which Whig principles were leading. Correspondingly British Whigs, in the enthusiasm of opposition toward the government in power, went very far toward a complete acceptance of the American position, though it is doubtful if at the time Burke, and Pitt, and Fox appreciated its full implications.13 REVOLUTION APPROACHING When agitation culminated in the Boston Port Bill, British occupation of Boston, the summons to the Continental Congress of 1774 and again the following year, and finally the creation of an American army with Washington as its chief, the long train of events which this chapter has but cursorily surveyed had reached one of those great turning points which give to history an ever fresh significance and vitality. The American colonies were ready for the great adventure. But even as their fate had hung repeatedly in the balance of European wars and treaties, so now their independence and their future depended on the courage and the statesmanship of the diplomats who were commissioned to set before the European nations the righteousness of their country's cause, and the wisdom and necessity of bestowing aid upon the struggling nation. Prince among American diplomatists, then and since, was Benjamin Franklin, an old man illustrious and honored, whose preliminary training was obtained as colonial agent from Pennsylvania to London at a time when his country was still loyal. With Franklin the colonial era of American diplomacy merged into the national. The old order gave place to the new. In summarizing the diplomacy of America in her colonial era, it is at once apparent that though the colonies were subordinate yet the interests of the mother country could not ignore them. They were an economic unit of the British Empire and a political outpost against France and Spain. They had a distinct share in causing and conducting the great European wars. They were responsible for important 18 For this viewpoint on sovereignty, see McIlwain, Charles Howard, The American Revolution: a Constitutional Interpretation (New York, 1923), especially 1-17, and 186-198. clauses in the treaties of Ryswick, 1697; Utrecht, 1713; Aixla-Chapelle, 1748; and Paris, 1763. The existence of a great colonial empire lent new importance to economic and political theories for its guidance, and ultimately challenged the entire supremacy of Parliament. Thus in the period of her membership within the British Empire, America was an integral factor, and her share in formulating its policies whether foreign or domestic was far from negligible. Τ' CHAPTER II THE REVOLUTION THE FOREIGN POLICY OF LOUIS XVI HE France to which Franklin and his associates, cently (1774) under the scepter of the well-meaning Louis XVI, pledged to a program of retrenchment and reform, but too keenly alert to foreign affairs to be happy under such restrictions. For Louis, whose ignorance of domestic problems was eventually to cost him his throne and his life, had a fair comprehension of the rôle in European events which his ancestors had played, and a clear conception of the dynastic considerations urging an aggressive policy in world affairs. The chief embarrassment of the Seven Years' War from the Bourbon viewpoint was its damage to French prestige. The most irritating evidence thereof was the new claim of Great Britain that its ambassadors should hold precedence at all courts to which they were accredited. To restore the House of Bourbon to its rightful hegemony in Europe seemed the prime duty of the amiable young man now called to its headship. Possessing the royal ear when the American War for Independence began were the exponents of two quite opposite viewpoints. At the foreign office, the Counts of Maurepas and Vergennes saw a probable opportunity to strike such a blow at England as would redress the balance of power, whereas Turgot, far-seeing economist, pointed out to the King in no uncertain terms, the dire necessity for economy in all the expenditures of the State, and the certainty that war would be followed by national bankruptcy, the consequences of which would defy calculation. Advice of this sort from the ablest financier of the time to a monarch whose will was final would seem to test the entire economic interpretation of history. For if economic considerations are fully determining, Louis could not possibly have aided the American Revolution. That he was finally induced to grant this aid shows in this particular instance at least the superiority of dynastic to economic considerations. For, of course, the motive of giving help to rebels against their lawful sovereign never once entered the mind of Louis. Whatever weight the movement of Eighteenth Century liberalism possessed among the French people—and many, like La Fayette, were eager to strike a blow for liberty-the King himself would act from cold calculations of dynastic policy.1 In the carrying out of a Bourbon restoration to world leadership the King of France would value the coöperation of his uncle, Charles III of Spain, a loyal member of the family, but not easily moved to reckless expedients. The French and Spanish branches of the House of Bourbon had been indeed for several years in accord. For in the darkest period of the late war, the French foreign minister, Choiseul, had scored a diplomatic victory when in 1761 he persuaded Ferdinand VI by the cession of Louisiana to Spain, to enter The Family Compact, an offensive and defensive alliance in which each power was pledged to a heavy program of military and naval assistance. In a certain sense Europe had regarded such recognition of French equality with decadent Spain as humiliating to the elder branch of the Bourbons. On the other hand considerable benefit accrued to France from this community of interest. French prestige was undoubtedly higher in 1776 than it had been a decade earlier. Thus the European situation simplified the task of American diplomacy. The course of French policy was determined by Bourbon interests, and these, in a dynastic sense at any rate, harmonized with those of America. The precise arguments most calculated to convince a monarch hesitating between policies so opposite were suggested more by Ver 1 On the subject of French motives see Corwin, Edward S., French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778 (Princeton, 1916), especially pages 1-22. gennes' knowledge of Louis' character than by the sagacity and zeal of Franklin. Although the minister saw in the War only the most obvious aggression against England, in audiences with his master he was much concerned to make it appear a war of defense. He pointed out repeatedly the temptation which the French West Indies offered to naval forces gathered ostensibly for the American War." SPAIN IS SOUNDED Preliminary soundings of Spanish sentiment revealed to Vergennes Spanish interest in the American struggle greater than Louis himself had as yet expressed, though when the time came for action, Spanish interest had cooled and France proceeded alone. However eager the King might finally prove to be, avowed support of the American cause was manifestly impossible until that cause gave some internal evidence of vitality. The American evacuation of Boston, the costly and hazardous maneuvers at Brooklyn, the retreat across New Jersey, and numerous evidences of a lack of unity and purpose in America itself were a weak foundation on which to erect a French alliance. The wisest of diplomats could scarcely persuade even the most eager of allies that the time for recognition was arrived. Only the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga in 1777 made French recognition possible in an official sense, though secret aid had been rendered for a year preceding, French military equipment having been furnished in large amounts through the agency of Hortalez and Company, a fictitious trading organization, created in order to give the transactions an unofficial character consistent with the Law of Nations, which imposes no restriction, beyond the right of search for contraband, on the private exportation of arms. It may be noted here that England was informed in the fullest detail by spies, who had wormed their way into the confidence of the American commissioners, of every move made on either side, even to the possession of copies of almost every document which passed between Congress, its 2 Corwin, Edward S., Op. Cit. 142-144. |