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the production of the effect, which is always the cafe where an intelligent being is the agent, then either of them fingly cannot be a cause, because out of conjunction with the others, it produces no effect. Again, A cause is any source or spring of existence: but either of these detached from some, or all, the others, is not a source or spring of existence, and confequently is but part of the cause, in every cafe of actual conjunction, and actual exiftence of caufe, and fhould be thus denominated. To fay, the material part of a caufe, the formal part of a cause, the efficient and final parts of a caufe; are quite confiftent expreffions. Strictly and properly speaking there can be no cause, which is not adequate to its effect. An inadequate cause is no caufe, and a contradiction. A caufe, according to every good de finition, muft be conceived, if conceived confiftently, a whole, an integral whole, confequently these diftinctions can only regard the parts of a cause, for a caufe is the whole of what in actual existence, produces a real change, or which fuftains in oppofition to change. All things in concurrence which are essential to the existence of an effect, is the cause and not each of the effentials in a detached state-Indeed, neither of them can poffibly exift in a detached state. A subject is effential to the existence of a mode: but no fubject can exift, where there is no existence of mode, and no mode can exift, where there is no existence


exiftence of a fubject. An effect is effential to the existence of its own caufe, but is not its caufe. The effect is not the caufe of its caufe, yet nevertheless, the existence of the effect, is effential to the existence of its caufe: for there can be no relation till both the fubjects related do exift. Thus there cannot be a husband, whilst there is not a wife in existence. A caufe is undoubtedly in order of nature, before its effect, but I contend, that cause and its related effect strictly conceived, are coexiftent as to time, in every cafe and inftance of their exiftence, or the exiftence of either.

That every valuable change in actual being, is the confequent of an actual caufe; and that valuable abiding or enduring, as opposed to change, is the confequent of an actual caufe; I account a first principle of intelligence: or a point affented to by every reafonable being who understands the terms.

What is called a partial caufe, is by its epithet confeffed to be no caufe, the total caufe alone is a cause: This also is ́self-evident, and such paradoxical language should be rejected by philofophers.

All things in concurrence which are effential to the existence of an effect is the caufe: This alfo is felf-evident to all perfons who know what a cause and effect is.

There cannot exist the part of a cause in a cer

tain respect, when a caufe does not exift in the fame respect. No one can doubt this axiom.

That a cause cannot exist to which there is no existing related effect, at the fame instant and that an effect cannot exift to which there is no related cause existing at the fame time; I account fully demonftrable, fince the denial of either is to affert, that relation may exist, and not exist, at the fame time, and in the same respect or that cause and effect are, and are not, invariably related; the impoffibility of which is felf-evident.

If the foregoing representation is juft, we shall, in that cafe, find no place for diftinguishing any clafs of causes by the epithet free, and talking of them as acting or operating difcretionally and occafionally, fince they could not be, before their operation and efficiency.

This axiom, that every effect has an adequate cause, does not imply that I, or another man, has faculties to difcover in all inftances of caufal exiftence, or in any inftance, the whole cause. Such limitation attends our knowledge, through ignorance of the insensible structure of matter, and the more inconceivable structure of our minds, that it is not amazing, if we should not be able to fay in any inftance, what is the parti'cular induction in actual existence, which conflitutes a specified caufe, notwithstanding in the general, I hope I have rightly fuppofed it to confift in power, operation and influence, in con

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crete with the requifite fubjects. Our knowledge of these objects, is however just and valuable in proportion as it agrees with them as actually exifting. In matters of mere speculation, and mathematics, where the nominal effence, as in the mind is the real effence, ability, capacity, and fuitable circumftances, with operation, influence and efficiency are in conception what they are in actual existence, that is, if they actually exift at all, for it may be doubted, whether an infinitely true line, circle or fquare, ever exifted otherwise than as the object of a determinate conception. The active property of our notion of fix, and paffive property of our notion of fifty, in the fuitable circumftances of being prefent, and in contact in our minds, are ever attended with operation and influence to a change of idea and to the effect fifty-fix in conception. The angles of a triangle and two right angles brought together in conception, produce by operation and influence, the idea of equality.

As various fimples may go to a compound, and many small fums to an aggregate, which yet admits of being again divided with different proportions and additional advantages to a present purpofe; fo, a cause seems to admit of fimilar treatment. Now if we reflect, that ability, capacity and opportunity, neceffarily muft have matter or mind, for its fubject, and that every effect within our cognizance, is in the modification of either


matter or mind, I think we are naturally led to divide a cause into fubject, power, operation and influence.

If I deviate in my use of words in this cafe from their more common meaning, may I not hope to be forgiven, as I do it under an apprehenfion of following more ftrictly the nature of things?

The parts of a caufe then may first be four in number, and, we will call them the subject part, the power part, the operation part, and the influence part, respecting the relative effect.

First, the subject part. There are two subjects effential to every caufe: the one the fubject of active property, the other of paffive property. Though popularly fpeaking, through the poverty of language, they may be frequently called one, as when a man or his mind is confidered the fubject of both caufe and effect: yet fpeaking with precision, there are two opposed objects of conception, the one the subject of active property, the other of paffive property in order to the exiftence of cause and effect.

Thefe fubjects may be either matter or mind; hence causes may be distinguished according to their fubjects into material caufes and mental causes. Material caufes then are all those second causes which have for their fubjects matter or body. Mental caufes are all thofe, the fubjects of which are mind and thoughts.—The subject part of a material cause is the matter or body possessed

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