefore, a man-of-war or privateer adds to the number or size of her guns, or makes any equipment solely applicable to war, it is an offence against this section. But if a vessel, having guns on board, and yet being neither a man-of-war nor a privateer, enters our ports, she cannot legally be equipped for the purposes of war. Without this construction, the act of Congress would be nugatory; as it might be evaded by bringing a single gun in the vessel. In the present case, it appears that Les Jumeaux had been employed in the Guinea-trade; that she arrived here with a cargo of sugar and cotton; and being converted from a merchant vessel, carrying a few guns for self-defence, into a privateer armed for hostilities, it is clearly an original outfit within the meaning of the law. The distinction is justified by this further consideration, that the 3d section makes arming the vessel, with intent to employ her in hostili

ties, the offence; whereas the 4th section refers nothing to the intent with which the force of the vessel is augmented, as it only contemplates the case of vessels originally fitted for war by the nation to which they belong.

Patterson, Justice: This is an indictment against John Etienne Guinet, for being, knowingly, concerned in furnishing, fitting out, and arming Les Jumeaux, in the port and river Delaware, with intent that she should be employed in the service of the French Republic, to cruise, or commit hostilities, upon the subjects of Great Britain, with whom the United States are at peace: And it is the province of the jury to inquire, whether the proof exhibited on the trial, has fully maintained the charge contained in the indictment.

Much has been said upon the construction of the 3d and 4th sections of the act of Congress; but the Court is clearly of opinion, that the 3d section was meant to include all cases of vessels, armed within our ports by one of the belligerent powers, to act as cruisers against another belligerent power in peace with the United States. Converting a ship from her original destination, with intent to commit hostilities; or in other words, converting a merchant ship into a vessel of war, must be deemed an original outfit; for the act would, otherwise, become nugatory and inoperative. It is the conversion from the peaceable use, to the warlike purpose, that constitutes the offence.

The vessel in question arrived in this port, with a cargo of coffee and sugar, from the West Indies; and so appears to have been employed by her owner with a view to merchandize, and not with a view to war. The inquiry, therefore, is limited to this consideration, whether, after her arrival, she was fitted out, in order to cruise against any foreign nation, being at peace with the United States. It is true, she left the wharf with only four guns, the number that she had brought into the port; but it is equally true, that when she had dropped to some distance below, she took on board three or four guns more, a number of muskets, water-casks, &c.; and, it is manifest, that other guns, were ready to be sent to her by the Pilot-boat. These circumstances clearly prove a conversion from the original commercial design of the vessel, to a design of cruising against the enemies of France; and, of course, against a nation at peace with the United States, since the United States are at peace with all the world. Nor can it be reasonably contended, that the articles thus put on board the vessel were articles of merchandize; for, if that had been the case, they would have been mentioned in her manifest, on clearing out of the port, whereas it is expressly stated, that she sailed in ballast. If they were not to be used for merchandize, the inference is inevitable, that they were to be used for war. No man would proclaim on the house top, that he intended to fit out a privateer: the intention must be collected from all the circumstances of the transaction, which the jury will investigate, and on which they must decide. But if they are of opinion, that it was intended to convert this vessel from a merchant ship into a cruiser, every man who was knowingly concerned in doing so, is guilty in the contemplation of the law.

It will only, then, be necessary to ascertain, how far the defendant was knowingly concerned; for, though he were concerned, if he did not act with a knowledge of the real object, he would be innocent. It has been

alleged in his defence, that he was merely an interpreter; and if, in fact, he had appeared in that character alone, we should not have thought it a sufficient ground for conviction. But the jury will collect from the other parts of the transaction, whether this is not used as a mask to cover his efficient agency in the equipment of the vessel. He carried orders from the owner to the ship carpenter; he told the pilotboy at what time the guns should be taken on board his boat, to be carried to the ship; the account found in his possession states charges for supplies of cannon, ball, muskets, and commissions for services; and the whole is conducted in a secret and mysterious manner, under the shade of night. Would he have acted this part as a mere interpreter? If it had been fair mercantile business, involving nothing repugnant to our laws, would it have been so much a work of darkness? This alone casts a gloom over the transaction, that will impress every just and ingenuous mind with an idea of fraud and delinquency.

If the defendant has been concerned in the offence, there is no doubt that it is effected as far as it was in his power to complete it. The illegal outfit of the vessel was accomplished; and that an additional number of cannon was not sent to augment her force, was not owing to his respect to the laws, but to the vigilance of the public police.

