time the comity of nations by acquainting the colonies comprised in the imperial domain, subsequently to become states, with the aims and civilization of the Roman world. A family of nations, governed in their exterior relations by a body of rules called international law, could not be established, based merely on the practice of the Mediterranean area Christianity was a leavening force, placing emphasis on interests other than those merely national in character, and especially on the belief in a universal brotherhood. The Crusades did much to bring the Western nations together. Thus, a "community of interests" among the nations was getting a firm hold. The Reformation, causing alliances to be formed ostensibly on grounds of faith as opposed to grounds of race, but actually on grounds of conquest and expansion, played an important part. But it remained for the discovery of the New World to quicken the European nations with an appreciation of their international responsibilities and opportunities. The desire for colonies and for the conquest of inferior peoples, while bringing the nations into conflict, had a distinctly sobering influence on them; for extended colonial expansion has for its counterpart increased complexity in foreign relations.

Following the bringing of the states into closer relations, certain influences operated to reestablish and preserve the balance of power and alliances. The most potent of these influences was the rise of the nations. The break-up of the Roman empire and of the empire of Charlemagne, and the subsequent rise of France and England as nations, settled the fact that European political development should be national in character. The interests of the Papacy were best served, not by European political unity, but by national political unity. The Holy Roman Empire by its failure only hastened the development of the nations. Nicolo Machiavelli, writing in the fifteenth century, advocated the

doctrines or reasons of state" and political expediency. This was the first concrete expression of the later theory of the balance of power. The Italian states made use of the principle when Naples, the Pope, Tuscany, Venice and Milan attempted to maintain a balance of power between them. The growth of commerce and the dominance of Spain in the sixteenth century further demonstrated the necessity of some sort of equilibrum among the states of Europe. Strong absolutism in France, and the Bourbon and Hapsburg dynastic rivalry were disturbing elements. It remained for the Thirty Years' War and the Peace of Westphalia definitely to establish the balance of power and the status quo in Europe.

The Peace of Westphalia did not remove from European politics the danger of an ambitious state. The power of Spain had declined and was no longer to be feared. Louis XIV, desiring to humiliate the Hapsburgs and to give to France the leadership of the Roman states, greatly disturbed the peace of Europe. His doctrine of natural boundaries and frontiers could only lead to intervention. The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1668 served further to establish the balance of power. Intervention for rights of succession is well illustrated in the eighteenth century. The War of the Spanish Succession, in which France was opposed by the intervention of the Grand Alliance, was settled by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. By this peace France was reduced to her original position as an ordinary European power. The war of the Austrian Succession, while giving the Hohenzollerns a victory over the Hapsburgs, did not settle the points at issue, and the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle proved to be only a truce. The Seven Years' War, however, had definite results. English dominance in North America was established, and France and Spain were humilated. The treaty

France, Spain and Portugal. The treaty of Hubertsburg brought the war to an end between Austria, Prussia and Saxony. The treaties did little to encourage a “lasting peace." The principle of partition was applied to Poland by the partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795. Intervention, then, was a definite principle in the European political system.

Opposed to the theory of intervention was the doctrine of non-intervention. It did not, however, gain much approval, except among the smaller states. It is obvious how difficult it was for such a principle to flourish in Europe. No sovereign state would agree not to intervene in the internal affairs of another state, when such abstinence might seem directly to involve its own existence; and non-intervention might have meant the ruin even of a large European state, so long as the system of alliances continued. The adop tion of non-intervention as a deliberate and consistent policy was reserved to the United States; the wisdom of which became very real after an instructive experience with a European alliance and a narrow escape from being drawn into the European conflict during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.

The status of European diplomacy at the outbreak of the war for American Independence was practically the same as at the close of the Seven Years' War. England had succeeded in establishing a position of maritime and colonial supremacy against the opposition of France and Spain. The American colonists had fought valiantly on the side of England. But England did not make proper use of her victory. The colonists wanted individual, governmental and commercial freedom, together with the destruction of the then universal system of commercial monopoly. They finally became convinced that revolt was the only way to secure their natural rights, and they were willing to take this step, together with an assumption of its responsibilities.

The European powers were little in sympathy with England, but were not prepared to give the colonists any active and open support. The important thing to notice is that Europe was still governed by the principles of the balance of power, alliances and intervention; while the Americans, conscious of the evils of the European system, were to follow a new course, in which the principles controlling Europe were to have only a negative influence.

It is not strange that the question of intervention or nonintervention as a national policy should have arisen during the Revolutionary period. The Revolution, if successful, meant the creation of a new state with all the usual consequences, including the establishment of foreign relations. Questions of treaties, exchange of diplomatic representatives, alliances and intervention would naturally arise; and there would be a serious responsibility to assume in committing the government to a definite policy, the subsequent abandonment of which, whether forced or voluntary, might result in humiliation. The history of Ainerican foreign policy at this time is limited to the definition of our relations with the states of Europe. The extension of that policy, comprehending the other independent states of America and the relation of the United States and of the states of Europe to them, was reserved for a subsequent and different

occasion.

The new government, soon after entering upon the war with England, sought admission to the family of nations by attempting to enter into diplomatic relations with the neutral states. In this it encountered serious obstacles. Independent states at war find diplomacy difficult; but a revolutionary government is more seriously embarrassed. At the outset American statesmen for the most part not only lacked

important, they lacked the means and opportunity to conduct such relations effectively.

According to Wharton, there were two schools of thought in Congress those who favored and those who opposed the exercise of a highly centralized executive authority. The conflict between these schools continued until the adoption of the Constitution, and persisted subsequently in dealing with questions of construction and interpretation. Both schools attempted to extend their ideas of internal administration to diplomacy. The first, represented by Samuel Adams, John Adams and Richard Henry Lee, did much to spread propaganda against Great Britain, but did not equal the other school in constructive statesmanship during the progress of the Revolution and afterward. Such influence in Congress prevented efficiency, not only in diplomacy but in war and finance as well. Dr. Franklin was the ablest and shrewdest diplomatist of the Revolutionary era, as will be shown in considering the negotiation of the French treaties. Morris, Livingston and Jay were constructive diplomatists, while the work of Jefferson and Hamilton at home was doubtless equal to the work of Franklin in France. It is an easy matter to magnify the importance of Wharton's distinction, and to attempt to explain tendencies by it for which it can in no degree be held responsible.

The success which our Revolutionary diplomatists eventually achieved must be credited to their own ability rather than to any guidance or aid from Congress. The organization of the department of foreign affairs was anything but satisfactory. In both the determination and the administration of foreign policies, experience seemed to be the only teacher of Congress. The first diplomatic organ during the Revolution was established by resolution of Congress:

1 Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. i, p. 253.