President Monroe to abstain from anything in his message which the Holy Allies could construe as meaning aggression. Should the Holy Alliance be determined to make an issue with the United States, it should be our policy to meet, and not to make it, and we should have all we could do to prevent intervention, without bidding them actual defiance in matters strictly European.*

On November 25, Adams proposed that a paper be delivered to Baron Tuyll, designed to be a "firm, spirited, and yet conciliatory answer" to the communications received from the Russian government, as well as an answer to the proposals of Canning to Rush. It was to be a discussion of the principles of the American government and of the political system to be maintained in the future. It was to be republican in that it would maintain its own independence and would respect that of others. It was to be pacific in that it would studiously avoid all involvement in the combinations of European politics, and cultivate friendship with the most absolute of governments. The United States wished to retain the friendship of the Emperor Alexander, but having recognized the independence of the South American states, the United States could not view with indifference any attempt of the powers of Europe by direct intervention either (1) to restore the Spanish rule on the American continents, (2) to introduce monarchical principles into these countries, or (3) to transfer any portion of the present American provinces of Spain to any other European power. Calhoun objected on the ground that the paper was too great a display of republicanism and would bring the United States into direct issue with

1 Adams, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 196.

Ibid., vol. vi, p. 197.

'Ibid., vol. vi, p. 199.

Ibid., vol. vi, p. 200.

[378 the Holy Alliance. Southard and Wirt suggested that the paper was aimed nominally at Russia, but practically at the Holy Alliance.1 Adams, however, felt that the time had come for an explicit answer to the Russian government. The status of things left the United States without an avowed policy, which he thought should be distinctly taken and resolutely maintained. He felt that the Holy Alliance would not invade South America, and he was equally sure that the Emperor Alexander did not intend to include the United States in his invectives against revolutions.

Such a note would bring a formal disavowal of any unfriendly attitude toward the United States, or it would reveal his exact intentions. Wirt thought that the United States was taking a serious responsibility in any event, and especially if we were assuming the attitude of menace without meaning to strike. The question was, should the Holy Allies act in direct hostility against the revolted provinces in South America, would the American government resist them by war? Adams admitted that this question gave him grave concern. This course would commit the United States so far as the President constitutionally could act on this point, and Adams desired that both Houses of Congress pass resolutions to the same effect. But the course would not commit the United States to absolute war, because of the cooperation of England with the United States and because the restoration of Spanish rule in South America would not be of any advantage to the allied governments.5

1 Adams, op. cit., vol. vi, pp. 200-201. "Ibid., vol. vi, p. 201.

3 Ibid., vol. vi, p. 202.

Ibid., vol. vi, p. 202.

1

On November 26, Adams reviewed with the Cabinet the results of the former meetings. The President's message had been presented, expressing general alarm at the situation, censuring European powers for the invasion of Spain, and recognizing Greece as an independent state. Adams suggested a substitute. In case of any issue with the Holy Alliance, it should be on grounds exclusively American; that we should disclaim all interference in European affairs and make the American cause alone supreme; that an answer should be made to the British and Russian communications in the same paper, at the same time stating the attitude of the United States toward the designs of the Holy Alliance upon South America. The only remaining question was whether there would be any advantage in a policy of opposition to the Holy Alliance. Wirt doubted that the country would support the government in a war for the independence of South America. Calhoun favored action, but feared that the contrast between republican and monarchial principles might be too offensive. An important question was raised by President Monroe. What if England should resist the Allies, should they attack South America, without the aid of the United States? Adams thought England would be victorious, and the probability of English occupation should hasten American action. The proposals of Canning, however, did not contemplate war, and hence there was little danger of it. On November 27, President Monroe advised the omission of all paragraphs objected to in the paper. Adams acquiesced, with the exception of the paragraph containing the declaration of principles of the government. This paragraph referred to Liberty, Independence and Peace as the fundamental prin1 Adams, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 205.

Ibid., vol. vi, p. 205.

Ibid., vol. vi, p. 209.

3

66

ciples of our government. The object of their exposition was to compress into one sentence the foundation upon which the mind and heart at once could repose for our justification of the stand we are taking against the Holy Alliance." He argued strenuously with the President to retain the paragraph, but Monroe thought it better omitted because of the circumstances. He reserved final decision, however

1

2

He

On December 2, 1823, President Monroe delivered his seventh annual message to Congress. This message contained a definite statement of the policy of non-intervention in its extended form, as worked out in the Cabinet meetings immediately preceding the delivery of the message. He first spoke of the arrangement to settle, by amicable negotiation, the disputes between the United States and Russia on the Northwest coast of North America. took advantage of this opportunity to declare "that the American continents, by a free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. In other words, any further colonization by European nations in the Americas was not to be acquiesced in by the United States. A paragraph was devoted to conditions in Greece, but recognition was not accorded. After reviewing the intervention in Spain and Portugal, the message expressed the interest of the United States in the countries of Europe, but distinctly stated that American policy was averse to engaging in any of the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves.

4

3

1 Adams, op. cit., vol. vi, p. 211.

'Ibid., vol. vi, p. 212.

'Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. ii, p. 209.

Only the invasion or the menacing of our rights could secure our participation in a European struggle. But with regard to any movements in the Western hemisphere the policy was reversed. The political systems of the two Continents were different, based upon a difference in government, and what rights had been thus far gained would be scrupulously defended. The time had come to declare that any extension of the European political system to any part of the Western hemisphere would be resisted by the United States. The status quo would be observed as regards existing European dependencies, and there need be no fear of intervention. But where governments had declared and maintained their independence, and it had been acknowledged by the United States, any intervention to oppress or in any way control them would meet the opposition of the United States.1 A policy of neutrality had been adopted and followed, both in relation to these governments and Spain. Only the security of the United States could cause a change in this policy. The forcible intervention in the internal affairs of Spain raised the question as to what extent such intervention could be carried, on the same principle. This raised the question of legitimacy. The policy of the United States was not to intervene in any of the internal concerns of the powers, and in all cases to recognize the de facto government as the legitimate government and the one with which the United States would deal. This settled the question of recognition of governments and also stated the proposition that the United States would not intervene in other states for rights of succession or for the purpose of determining the legitimacy of governments. But in the American continents, where circumstances were absolutely different, any extension of their political system would endanger the peace of the United States, and the new states

1 Richardson, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 218.