Great Britain refused to agree to the protocol. Castlereagh declared that Great Britain was neutral as regards Naples, and that the proposal would restore the general system of guarantee, both territorial and political, which was abandoned at Aix-la-Chapelle.' He also distinguished between the French revolution and other revolutions. The signatures to the protocol were withdrawn and the Conference adjourned to meet at Laibach in order to allow the King of Naples to attend. Here the same debate continued, Great Britain and France opposing the stand taken by the three autocratic powers, Austria, Prussia and Russia. There was, therefore, a distinct difference between the ideas of the Western liberal powers and the original members of the Holy Alliance.

The Congress of Verona was called to consider the revolutionary movement in Spain. France immediately asked the allies whether they would withdraw their ministers from Madrid should France do so. In case of war, how would the allies express their moral and material support? Emperor Alexander was of the opinion that the question was a European one, not French.2 Wellington urged the allies not to become the enemies of Spain, and declared that Great Britain could not be party to interference in that country. By a treaty of November 22, 1822, it was declared that representative government was incompatible with monarchical principles, and they engaged "to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known. The liberty of the press was to be sup

1

1 Phillips, W. A., Confederation of Europe, pp. 223-227.

2 Ibid., pp. 269-270.

'Ibid., p. 274

Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 46.

pressed, and the clergy were to be sustained in whatever measures they should adopt to preserve the authority of Princes. This adoption of the principle of intervention by the allied powers marked the formal withdrawal of Wellington from the Conference.

The various Congresses were held for practical purposes, not theoretical. The principle of intervention was a serious reality to the smaller states of Europe. The Congresses of Troppau and Laibach concerned the revolution in Naples. The Congress of Verona concerned the uprising in Spain. Austria intervened in Naples and in Piedmont. France intervened in Spain. Portugal was dangerously threatened, but protected by England. The purpose of the Holy Alliance was a real one, which, if extended to America, would cause infinite trouble for the United States.

The principle of intervention pursued by the Holy Alliance could result only in intervention in the Americas, if unopposed. Such intervention was regarded by the continental powers as their clear right. The Spanish colonies were discussed at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, due largely to the insistence of France. Richelieu favored the establishment of the royal house of Bambara in the revolted provinces. The mediation asked by Spain was to be without force, the revolted colonies being treated as the loyal ones. Spain refused the mediation, as she was excluded from the Conference. France and Russia proposed that the United States be invited to a Conference at Madrid to consider the question of the Spanish colonies.1 Richelieu regarded the United States as no source of danger; but an entirely new and complete republican world would endanger the old world. It was his purpose to get the United States to meet "in order to attach the United States to the general system of Europe and to prevent a spirit of rivalry and

1

2

hatred establishing itself between the Old and the New World." May 13, 1818, President Monroe submitted the following question to his Cabinet: "Whether the Ministers of the United States in Europe shall be instructed that the United States will not join in any project of interposition between Spain and the South Americans which should not be to promote the complete independence of these provinces; and whether measures shall be taken to ascertain if this be the policy of the British government, and, if so, to establish a concert with them for the support of this policy The ministers of the United States to France, England and Prussia were instructed to make known to those governments that the United States would have no part in any mediation or interference which did not have as its basis. the absolute independence of the Spanish colonies.3 Russia unofficially invited the United States to become a party to the Holy Alliance, holding that it was essentially a pledge of principles. Mr. Adams, as Secretary of State, instructed Mr. Middleton, minister to Russia, to refuse explicitly for the United States. He stated to Mr. Middleton the following as regards the origin, growth and difficulties of the American policy:

The political system of the United States is also essentially extra-European. The stand in firm and cautious independence of all entanglements in the European system, has been a cardinal point of their policy under every administration of their government, from the peace of 1783 to this day. If at the original adoption of their system there could have been any doubt of its justice or its wisdom, there can be none at this time. Every year's experience rivets it more deeply in the principles and opinions of the nation. Yet in proportion as the import

1 Phillips, W. A., Confederation of Europe, pp. 256-257.

'Hart, The Monroe Doctrine, p. 48.

Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. vi, pp. 375-376.

ance of the United States as one of the members of the general society of civilized nations increases in the eyes of the others, the difficulties of maintaining this system and the temptations to depart from it increase and multiply with it.1

The growing hostility of Great Britain to the Holy Alliance, and her aversion to the principle of intervention against all revolutionary movements has already been pointed out. A share in South American commerce was desired by Great Britain, but this could not be gained under Spanish control. In an interview with Richard Rush, American minister to England, Canning indicated the general outlines of British policy. Increasing difficulties surrounded the Spanish cause, he thought. The course of time and events had settled the separation of the colonies from Spain, although their recognition by Great Britain depended on circumstances. The British King had no intention of appropriating any Spanish territory in America to himself. Any such attempt by France would not be acquiesced in by England. He proposed that England and America make known to the world their views on the subject. Rush could not give a definite reply. He was of the opinion that there would be no reconciliation between Spain and the colonies, but in case there should be, England would do nothing to prevent it. No formal recognition had taken place, but a commission of inquiry was likely to be sent to America to report on the status of the de facto governments. On August 20, 1823, Canning proposed to Rush that the time was at hand for an open avowal of their attitude. submitted the following propositions:

2

1 Moore, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 378.

'Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, vol. vi, p. 362.

He

1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.

2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent states, to be one of time and circumstances.

3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiation.

4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.

5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference.1

Canning argued that if both countries were of this opinion, there was no reason why they should not confide in each other and publish it in the face of the world. It would put at rest the ambitions of European states, while ending the jealousies of Spain and the agitation in the colonies. He believed that an opportunity was never before afforded "when so small an effort of two friendly governments might produce so unequivocal a good, and prevent such extensive calamities." 2 Rush replied on August 23, agreeing to Mr. Canning's propositions, but disclaiming any authority to act. In writing to the Secretary of State, Rush feared that Canning knew of designs against the independence of the South American states. This fear was confirmed by Canning's notification to Rush (August 23, 1823) that a Congress on Spanish-American affairs was planned after the affairs in Spain were settled."

4

President Monroe favored meeting the British proposal. He submitted Canning's proposals to Jefferson and Madison, asking three questions:

1 Hamilton, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 365.

'Ibid., vol. vi, p. 366.

"Ibid., vol. vi, pp. 366-367.

Ibid., vol. vi, pp. 368-369

5Ibid., vol. vi, p. 369.