T CHAPTER X THE MONROE DOCTRINE FLORIDA SECURED HE conclusion of the war brought the tempestuous Andrew Jackson into prominence as a national character, and his influence on foreign affairs as well as domestic proved disquieting. In 1816 he voted for Monroe and then proffered advice on cabinet positions ill-timed and unaccepted. Before the year was out he became a storm center in a controversy which echoed for over two decades. Since 1803 and the Louisiana Purchase, Monroe was of the number who affected to believe that West Florida came within the purchased limits. He shared in the dubious negotiations preceding the seizure of West Florida, and in his term as President he trusted to round out the territory by purchase of East Florida. But the methods he preferred were peaceful, and Jackson upset his calculations. During the late war the British had operated on Spanish territory against the southern frontier. On the Appalachicola, fifteen miles above the sea, they had built a fort of considerable strength. After the formal declaration of peace, this fort and its garrison of some 300 negroes and a few Choctaws endangered the neighboring districts until an American gun-boat burned it up with red-hot shot. Conditions here were typical of Spain's inability to keep order on the American frontier, a failure unavoidable since well nigh the whole empire of Spain was in revolt, with little prospect of subduing it. The explanation was not on that account more satisfying. At all events the Treaty of 1795 was violated, for Spain was pledged to strict control over her Indians in Florida. Though it is not likely that Monroe meant seriously to endanger peace with Spain, he took a somewhat provocative step in sending Jackson to clean up the border. Jackson's recent record made him the logical instrument for this, yet Monroe seems to have expected that Jackson would go in, restore order, and return, leaving Spain chastened but improved, and the Indians and their white abettors in the fear of God. Jackson did not so interpret his instructions. He assumed that the government expected him to conquer Florida, and to clarify the issue, he requested a more specific authorization. He addressed Monroe directly, but suggested a reply through Rhea, a Congressman from Tennessee. On this latter point confusion afterward arose. Jackson always insisted that through Rhea he received the necessary authority from the President. But he was never able to produce the letter. Rhea demanded its destruction as a confidential document, and Jackson had obeyed. One may here suspect an alibi. Monroe, on the other hand, asserted that not till long afterward did he read Jackson's letter, and far from instructing him to seize Florida, he was too ill to transact business. In this there is suspicion also of an alibi.1 The military operations of the general in his Florida campaign of 1818 do not concern us here save as they complicated affairs of state. Like Napoleon, the American hero kept many jumps ahead of diplomats. His activities called forth the possibility of wars with Spain and Great Britain alike. It became the task of diplomacy to avert them. Jackson believed that the Creeks were urged on by white renegades. His conception of the law of nations excluded any man from the protection of his flag who, when his own nation was at peace with a given nation, incited the attacks of non-belligerents against that nation. In other words, if he found Englishmen urging Creek Indians to harass the United States, he proposed to deal with them as he himself thought fit. In a swift campaign, Jackson reduced Florida to order, to the intense indignation of Spain, and the almost equal indignation of Great Britain, two of whose subjects he summarily executed on the charge of instigating the Creeks to 1 For bibliography on this subject see Channing, Edward, History of the United States, V, 348-349. border outrages. One of them was Alexander Arbuthnot, a respectable Scottish trader seventy years old, whose long residence in Florida had made him a friend of the Indians. Arbuthnot seems to have been honestly convinced that the Peace of Ghent restored to them disputed lands. His execution is a blot on Jackson's name. That of Robert Ambrister, a British officer not commissioned and whose presence in Florida years after the Peace was not so easily accounted for, represented doubtful policy toward England, but came much nearer to the line of military duty.2 Had Great Britain made these executions a casus belli, the result would have been chargeable to Jackson. The period of outrage in Florida coincided fortunately, however, with one of conciliation on other issues, and the British ministry ignored the injury. It was otherwise with Spain, and the protestions of Don Luis de Onis, her minister at Washington, embarrassed the administration. To uphold Jackson was to challenge war with Spain. To repudiate him meant to forfeit Western votes, for the conqueror of Florida was the idol of his section. On the whole a clash with Spain seemed the path of least resistance. After a cabinet session in which John Quincy Adams, now Monroe's Secretary of State, upheld