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the wise, nor yet riches always to men of understanding, nor yet favour always to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all. For man also knoweth not his time; as the fishes that are taken in an evil net, and as the birds that are caught in the snare, so are the sons of men snared in an evil time, when it falleth suddenly upon them."

We now dismiss the origin of evil, and are naturally led forward to the Divine ruling of mankind, which is in general effected by our constitution, by instruction, and by the over-ruling natural evil, and natural good to the prevention and destruction of moral evil, and production of moral good.-Common sense, moral sense, and the sacred Scriptures, testify that there are evils which God hates, and for which he blames and condemns their subject. Yet suffer a concluding remark.-As even the works of God may be a reason of accidental evil, although neces sarily chosen in perfect consistency with infinite wis dom; so, neither God nor man can justly consider that as blamable, by which evil has been but accidentally caused. This at least, is the reward of wisely chosen conduct, that no unlucky consequence can rationally cause us to repent it.

SECTION II.

Of the Nature of Divine Ruling.

RULING is suasive governing, or it is governing by persuasion and dissuasion. Its object is the manners and principles of dependant free agents.

Merely governing, or governing exclusive of ruling, is a very distinct thing from that species of

governing which we rightly call ruling. The former is by mechanical force, the latter by suasion and inducement. The first is the government of beings which have no essential activity, the other of intelligent and active beings.

"An instance of mechanical government may be that of a master or commander of a ship at sea. Supposing her skilfully built, and furnished with every thing proper for the destined voyage; to govern her properly for this purpose, requires much art and attention: and as every art has its rules or laws, so has this. But by whom are those laws to be obeyed, or those rules observed? Not by the ship, surely, for she is an inactive being, but by the governor. In the proper sense, the ship can no more obey the rudder, than she can give a command Every motion, both of the ship and rudder, is exactly proportioned to the force impressed, and in the direction of that force.". "_"Whatever may happen during the voyage, whatever may be its issue, the ship, in the eye of reason, is neither an object of approbation, nor of blame, because she does not act, but is acted upon."

"Another instance to illustrate the nature of mechanical government, may be that of the man who makes and exhibits a puppet-show. The puppets in all their diverting gesticulations, do not move, but are moved by an impulse secretly conveyed, which they cannot resist. If they do not play their parts properly, the fault is only in the maker or manager of the machinery. Too much or too little force was applied, or it was wrong directed. No reasonable man imputes either praise or blame to the puppets; but solely to their maker or their governor."

These illustrations of merely governing exclusive of ruling, are of what is truly called mechanically governing. But there is a higher kind of governing, which is mental, and not mechanical, which reaches even to the volitions and voluntary actions, yet still

is not ruling, and does not essentially claim for its Subject, freely chusing beings. Some admit that being an agent, is essentially requisite to being ruled; ut ask them who is an agent, they tell you it is he who acts or refrains voluntarily; or if you ask, what is agency, they reply, acting voluntarily; and admit that necessity is as truly applicable to governing in these mental cases, as in the former mechanical ones: and also, that volition as fixedly follows the conception and temper, as wave is impelled or repelled by wave. But in all cases in which there is no ability, or no opportunity for deliberation, consideration, and making choice, there is no ruling. Were you to fix your son's hands behind him, that he might not steal, I admit that you would govern him; were you to fix his feet, you would prevent his trampling on a prohibited part of your garden, and truly govern him; were you to cut out his tongue to prevent his telling lies, you would govern him: and were you to castrate him to prevent his committing fornication or adultery; you would truly govern him in these respects: but in neither of these cases would you rule him; so far from it, that you totally disqualify him for being ruled in either of these respects. Again, you mount your horse, furnished with a bit and bridle, by which you restrain its impetuosity, and turn it to the right hand or to the left; and in obeying your signs, your horse is voluntary. You are also furnished with whip and spurs, by which, if its docility does not supercede, you drive forward the animal, in which obedience your horse is voluntary, you govern, although you do not rule your horse. Again, a culprit voluntarily walks to prison, to avoid being dragged thither like a piece of timber. He is governed by the officer, but is not under his ruling. And thus a nobleman, about to lose his head, has voluntarily dropped a handkerchief as a signal to the executioner. In neither of these instances is there any thing like

chusing, or free choice, consequently no ruling. Brutes, children, insane persons, and persons under torture, exhibit strikingly this mental governing exclusive, more or less, of ruling; whether in some cases the governed are capable of exercising choice and be subjects of actual ruling or not.

A drover governs a hundred sheep, and secures their voluntary movements, but does not rule them. The magpie voluntarily builds an excellent nest, but who ever thought that it previously chose its make or composition from plans or projects? I admit the magpie is governed, but deny that it is ruled in respect of that effort.

Probably the following remarks will positively exhibit the nature of ruling, and of Divine ruling.

1st. The instruments of ruling are persuasives and dissuasives: such as, commands, prohibitions, reproofs, exhortations, precepts, promises, and threatenings, enforced by rewards and punishments.

2d. Ruled persons, it is requisite, should be subjects of active thoughts and imaginations; also able to understand and reason on requirements, persuasives, and dissuasives; and also capable of corresponding emotions, attention and consideration, inducement and wise chusing, which go essentially to the end of ruling.

3rd. The requirements of a ruler must be things possible, that is, things within the ruled persons dominion; things concerning which we may previously say, These may or may not exist; which contingence is in the case determinable only by the choice and agency of the ruled person. Contingence generally expresses possibility, irrespective of the choice of any agent, but chance expresses possibility, extended to even choice itself.

4th. Previous to the operation of ruling, there is chance of obedience, and chance of disobedience, or in other words, chance respecting which will be chosen. Ruling essentially supposes a chance of

choice and deportment of the ruled person, which are diverse from the end of the tendency of ruling: or, there is some chance of failure of operation and influence from the ruling adopted and exercised. But the very nature of ruling also requires, that the ruled person should have previous chance, both for disobedience and for obedience; not merely opportunity to do or refrain as is enjoined, which belongs to will and act, but some degree of chance for choice, and for choice of either object, which belongs to chusing. To suppose that either the disobedience or obedience, was previously necessary, i. e. must be, and cannot but be, destroys the essence of ruling, and in case of influence, mere governing takes its place. Chance of obedience and disobedience may be sometimes decided by chance imaginations or fancies, as concurring to a choice; yet, be it remembered, that chance-moral-evil is not punishable, or chance-moral-good rewardable, although the former may be the reason of suffering, and the latter of some valuable enjoyment.

5th. Ruling operates necessarily, so far as it operates to induce us to exercise chusing. And after the choice is made up, that choice, and also the influence of ruling, necessarily terminates in a wish, a purpose, or a will. Thus a messenger, coming to a place where two or more ways meet, is necessarily put on chusing by examining his map, direction posts, or other means at hand: and having made choice, that choice, and the regard to his sovereign's injunction, necessarily causes purpose, will, and moving forward.

6th. Ruling, and Divine ruling, all good ruling, its essence truly conceived, has tendency to diminish the chance of chusing unwisely and wrongly, and to enlarge the chance of chusing wisely and rightly. Or if the reader had rather say, God's ruling has tendency to decrease the chances of the ruled person's chusing wrongly, and to increase the chances

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