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that declaration, which Buenos Aires had invoked, was held by the United States to be inapplicable to the case. But the United States also maintained that, even if Great Britain had violated the Monroe principle, this would not give another government the right to demand from the United States redress for injuries alleged to have resulted from its failure to act. The United States further contended that there was ample justification for putting an end to Vernet's operations, even if the claim of Buenos Aires to sovereignty over the islands were admitted. From this review, it appears that the United States maintained, in the Falkland Islands affair, the following positions: (1) that, where a dispute as to title antedated the Monroe message, the United States did not regard itself as being called upon to interfere; (2) that the Monroe declaration did not, in the opinion of the United States, operate retroactively; (3) that another government could not as of right demand that the United States enforce the Monroe declaration, or demand redress for injuries sustained as the result of inaction by the United States; (4) that the United States had, as an independent nation, the right to abate a nuisance involving lawless aggressions upon the persons and property of its citizens, without regard to the question of territorial jurisdiction.

In reply to a suggestion, in 1898, that the United States should join Germany and Great Britain in representations to the Argentine government in relation to its alleged refusal to proceed with the arbitration of the boundary dispute with Chile, the Department of State observed that the fact that the queen of Great Britain had already been chosen as arbitrator would probably stand in the way of joint representations by Great Britain and Germany; but the Department added that it did not wish to appear as opposing

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any suggestion of arbitration, when "made benevolently and not in the form of intervention, joint or otherwise, inconsistent with the independence of the nation to which it was addressed." A tender of good offices had already been made by the United States to Argentina and Chile. The relations of the United States with Chile reveal two cases where the principle of non-intervention was at first disregarded, but later applied. The first was the controversy over asylum and safe-conduct during the civil war following the dispute between President Balmaceda and the Chilean congress. Many persons sought refuge at the various legations. Even prior to the resignation of Balmaceda, Mr. Patrick Egan, then American minister at Santiago, was threatened with police inspection for harboring Congressionalists. During the year 1891, when many persons were seeking asylum, the Chilean government, claiming that the privilege of asylum was being abused, began to police the American legation. Mr. Egan protested vigorously, and declared that he would permit his refugees to leave the legation only under proper safe-conduct to neutral territory. He repeatedly demanded safe-conduct for the people at his legation, but without result. The State Department instructed him to report the facts of the situation, to learn the practices of other states and to prevent the abuse of the privilege of asylum. Mr. Egan argued with Señor Matta that his house was an integral part of the territory of the United States, and that, without the will and permission of that government, Chile could not consider as subject to her judicial action persons clearly beyond her jurisdiction. He also contended that the grant

1 Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 435. Foreign Relations, 1891, p. 166.

3 Ibid., pp. 166, 177, 184, 185.

♦Ibid., pp. 167, 177, 178, 179.

of safe-conduct to harbored refugees was ordinary Chilean practice. Señor Matta would admit the extraterritoriality of the minister's domicil, and the attendant right of asylum, but the granting of safe-conduct, he held, was only a matter of courtesy.1

1

This unwarranted extension of extraterritorial privileges, resulting in the defeat of justice and the crippling of the administration of extradition, was reasserted by Mr. Egan in 1893, during a new uprising of the Balmaceda party. The leaders of the movement, Colonel Fuentes and Señor Blanlot-Halley, were received by Mr. Egan at the American legation, and safe-conduct was requested for them.2 Mr. Gresham, who was then Secretary of State, after learning that the men were wanted for “ murder and robbery," and that a regular trial would be afforded them, notified Mr. Egan that he had no authority to protect Chileans against police officers who were bound to arrest them for violation of the laws of their country, and instructed him to cease harboring them if they were demanded by the Chilean government on a criminal charge. On April 18, 1893, Mr. Gresham instructed that the criminals be ordered to leave the legation. Mr. Cleveland in his annual message, December 4, 1893, completely disavowed the act of Mr. Egan as unauthorized by the government, not sanctioned by international precedent, and provocative of strife and sedition, adding that "under no circumstances can the representatives of this government be permitted, under the ill-defined fiction of extraterritoriality, to interrupt the administration of criminal justice in the countries to which they are accredited."

1 Foreign Relations, p. 195.

2 Ibid., 1893, pp. 217, 218.

'Ibid., pp. 219, 220.

4 Ibid., p. 221.

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3

The attempted intervention by Mr. Blaine, as Secretary of State, in the Chile-Peruvian war in 1881, and the subsequent reversion to the policy of non-intervention by his successor, Mr. Frelinghuysen, exemplify in a striking way how deeply intrenched the policy of non-intervention had become. The dispute between Chile and Peru related to territorial rights over the seaboard of Atacama, which led to the Chile-Bolivian conflict of 1879, and to the subsequent entry of Peru into the conflict. This comparatively insignificant region became famous in 1841 because of the discovery of vast guano deposits. While Chilean jurisdiction had been generally recognized, Bolivian claims of jurisdiction extending southward to the Salado river formed a serious complication. Chile's strong denial of the Bolivian claims threatened war, but Spanish aggressions on the west coast of South America stayed the immediate drift towards hostilities. The treaties of 1866 and 1874 between Chile and Bolivia were aimed at an amicable settlement. The secret compact between Peru and Bolivia, made in 1873, further complicated the situation. Diplomatic relations between Chile and Bolivia were broken off on February 10, 1879, and hostilities commenced four days later. On April 5, 1879, Chile declared war against Peru. Secretary of State Evarts refused in 1879 to join with Germany and Great Britain in mediation between Chile and Peru, on the ground that single or collective mediation would at the time carry the impression of dictation or coercion in disparagement of belligerent rights.1 No objection was made to efforts to restore peace wherever the good offices of the United States might be usefully proffered; but it was intimated that no premature efforts nor any effort in combination with other neutral powers would be made. In the same year Mr. Pettis, American Minister

1 Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 34.

[416 to Bolivia, visited Lima and Santiago in order personally to acquaint each of the three governments with the attitude of the others concerning peace.1 The Department of State criticised his action as rash and unauthorized. The Chilean press had represented that Mr. Pettis had indicated a purpose on the part of the government of the United States. to end the war by intervention or arbitration on terms proposed by itself, but these statements were dismissed by the Department of State as the false utterances of a hostile press.

Secretary of State Blaine, on June 15, 1881, instructed Mr. Hurlbut, American Minister to Peru, in the event that the Chilean authorities were willing to allow the establishment of the provisional government set up by Señor Calderon, to encourage the Peruvians to accept any reasonable conditions to make this result possible, and to impress upon the Chileans the desirability of a liberal policy." The United States believed that Peru should make peace, even if loss of territory were demanded; and the weight of American influence with Chile would be used to make the cession of territory a subject of negotiation, and not a condition precedent to negotiations. The objects of the provisional Peruvian government, thought Mr. Blaine, were to establish a constitutional government and to open negotiations for peace without the imposition of preliminary conditions on either side. Chilean rights as a result of success in war were recognized, and it was admitted that cession of territory by Peru might necessarily follow as a price of peace. Mr. Hurlbut was expressly warned that the time for friendly intervention had not arrived.

The course of Mr. Hurlbut, giving the impression that the United States would interfere actively in the South

'Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 35.