price in terms of national dignity, though with his leanings toward the northern wing of the democracy, he was skeptical of the whole imbroglio as too high a bid for southern popularity, the South alone having any real concern in Florida.

Sectional interests were here again, as in Jay's Treaty, clearly defined. Over against the South and Florida, the North demanded insurance for its commercial interests against renewed attacks by Britain. Impressments had

never ceased, but so long as American commerce was protected by British warships against the depredations of France and Spain, complaint was silenced by prosperity. Merchants and their crews might groan at times, but they endured what so enriched their cash box. But the instant seizure, following the Essex decision, of 500 American ships, presented Britain and her policies in quite another aspect. And Jefferson, little as he liked these complications, was compelled to formulate anew his British policy.

Amid these multiplying embarrassments Jefferson preserved a sanguine temper and the conviction that at his disposal, should he be driven to its use, was a means of peaceful coercion, ready to cope on equal terms with the fleets of Pitt and the armies of Napoleon. It was an embargo on commerce, a restriction already employed by Washington for a brief term in 1793. It relied for its effect on the commercial needs of nations when at war. A familiar thought with Jefferson was the gain which comes to those who feed while others fight. And for a statesman whose interest in the normal operations of commerce was so slight, the potency he attributed to their curtailment is remarkable. There is even a melancholy humor in Jefferson's anticipations of the fear which his peaceful weapon might inspire in the conqueror of Europe and the wielder of the British trident.

Recent studies in the history of industry and commerce have demonstrated that notwithstanding some apparent element of the ludicrous in such a scheme, Jefferson, in basing his diplomacy on the economic pressure of a powerful

The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Federal Edition, VI, 89.

neutral on nations worn by war, was converting to the use of diplomacy a weapon truly potent. Singular was the contrast between the annoyances engendered by Jefferson's futilities in Florida and the profound and philosophic foundation for peaceful diplomacy toward which he looked for their solution.®

This year of 1805 was in many respects the parting of the ways. Not only did Jefferson make his choice between war and peace with Spain, and Pitt make his between toleration of America or even an entente versus the seizure of our merchantmen for prizes, but the year marked a turning point as well in the great struggle between England and Napoleon. Till then the commercial aspects of that warfare had to some extent escaped attention, notwithstanding the outpourings of the pamphleteers, and writings such as "War in Disguise," wherein James Stephen, an outspoken champion of Tory policies, endeavored to arouse commercial men in Britain to the menace of American competition. With a new recognition after 1805 that the war was basically commercial, belligerents imposed upon the neutrals an ever mounting load of injuries.

After a temporary lull in provocations during the brief administration of Charles James Fox, these injuries broke out afresh in the Berlin and Milan Decrees of 1806 and 1807, and the British Orders in Council of January and November in the latter year. But the nature and consequences of these various instruments will be better understood in the light of Monroe's unhappy adventures as a diplomat at London-for Monroe was not destined to return to America till he had tasted to the full the cup of bitterness and humiliation-in the light also of the situation in the American Congress as it reacted on the President and his authority at home.

The Florida troubles appeared to John Randolph of Roanoke, the most erratic and abusive speaker the American

• For Jefferson's concepts of international law, see a paper on "Jefferson and the Law of Nations" by Louis M. Sears in The American Political Science Review, XIII, 379-399.

Congress has ever known,' a heaven-sent opportunity to ruin the Secretary of State, whose aspirations for the presidential succession were anathema to a numerous faction in Virginia. His victim played into his hand, for a bill before Congress to place at the President's disposal two million dollars as part of an eventual five million for use in bribing French interest into bullying Spain out of her provinces, drew from Randolph the most pitiless invective, and exposed the administration to ridicule and worse. It needed Jefferson's utmost adroitness to restore authority in his own household. Meanwhile prestige abroad was falling.

8

The personal feud between Madison and Yrujo came also to a head when, in defiance of the expressed wish of our government, the Marquis came to Washington. Madison ordered him to quit the capital. Yrujo retorted that the only orders he acknowledged were those of Charles IV. After flaunting his defiance for a fortnight, and presenting a taunting note to Madison on the Secretary's complicity in an expedition of the Venezuelan patriot, Miranda, to the Spanish Main, the minister withdrew. For another year, however, he remained within the United States, thereby testifying to his country's indifference to American good will.