Jackson while John C. Calhoun condemned him, it was decided to take the offensive against Spain.3 The Secretary of State accordingly defended Jackson on the score of violated treaties. America, said Adams, was the victim of innumerable outrages. Spain's pleas of inability to police her borders were tiresome. Jackson did right in policing them for her. Hereafter excuses of incompetency would not be heeded. Spain must keep order or abandon the country. Under no circumstances would the United States apologize for the conduct of a patriot in the obvious line of duty. Now was the time for settling many grievances. American claims were pending for damages to shipping. If Spain would surrender a district she could in any case no longer hold, the United States would assume these obligations up to $5,000,000 in amount. 2 Channing, Edward, History of the United States, V, 333-336. 8 Ibid. Op. Cit. V, 336-339. The ethics of such tactics was somewhat dubious; their success was certain. Demoralization in Spain herself under the odious Ferdinand VII, whom the downfall of Napoleon had restored to power, and the revolt in South America went hand in hand. To retain Florida in the face of these discouragements was impossible. The terms of Adams were accepted and Florida was added to the United States by the Treaty of 1819. Before it took effect, the King of Spain attempted a rather despicable trick. He divided the crown lands among three of his own friends, their title to be subject to American sovereignty. For the United States to recognize this act would mean to alienate the very lands whose sale might ultimately refund all payments on the damage claims. The scheme though circumvented delayed negotiations, and final ratification was deferred till 1821 when Jackson was rewarded for his merits by the post of governor of the new territory.* The secrets of the cabinet were kept. The part played by Calhoun in opposing Jackson was for many years unknown. When at last it came to light, the Presidential prospects of Calhoun were blasted, so vindictive was the General's hatred toward all who crossed his purposes. The boundary determined in this treaty of 1819-21 was scarcely satisfactory. From the first news of the Purchase, the country set its heart on Spanish territory to the east, our claim to which was shadowy at best, and in its realization entailed a series of misfortunes. Meanwhile the western limits of the Louisiana Purchase, of greater actual importance, remained undefined until the treaty which rounded out the whole of Florida, when territory adjoining Texas was abandoned which was reasonably ours. The Florida treaty designated the Sabine River as the western limit of the Louisiana Purchase. The boundary followed a line drawn from the mouth of the Sabine along its western bank north to latitude 32°. From here the line went due north to the Red River, which it followed to the one hundredth meridian of longitude, and from here again 4 McMaster, John Bach, A History of the People of the United States, V, 1-2. due north to the Arkansas, which it followed to its source and then broke on a north and south line direct to latitude 42° and due west to the Pacific. It was by virtue of this clause in the Treaty (Article III) that the United States fell heir to any title Spain possessed to the Oregon territory. This boundary, now for the first time determined, cut off enormous areas in western Texas and roused the wrath of Henry Clay, the champion of Western interests. Clay for the West was once more pitted as at Ghent against Adams for the East. Again New England had her way in a contest as personal as it was sectional, for Clay was displeased that in the cabinet of Monroe the straight-laced Puritan rather than himself held the first portfolio. Time was needed before such opposites could work together." RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA The new interest which the United States felt in Spanish America and in extension toward the Pacific, increased the significance of our relations with Russia. In 1813 Russia was a possible mediator between Great Britain and ourselves. In 1819 Russia was the well known friend of Spain, and at the same time was contemplating expansion southward along the eastern shores of the Pacific. Either interest would bear watching. In fact studies in the diplomacy of John Quincy Adams and George Canning reveal that their joint apprehension respecting Russian expansion down the Pacific coast was the dominating influence in drawing American and British policy together in 1823. In 1817 America was ably represented at St. Petersburg by William Pinkney, an experienced diplomat. His relations with the Court were cordial, though he did not succeed in negotiating the commercial treaty he was authorized to draw, which mattered little, as Americans already enjoyed 5 For comments of Adams, see The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, IV, 238, 273, 451, and V, 53, 109, 290. 6 For defensive character of the Monroe Doctrine see William R. Shepherd, "The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered," Pol. Sci. Quar., vol. XXXIX, pp. 38-40. |