Upon the whole, the jury will consider the indictment; and give such a verdict as shall comport with evidence and law. Verdict-Guilty.*

• See for proceedings on same offence, at common law, Henfield's case, ante p. 49.

TRIALS

OF THE

WESTERN INSURGENTS.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT.

PHILADELPHIA, 1797.

[In consequence of the sameness of the testimony taken in each of the group of cases which compose these trials, and of the great voluminousness of the notes which have come into the Editor's hands, he has deviated from the plan in most instances adopted, of giving each case by itself, with the particular evidence belonging to it; and has here, through the aid of a learned friend, presented in a popular shape, a general statement of the facts developed during the whole course of the prosecutions. The proceedings of the Court in each case, wherever such proceedings are peculiar to it, are appended.]

THE Act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1791, which imposed a duty upon spirits distilled within the United States, produced at once great opposition, both in and out of Congress. A majority of the southern and western members, even before the bill was passed, proclaimed an organized agitation for its repeal; and hardly had the President's signature been obtained before the measure was assailed violently from the country at large. It was branded with the name of an excise, a term very hateful to the people, as connected with the former oppressions of the British Government. It was declared unnecessary and tyrannical. The Legislatures of Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina united in solemn declarations of rooted dislike, and of resistance, in some cases, hardly to be reconciled with constitutional opposition; and by the latter State a position was assumed, which, in later days, would have been called nullification. But it was in the western parts of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and particularly in the counties of Alleghany, Washington, Fayette, and Westmoreland, in the first-mentioned State, that resistance to the bill was most violent, and it was there an agitation was started which, in the course of a few years, ripened into an organized insurrection, and involved its leaders in the crime of treason.

The peculiar opposition of these portions of the Union may be accounted for by the circumstance that the war of the Revolution, by cutting off the trade in foreign spirits, had turned the attention of the grain

growing districts of these States to the distillation of rum and whisky. This soon grew into a very considerable business; the greater part of the United States was supplied from these sources, and spirits were even exported into Canada. So lucrative did this trade soon become, that almost the whole local population, at the end of the Revolution, was connected with it. The "Western Country," as it was then called, swarmed with distilleries.

Not only were whisky and rum articles of commerce and of consumption, but from the natural deficiency of specie in a wild country they also were used universally as currency. Payments were made in them; and they were received in satisfaction of debts.

The agricultural interests became enlisted in the traffic by the immense amount of grain thus consumed. At one time, such was the quantity disposed of in this manner, that a famine was dreaded, and, moved by popular clamour, the Legislature was compelled to interfere and pass a law to prevent the distillation of any kind of grain; which was, however, afterwards repealed, so far as regards rye and barley.

The attention of the Legislature of Pennsylvania was early called to this as a productive source of revenue. In the year 1772, even before the trade had acquired any great importance, an excise law was passed upon domestic and foreign spirits. At first, however, as to home distilled spirits it was not executed, and, indeed, hardly any steps were taken for the purpose, particularly in the older counties. But, during the revolutionary war, the necessities of the State, and a temporary unpopularity of distillation, before alluded to, rendered the collection of the duties both necessary and practicable; and a considerable revenue was thereby obtained. Towards the end of the war it again ceased.

In 1780 Congress resolved that an allowance of an additional sum should be made to the army, to compensate for the depreciation of its pay. This was distributed among the States for discharge. Pennsylvania made several appropriations for the purpose, but the funds so applied turned out to be unproductive. The depreciation fund having always been treated as a favoured claim, on application of the officers of the Pennsylvania line another effort was made, the revenue arising from the excise was appropriated to this end, and vigorous measures were taken for its collection.

If the duties on domestic spirits could have been enforced, there was no doubt, such had been the increase in the business in the few years previous, that, in a short time, it would have paid both principal and interest of the fund. Aware of this, in the year 1786 Mr. Robert Morris offered to farm the revenue, and to pay into the State Treasury the sum of 70,000l. per annum. This was, however, rejected, from a prejudice to the mode, which was supposed to be peculiar to despotic government; but there was no question at the time that that sum could have been so produced, if it could have been collected. The ordinary means were therefore to be adopted.

But great changes had taken place in the disposition of the people since the first imposition of these duties. The neighbouring States were free from the burthen; and in New Jersey, where a law had been passed for the purpose, its execution had been entirely prevented by a powerful combination. The Pennsylvania law, therefore, met with