Fortunately for the credit of the government the accusations of Yrujo, though well founded in fact, were not supported by any copy of the correspondence between Madison and Miranda. Had it been otherwise, the encouragement accorded to the revolutionary leader would have compromised our country before the bar of world opinion for aiding an adventurer against a nation nominally at peace with

us.

The difficulties with England reached a fresh crisis in 1806, when a British warship, the Leander, firing across the

7 The student interested in the effect of psychic traits and abnormalities upon the conduct of leaders, and consequently upon politics and diplomacy will find much to interest him in Bruce, William Cabell, John Randolph of Roanoke, 2 vols. (New York, 1922.)

Adams, Henry, Op. Cit. III, 132-134.

9 Anonymous, "General Miranda's Expedition," in Atlantic Monthly, V, 589-602.

bow of an American merchantman which was leaving the harbor of New York, killed the captain's brother. The victim, Pierce, received a public funeral. Feeling in the crowd ran high. One more item demanded settlement if peace with England were even nominally to be maintained.10 One turns with all the greater interest, therefore, to the efforts of the diplomats.

MONROE AND PINKNEY

It was no plan of Jefferson's to detain Monroe indefinitely abroad. But in the critical posture of events it seemed advisable to send a colleague with whom Monroe might act in concert, and to whom he might surrender sole charge of the negotiation should circumstances suggest return. General Robert Smith, of Maryland, naval secretary in the cabinet of Jefferson but since the Randolph insurrection no longer in the confidence of his chief, had long desired a diplomatic post. The London mission would have gratified both hopes and vanity. But Jefferson had other plans. To the astonishment of the Democrats, and the confusion of the powerful Smith faction, the President's choice fell upon William Pinkney, a Federalist, distinguished at the bar in Maryland.

Meanwhile Congress, to whom the President surrendered most of the initiative in untangling British problems, was busy working out a basis on which the diplomats might act. War with England was not contemplated. No more was embargo in its fuller sense. A milder weapon was invoked, non-importation of British goods. And such was Gallatin's solicitude for revenue that even this was partial. America was making, however, a definite advance toward that policy of commercial restriction which characterized the next six years until reversed in 1812 by war.

Even as the negotiations of Monroe and Pinkney must take cognizance of Congress and its acts at home, so the endeavors of Armstrong, their colleague in France, must inevitably either strengthen or weaken their position. Indeed, 10 Adams, Henry, Op. Cit. III, 199.

in the summer of 1806, it seemed for a time that Armstrong was to solve the Florida problem. While Napoleon was absent in the campaign of Austerlitz, Talleyrand conducted the Foreign Office with greater independence than had lately been his wont. And it accorded with Talleyrand's own sentiments and the embarrassments of Marbois at the Treasury to further a negotiation whereby France or at any rate French officials stood to gain somewhat by the "Two Million Bill" so hotly fought by Randolph.

Armstrong was soon gratified to learn therefore that the French agent at Madrid had overcome Godoy's reluctance to a reconciliation with America, and that Florida would no longer be an obstacle. The Florida tangle seemed on the highroad to solution and Armstrong had every reason for rejoicing, when suddenly the wind veered. Napoleon was on the scene once more, and he had other plans. Talleyrand himself was mystified. The French agent at Madrid received a reprimand instead of the praise he merited and anticipated. Marbois was removed from office. Armstrong perceived that a great change in policy was projected. But he gleaned little information when those who stood nearest to the Emperor could not divine his purposes.

11

The secret remained locked in the bosom of Napoleon until the autumn of 1806. On October 14th he crushed the Prussians at Jena. Thirteen days later he entered Berlin. His mastery of the continent was now as complete as British mastery of the seas. Land and water faced each other for a deadly combat. On November 21st, from the capital of his defeated foe, Napoleon hurled his thunderbolt. England was blockaded. Neutrals might no longer trade with her. While launching such a blow at neutrals, of whom America was chief, it is not surprising that Napoleon should have felt no interest in America's own problem of Florida. The decree affected America directly. Also indirectly it affected us by modifying British policy toward foe and neutral too. The Berlin Decree therefore came within the purview of Monroe and Pinkney.

11 Ibid. III, 370-391.