a purpose to effect a union between the creoles and negroes of the island, and to set up a negro military republic under British protection.1 Daniel Webster, who was then Secretary of State, thought that this would be a death-blow to slavery in the United States, and would constitute a serious menace to American commerce. "It is quite obvious,” he stated, in a letter to Mr. Campbell, the American consul at Havana, “that any attempt on the part of England to employ a force in Cuba for any purpose would bring on a war, involving possibly all Europe as well as the United States." 2

In 1852 the ministers of France and Great Britain, at Washington, invited the United States to join their government in the conclusion of a tripartite convention, the substance of which was contained in the following article:

The high contracting parties hereby, severally and collectively, disclaim, now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and they respectively bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatsoever.

The high contracting parties declare severally and collectively, that they will not obtain or maintain for themselves, any exclusive control over the said island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the same.3

This proposal was declined. The response of the United States was made by Edward Everett, as Secretary of State, in identic notes addressed to the British and French ministers at Washington on December 1, 1852. In these notes, which attracted wide attention, the Cuban question was comprehensively reviewed; and the conclusion was

144 Br. and For. State Papers, p. 174.

244 ibid., p. 176.

S. Ex. Doc. 13, 32 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 15.

reached that the United States, although it entertained no designs on the island, could not be expected and could not properly be asked to agree not to acquire it under any future conditions.1

1

He

Only five years before Mr. Everett's note was written, President Polk had made a serious effort to bring about the annexation of Cuba to the United States. Among the reasons by which he supported his action was the fear that Great Britain would eventually seize the island, and thus have the coastwide trade of the United States at her mercy. authorized the offer of a maximum of a hundred million dollars for the cession.2 The Spanish government would not listen to the proposal, the minister of the United States at Madrid reporting that " sooner than see the island transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sink in the ocean.

9 3

In the celebrated "Ostend Manifesto" of 1854, the annexation of Cuba by the United States was openly and strongly advocated. This document was signed by James Buchanan, John Y. Mason and Pierre Soulé, ministers respectively to Great Britain, France and Spain, who had been instructed to meet at some convenient point in Europe to confer and report upon the Cuban question. They strongly recommended the purchase of the island, and, in case Spain should persist in refusing to sell, intimated that the United States would be justified in acting upon the principle of self-preservation, especially if conditions should develop, as regards the slave population, that would endanger the peace and tranquility of the states of the United States in which slavery existed. Should such conditions

1 S. Ex. Doc. 13, 32 Cong. 2 Sess., pp. 17, 22-23; Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 460.

'H. Ex. Doc. 121, 32 Cong. I Sess., p. 49.

supervene, and Spain still remain obdurate to offers of purchase, the question would, in the opinion of the signers of the "manifesto," then arise as to whether further action was not imperative; and in this relation they significantly declared:

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

The Ostend Manifesto became a political issue, in connection with the contest over slavery; but condemnation of it was not confined to the members of any one political party. There were leading Democrats who requdiated its recommendations. Naturally, the Republican platform of 1856 denounced it, declaring "that the highwayman's plea that might makes right embodied in the Ostend circular

. . would bring shame and dishonor upon any government or people that gave it their sanction." 1 The Democratic Secretary of State, William M. Marcy, in a letter to Soulé, remarked that doubtless "it was not extended by yourself and your colleagues to offer to Spain the alternative of cession or seizure."2 Marcy, while expressing the opinion that the acquisition of Cuba would be advantageous as "a precautionary measure of security," stated that he did not regard existing conditions as imperiling the existence of the government. " But," he added, "should the contingency suggested in your report ever arise there is no reason to doubt that the case will be promptly met by the deliberate judgment and decisive action of the American people."

1 Stanwood, History of the Presidency, p. 272.

'H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33 Cong. 2 Sess., p. 135.

Ibid., p. 136.

During the years 1868-1878, the civil strife, commonly known as the "Ten Years' War," kept the Cuban question before the American people, and gave rise to many perplexing problems. President Grant, in his annual message to Congress, December 6, 1869, said that the United States would refrain from enforcing its views upon unwilling nations and from exercising an interested part without invitation in the quarrels of other states, whether between nation and nation or between government and subjects.1 The Cuban struggle, he declared, had not reached a state of actual war, nor had the insurgents demonstrated their capacity for recognition as belligerents. Spain had accepted a tender of the good offices of the United States only on terms unfair to Cuba, and the offer was withdrawn. Later, in a special message to Congress, the President reviewed the progress of the disorderly system of warfare prevailing in the island, the chief results of which were devastation and wanton destruction. The law of nations was violated by both parties. No responsible de facto government existed on the island, nor had Spain quelled the revolt or protected the rights and interests of foreign nations and their citizens. Similar complaints, together with discussions of the question of declaring neutrality and according to the insurgents belligerent rights, may be found in the annual message of 1870, as well as in subsequent communications to Congress. Vigorous protests were made to Spain against her conduct in numerous matters.2 The termination of the conflict, together with the abolition of slavery and the granting of autonomy to the islands, was urged.3 The president regarded “. . . . independence, and emanci

1Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vii, p. 31. 'Ibid., vol. vii, pp. 64, 97, 147.

3 Foreign Relations, 1871, p. 733; 1872, p. 580; 1873, vol. ii, pp. 1032

pation, of course, as the only certain and even necessary, solution of the question of Cuba. And, in his mind, all incidental questions are quite subordinate to those, the larger interests of the United States in this respect.

September 26, 1872, a circular was issued by Señor Jil Colunje, Colombian secretary of interior and foreign relations, to the American governments relative to the situation in Cuba. The length of the contest, the hopelessness of peace, the devastation and ruin of the island and the utter disregard for law and order rendered the situation so serious that the American nations, so the circular declared, could not longer remain unconcerned.2 Cuban rights should be respected. Cuba as an independent nation would mean the disappearance of slavery. Colombia also proposed that the governments of Spanish America and the United States act jointly to obtain from Spain the recognition of Cuban independence. In case the expenses of the war caused Spain to hesitate, the mediating governments might agree to a pro rata reimbursement, requiring none in return, although the resources of Cuba were ample. In case mediation was accepted, it was proposed that confiscation of property and capital punishment for political offenses be discontinued. In replying to this circular, Mr. Fish, speaking as Secretary of State, intimated that the United States would not enter upon the course suggested by Colombia, unless the answers of the Spanish American states to the circular and the conditions prevailing in Cuba furnished reasonable grounds to believe that American intervention would be successful. On another occasion Mr. Fish also intimated that, instead of taking it for granted that the United States would act upon the proposals con

1Foreign Relations, 1874, p. 862.

3

'Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law, vol. vi, p. 70.

Ibid., vol. vi, pp. 70-71.