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NOVEMBER 29, 1775.

Resolved, That a committee of five be appointed for the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland and other parts of the world, and that they lay their correspondence before Congress when directed.

Resolved, That this Congress will make provision to defray all such expenses as may arise by carrying on such a correspondence, and for the payment of such agents as they may send on this service.1

The members chosen for this work were Mr. Harrison, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Jay. The selection of Dr. Franklin and Mr. Jay was not sanctioned by John Adams, Samuel Adams and Arthur Lee." This resolution is doubly important because it was the first step taken to organize a department of foreign affairs and the first effort to get in touch with European countries. The committee of foreign affairs was established in April, 1777, taking over the work of the committee of secret correspondence. The constant changing of the personnel of the committee and the lack of a permanent executive officer imperiled the work of the committee from the start. The President of Congress directed the diplomatic correspondence when no committee existed for the purpose. On August 10, 1781, Robert R. Livingston was appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Congress, however, entrusted him with little discretionary authority.

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The conflict in Congress over the question of administration led to the practice of what Wharton calls "militia diplomacy. The Congress paid little regard to the rules of diplomacy, while some, like John Adams, chafed under them. Determined to establish diplomatic relations with

1 Wharton, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 61.

'Ibid., vol. i, p. 554.

European governments, Congress insisted upon sending ministers to all foreign courts without inquiring as to whether they would be received. The chief object of these missions was to borrow money. Dr. Franklin regarded them as indiscreet. In a letter to Arthur Lee, March 21, 1777, he very clearly stated his judgment of the ultra-enthusiasm of Congress in hastening foreign intercourse: “I have never yet changed the opinion I gave in Congress, that a virgin state should preserve the virgin character, and not go about suitoring for alliances, but wait with decent dignity the applications of others. I was overruled; perhaps for the best." 1

The quest of recognition at some of the European courts resulted unfortunately for the revolted colonies. Contrary to Franklin's advice, Congress commissioned Arthur Lee to Madrid and to Berlin, William Lee to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The Hague, and Izard to Florence; all with instructions to secure both recognition and subsidy. None of these representatives was officially received. The prestige of the United States was wounded, both by the practice of sending unwelcome representatives, and by the manner of the appeals. Congress did not seem to take into account the likelihood that the recognition of the United States by neutral powers would be considered by Great Britain as an act of intervention.

Spain did not care to risk the consequences of recognizing the independence of the United States. Frederick the Great of Prussia was by no means opposed to the American revolt, but commercial and neutral interests prevented him from according recognition. Russia was at this time championing neutral rights, and hence could not afford to abandon her neutral position. The Netherlands had no inclination to become involved in the American war, until

'Franklin, Works, vol. vi, p. 83.

complications with England made it imperative. The French alliance was the only one secured during the Revolution. While it proved of value in winning the war for independence, it was at the same time an alliance which some of our ablest statesmen later sought to avoid, and which, without proper leadership, would have led to disastrous consequences.

The American-French relations during the Revolution directly involved the question of American interference in European affairs. Encouraged by representations from the French court, Franklin favored seeking an alliance with France, but with no other power. The reasons for French sympathy with the Revolution were older than the Revolution itself. They dated back to the treaty of Paris of 1763. The Seven Years' War brought nothing but humiliation to France. That country had lost its position in the New World. With her navy destroyed, her army defeated, and her commerce badly crippled, France attempted to repair her fortunes and to restore her former prestige. If an alliance with the revolted American colonies would produce this result, she would not hesitate to enter into negotiations. Louis XV favored the encouragement of discontent in the British colonies. The accession of Louis XVI to the throne was followed by the appointment of Vergennes as foreign minister. Vergennes was not sentimentally interested in the Revolution. He watched the American situation carefully with the idea of French intervention in mind. Bonvouloir was sent to America on a secret mission to secure information and to indicate to the American leaders that they might secure aid from France, should war follow. Bonvouloir was received by the secret committee, but refused to commit France to any definite policy of alliance or intervention. He stated that France

war.1 His impressions were conveyed to Vergennes, who at once gave himself to a serious study as to how far France should actively aid the Colonies.

On October 2, 1776, the secret committee received from Congress a draft of a treaty of commerce and alliance between France and the United States, together with the appointment of Dr. Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and Silas Deane as commissioners to negotiate the treaty. The committee transmitted this information to Silas Deane. In the absence or disability of any one or two of the commissioners, the other was given full power to act. The committee advised Deane, however, to await the arrival of Franklin and Jefferson before communicating the commission to the French ministry. On December 4, Franklin informed Deane of his arrival, of the appointment of the commissioners, and of the selection of Arthur Lee, then at London, in place of Jefferson who had declined to serve. Deane at once communicated the arrival of Franklin to Vergennes.*

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Congress now gave its attention in earnest to the proposed French alliance. The secret committee warned the American commissioners at Paris of the means England was taking to prevent foreign aid, especially French, from being given America. Prospects of accommodation, the committee declared, would effectually prevent foreign interference. It was, therefore, the most decisive note yet received by the American commissioners when the secret committee declared that "all views of accommodation with Great Britain but on principles of peace as independent states and

5

'Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. i, p. 334.

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Franklin, Works, by Bigelow, vol. vi, p. 35.

Wharton, Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, vol. ii, p. 223.

5 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 227.

in a manner perfectly consistent with the treaties our commissioners may make with foreign states" were "totally at an end since the Declaration of Independence and the embassy to the court of France." On December 30, 1776, Congress again urged the commissioners to hasten with their tenders of alliance.2

1

The secret committee's correspondence became largely memoranda of the military and financial situations for the intelligence of the commissioners. No further suggestions could help them. There was no longer any question as to the American policy of seeking foreign aid. The problem now was to complete the negotiations. So intense were the commissioners in their desire to prove America a faithful party to the proposed stipulations, that they agreed to the following personal pledge:

We, the commissioners plenipotentiary from the Congress of the United States of America, are unanimously of the opinion that if France or Spain shall conclude a treaty of amity and commerce with our states, and enter into a war with Great Britain in consequence of that, or of open aid given to our states, it will be very right and proper for us, or in the absence of the others for anyone of us, to stipulate and agree that the United States shall not separately conclude a peace, nor aid Great Britain against France or Spain, nor intermit their best exertions against Great Britain during the continuance of such war, provided always that France and Spain do on their part enter into a similar stipulation with our states.3

This pledge was an entering wedge toward a strong policy of alliance in that the right of making a separate peace was to be abandoned in case of reciprocal agreements with

1 Wharton, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 229.

'Ibid., vol. ii, p. 241.

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