2 France and Spain. The publication of the Articles of Confederation and the various state constitutions in French did much to increase confidence in the political sagacity of the Americans. The commissioners under the leadership of Franklin did not lose courage, but informed the secret committee that while France would not treat with them as regards independence while at peace with Great Britain, yet American commerce was receiving the treatment accorded the most favored nation, and nothing could be gained by unreasonable haste. On September 8, 1777, the American commissioners again communicated the status of negotiations to the secret committee. France still professed to England that she would observe all treaties. brought into French ports were restored, persons found fitting out armed vessels against England within French jurisdiction were imprisoned, and the exportation of warlike stores were prohibited. Privately the French court professed friendship, winked at the furnishing of supplies to America, and at the same time was preparing for war. It was playing a double part, thought the commissioners, the question which part would ultimately predominate being unsettled. 3 Prizes On December 8, 1777, the same day Congress resolved to recall Silas Deane, the American envoys addressed a communication to Vergennes which soon proved to be effective." An audience was granted by Vergennes on December 12.° On December 17, Monsieur Gerard called upon the American representatives by order of the king, and informed them 1 Wharton, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 287. 2 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 324. Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 388, 389. Ibid., vol. ii, p. 444. ▪Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 444-445. •Ibid., vol. ii, p. 452. that His Majesty had decided to enter into a treaty of amity and commerce. He said that the king desired a perpetual amity, and would both acknowledge and support American independence by every means in his power, even to the extent of going to war, which then seemed likely.' He would not even insist upon America not making a separate peace at her convenience, but he must require that in any peace made with England, the United States should not surrender their independence and return to British rule. A courier was to be sent to Madrid to secure the concurrence of Spain. There were legitimate reasons for Spanish delay. Perhaps the clearest expression of the French attitude toward the alliance is shown in the note of Louis XVI of France to Charles III of Spain, January 8, 1788. It is evident that the French in the formation of their alliances were not prompted by purely altruistic motives. His Most Christian Majesty was of the opinion that the Bourbon system of alliance" would be best maintained by an alliance between himself, His Most Catholic Majesty, and the United States. The defeat of Burgoyne and the discouraging position of Howe had entirely changed things. It was the policy of England, thought the king, to pacify America, and then to fall on France with her maritime force, and the time was at hand to act, if reunion with the mother country was to be prevented. Negotiations were hurried, and after certain communications between the commissioners and Gerard, treaties of amity and commerce, and of alliance, were concluded at Paris, February 6, 1778. The treaty of amity and commerce followed closely the projected Congressional plan.* 1 Wharton, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 452. "Ibid., vol. ii, p. 453 'Ibid., vol. ii, p. 467. 1 The treaty established "firm, inviolable and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship between the Most Christian King, his heirs and successors, and the United States of America." It was agreed reciprocally to extend "most favored nation" privileges in commerce and navigation, to prevent discriminatory duties both in the United States and in France, and to extend reciprocal protection to the vessels of both countries. The remainder of the convention treated mainly of fisheries, contraband goods, treatment of prisoners of war, consuls, and of vessels, trade and navigation. 2 66 But the crowning achievement of the commissioners was the treaty of alliance, which has been aptly termed "the most important diplomatic event of the American Revolution." By the first article an alliance was formed against Great Britain. In the event of war between Great Britain and France before the close of the Revolution, the United States and France agreed to make it a common cause and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their councils and forces, according to the exigence of conjunctures, as becomes good and faithful allies." By article II the avowed purpose of the defensive alliance was to "maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty and independence absolute and unlimited, of the United States, as well in matters of government as of commerce." There were certain important agreements as to operations. Each party should, acting for itself, do everything possible against the common enemy. In case concurrent action was necessary, the details of the case should be settled by a special convention. Any reduction of the British power in North America or in the Bermudas, should result in an enlargement of the territory of the United States. France renounced all claim to 1 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, etc., vol. i, p. 469. any territory in North America or the Bermudas that had formerly been ceded to Britain. The islands in the Gulf of Mexico were, in case of success, reserved to France. In Article VIII the contracting parties agreed not to conclude a truce or peace without the consent of the other, and engaged not to lay down their arms until American independence had been guaranteed by treaties. No claim of compensation could be made by one ally against the other, and a general invitation was extended to other nations to make common cause against Great Britain. The United States guaranteed to France the possessions held by the latter in America, and any others which might be gained by the treaty of peace; France guaranteed the liberty, sovereignty and independence of the United States, and the territories taken in the war. This reciprocal guarantee was to take effect the moment war occurred between France and England, if such should happen; if not, at the close of the war between the United States and England. A separate act was made, reserving to the king of Spain the right to agree to both treaties.1 Franklin and Deane informed Congress of their success on February 8, 1778. On February 16, the three envoys transmitted the treaties to the committee of foreign affairs, remarking that "this is an event which will give our states such an appearance of stability as must strengthen our credit, encourage other powers in Europe to ally themselves with us, weaken the hopes of our internal as well as our external enemies, fortify our friends and be in many other respects so advantageous to us that we congratulate you upon it most heartily." The best hope for the future of America, thought Congress and the commissioners, lay in 2 1 Malloy. Treaties, Conventions, etc., vol. i, p. 482. 2 Wharton. Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, the formation of foreign alliances. On May 4, 1778, Congress ratified the treaty which later brought the United States face to face with the question of interference in European affairs, and the treaty which brought to the front the question of intervention or non-intervention as an American policy. It was destined to test the statesmanship of Washington, Jefferson and Hamilton, and to be abrogated by an act of Congress in support of the policy adopted because of treaty complications with France. It may be said that France fully performed the obligations of the alliance. The unofficial aid privately given before the alliance was only a mere suggestion of the aid subsequently given. Large sums of money were constantly loaned. Supplies were obtained in France. The Marquis de Lafayette and other French officers and men rendered distinguished military service. And France paid the price for her alliance,-an act of intervention which led to war with Great Britain. While the Revolution and the French alliance achieved the independence of the United States, the policy of the country as regards interference in European affairs was as yet to be finally determined. It is true that non-intervention was theoretically the policy of the United States, and that from the first discerning statesmen regarded America as a nation apart, with a different role to play in the world's affairs. Attention will be given to the influence of the non-intervention principle as a theory, but it is important at this juncture to examine the events leading up to the discussion of the intervention question and the circumstances under which the policy of non-intervention was adopted. Perhaps the most fundamental principle in the American foreign policy, it is essential to understand how it was tested and formally proclaimed in the post-Revolutionary period. |