During the critical period immediately succeeding the Revolution, the government of the Confederation had perplexities enough, without concerning itself with the question of a permanent policy as regards intervention; but this question was not to be long postponed. The year 1789 was a memorable one. The Constitution became operative. Washington assumed his duties as President. Jefferson was relieved of his duties as minister to France and William Short was named in his stead.1 In the same year the French Revolution broke out-a movement which evoked much American sympathy; and it was to be in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars that the test of the strength of the non-intervention principle was to be made. The political theories of Locke and Rousseau as regards natural rights and especially as regards the right of revolution, had a deep effect in America and in France. It is difficult to determine just what part American sympathy played at this critical juncture when our non-intervention and neutrality policies were at stake. A celebration was held in New York on December 27, 1792, and a "Civic Feast" occurred in Boston January 27, 1793. Many popular demonstrations were held. The term Citizen" became widely adopted. Jefferson, in writing to Monroe, May 5, 1793, said that the war between France and England was rekindling the spirit of 1776. He declared:

66

A French frigate took a British prize off the capes of Delaware the other day and sent her up here. Upon her coming into sight thousands and thousands of the yeomanry of the city crowded and covered the wharves. Never before was such a crowd seen there, and when the British colors were seen reversed, and the French flag flying above them they burst into peals of exultation. wish we may be able to repress the spirit of the people within the limits of a fair neutrality.

'Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, p. 58.

The enthusiasm of the people, however, did not extend to the government of the United States. If the former had been the true test of the American attitude, France had good reasons to expect substantial aid from her ally. It was fortunate at this time that Washington, Jefferson and Hamilton were in control of the government. In his first inaugural speech and first annual address to Congress, Washington did not place much emphasis on the subject of foreign relations. He did, however, advocate provision for the national defence and the extension of foreign intercourse. In his second annual address, December 8, 1790, he reminded Congress that the situation in Europe should invite America to greater circumspection in maintaining peace; that the tendency of a war could not be overlooked and should be met by preparation for war. He prophesied commercial troubles, and recommended action to guard against it. Washington's private correspondence with Lafayette (July 28, 1791) reveals a wholesome attitude toward Europe, but also a desire to remain at peace with the world." He cleverly observed that the guarantee of peace caused the people to appreciate and uphold the government. Consistently with his avowed policy, he made no statements favoring or justifying the liberal movement in France except to Lafayette and on the event of the acceptance of the constitution by the French king. These statements were characterized by a quiet dignity.

4

The President, when war approached in 1793, was alert to the danger which might threaten America. On April 12, 1793, he wrote Secretary of State Jefferson that "War having actually commenced between France and Great

1Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, pp. 65, 66. 'Ibid., vol. i, p. &.

8 Washington, Writings, by Ford, vol. xii, p. 59.

'Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. i, pp. 116-117.

[324 Britain, it behooves the government of this country to use every means in its power to prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling us with either of those powers, by endeavoring to maintain a strict neutrality." In addition he ordered Jefferson to give the subject "mature consideration," in order that appropriate action might be taken.

1

The news of the war was not the only event complicating the situation. The advice came that M. Edmond C. Genêt had been appointed minister to the United States, representing the new French republic, and that he was on his way to take up his duties. Minister Morris, in a note dated March 7, 1793, informed the government that Monsieur Genêt took out with him three hundred blank commissions, to distribute to such as would fit out cruisers in American ports to prey on British commerce. Morris regarded this procedure as pernicious morally as well as leading to dangerous consequences. His note to Thomas Pinckney, American minister to Great Britain, on March 2, was more specific. He was certain that the Executive Council had furnished Genêt with the three hundred commissions, and was equally certain that France would benefit more as a nation from American neutrality than from an alliance. Feeling strongly on the subject, he suggested a proclamation of neutrality, and a denial of protection to all contravening it, leaving them at the mercy of the party taking them.

The Washington cabinet was immediately summoned. On April 18, the President sent a circular letter to the cabinet members, informing them of the delicate situation in which the United States was placed. In forming a general plan for executive action, he submitted the following questions for their consideration:

'Washington, Writings, by Ford, vol. xii, p. 278. Am. State Papers, For. Rel., vol. i, p. 354.

1. Shall a proclamation issue for the purpose of preventing interference of the citizens of the United States in the war between France and Great Britain, etc.? Shall it contain a declaration of neutrality or not? What shall it contain?

2. Shall a minister from the Republic of France be received? 3. If received, shall it be absolutely or with qualifications; and if with qualifications, of what kind?

4. Are the United States obliged by good faith to consider the treaties heretofore made with France as applying to the present situation of the parties? May they either renounce them or hold them suspended until the government of France shall be established?

5. If they have the right, is it expedient to do either, and which?

6. If they have an option, would it be a breach of neutrality to consider the treaties still in operation?

7. If the treaties are to be regarded as now in operation, is the guarantee in the treaty of alliance applicable to a defensive war only, or to war either offensive or defensive?

8. Does the war in France appear to be offensive or defensive on her part? Or of a mixed and equivocal character?

9. If of a mixed and equivocal character, does the guarantee in any event apply to such a war?

10. What is the effect of a guarantee such as that to be found in the treaty of alliance between the United States and France?

II. Does any article in either of the treaties prevent ships of war, other than privateers, of the powers opposed to France from coming into the ports of the United States to act as convoys to their own merchantmen? Or does it lay any other restraint upon them more than would apply to the ships of war of France?

12. Should the future regent of France send a minister to the United States, ought he to be received?

13. Is it necessary or advisable to call together the two houses of Congress, with a view to the present posture of European

affairs? If it is, what should be the particular object of such a call? 1

The foregoing questions, discussed in Cabinet meeting April 19, 1793, indicate Washington's broad grasp of the general situation. The opinion of the Cabinet was expressed concerning the first two questions only. As to question I, it was " Agreed by all that a proclamation shall issue, forbidding our citizens to take part in any hostilities on the seas with or against any of the belligerent powers, and warning them against carrying to any such powers any of these articles deemed contraband according to the modern usage of nations, and enjoining them from all acts and proceedings inconsistent with the duties of a friendly nation towards those at war." 2 As to question II, it was "Agreed unanimously that he shall be received." As to question III, it was decided that "This and the subsequent questions are to be postponed to another day."

Following the meeting of the Cabinet, Jefferson on April 28, 1793, delivered to the President his opinion on the general question: Whether the United States ought to declare their treaties with France void, or suspended. This opinion contained answers to questions II to VI, inclusive. He held that questions VII-X, being on the guarantee, could not be adequately answered apart from a situation to which they applied. On the twelfth question (as to the reception of a minister sent by the future regent of France) he was of the opinion that if the nation of France should ever reestablish such an office as regent, a minister should be received, but not from a regent set up by any other authority.*

1Washington, Writings, by Ford, vol. xii, p. 280.

'Jefferson, Writings, by Ford, vol. vi, p. 217.

'Ibid., vol. vi, p. 218.