California we should have the same ascendency on the Pacific." The assent of Mexico to such a plan depended on successful war. But Webster and the President in 1842 trusted to obtain Upper California by an agreement with England which should at the same time settle the boundaries of Oregon. With the refusal of Congress to authorize a special mission, and the decision of Everett not to budge from London, the project for a time fell through. This was disappointing, for years later Webster declared his "opinion to have been, and now is, that the port of San Francisco would be twenty times more valuable to us than all Texas." 23

The Oregon question was now ripening. Lord Ashburton's Treaty left matters where they were. But joint occupation could scarce survive a population influx. Precisely this occurred in the great trek of the early forties. California, too, was ready for the picking. As Sir George Simpson, an agent of the Hudson Bay Company, reported to his chief in March of 1842, "The whole population of that beautiful and extensive country, possessing 1200 miles of sea-coast, does not exceed 7,000, of whom 600 are foreigners, principally Americans." He elsewhere notes-and he expected his communication to reach the eyes of Aberdeen-that Wilkes, the American commodore on the Pacific station, is recommending to his Government a claim to the entire coast and hinterland from 42°, the northern line of Mexico, to 54° 40', the southern line of Russia in America.24

The investigator was well informed. The line in question made the campaign slogan for Polk in 1844. The administration of John Tyler, so rich in diplomatic victories, passed on to his successor the rounding out of empire. James K. Polk, the agent of imperialism, inherited a Mexican problem-a legacy from Texas; a California goal linked more with commerce than with slavery; and an unmarked boundary for Oregon, postponed in 1818 and then twice.

23 The bibliography of Webster is voluminous. A relatively recent work is by Ogg, Frederic Austin, Daniel Webster (Philadelphia, 1914). 24 See "Letters of Sir George Simpson, 1841-1843," in Am. Hist. Rev., XIV. 70-94.

since, but now grown urgent for solution. To meet them all and solve them was to be the task of the Tennessee "Dark Horse." Yet so implacable were Polk's contemporaries that few among his countrymen even yet appreciate his services.

B

CHAPTER XIII

THE POLK ADMINISTRATION

EFORE one accepts the verdict of New England in

1845, or of General Grant proclaimed years later,

that the War with Mexico was the cowardly attack of a bully on an innocent, fairness to the nation's good repute suggests an inquiry into the diplomacy which preceded war. Viewed dispassionately, the government of Mexico seems more a martyr to its own fatuity, than a prey to vulpine greed.

News of the Joint Resolution of March 1st convulsed the Mexicans with fury. The minister, Almonte, protested that Mexico would enforce her claim to Texas "at all times, by every means. . . in her power." And notwithstanding a conciliatory note from James Buchanan, the new Secretary of State, Almonte broke off relations and demanded his passports. His action was more impulsive than judicious.1

Again in July, when news reached Mexico that our terms had been approved by Texas, the flames leaped high. Preparations went on apace for war. In August the Mexican consulate at New Orleans was closed, and the consul at Cuba was informed officially of a state of war between his country and the United States-though for tactical reasons it seemed wiser to assert that America had herself declared the war by seizing Texas.

But American efforts to preserve the peace were unabated. Almonte was given further assurances of good will, and a confidential agent of the government, W. S. Parrott, was sent to Mexico with instructions to use his best ability "to restore friendly relations between the two republics." Mexico must be informed of our anxiety to dispose of all un

1 Smith, Justin H., The War with Mexico (2 vols. New York, 1919), I, 87.

settled questions "in a most liberal and friendly spirit," excluding, of course, Texas on which final action had been taken.2

The outlook gave the greater hope from the honest character of the Mexican President, Herrera, and his desire to curb military waste. Relations with both France and England had also undergone a change. And all three Americans in Mexico, the consuls at the capital and Vera Cruz and Parrott, the special agent, concurred in August, 1845, in a belief that Mexico would receive a minister.3

America had sufficient reason to maintain peace. Our heavy claims against the Mexicans were in themselves an argument. Our relations with European countries were complicated and in need of settlement. The good will of other Latin states, sensitive to encroachment on their sister, was in 1845 as weighty a consideration as it is to-day. Moreover an American at Mexico was desirable to circumvent designs of Britain against California. The possibility of efforts to set up in Mexico a European monarchy would also bear investigation. And Oregon, on which Polk did not anticipate a compromise, seemed so far to menace war that Polk was moved to caution. Finally the mere presence of a minister would tend to straighten tangles and avoid unnecessary controversy.

THE SLIDELL MISSION

The letter from Parrott was discussed in cabinet where opinion was unanimous that America (although the injured party, since it was Mexico that first broke off relations) was great enough, foregoing ceremony, to make the first advances. John Slidell, of New Orleans, was selected as the minister, but his departure was postponed pending assurance of a welcome. A turn in British diplomacy seemed to augur favorably, since Great Britain, solicitous for Mexi

2 Smith, Justin H., Op. Cit. I, 88.

3 Ibid. I, 89.

The Diary of James K. Polk provides a remarkably intimate and candid examination of the author's own administration.

can investments of her capitalists, and averse to conquests by America, endeavored to persuade the Mexicans to receive our minister. Following an interchange of notes Mexico agreed "to receive the representative of the United States who may come to this capital with full powers from his government to settle the present dispute in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner." 5

Herrera's uncertain hold on power made haste urgent, and on November 10, 1845, word was sent Slidell, who was already at Pensacola in order to be near his mission, to make all speed for Mexico. An American warship brought him on the 30th to Vera Cruz, from whence he set out immediately for the capital on the most delicate of missions. He must negotiate with an offended Mexico, and win from her not only recognition of the Texan fait accompli, but also further concessions.

Having once mastered the idea that Texas was no longer theirs, the Mexicans must learn its new boundary. Here American claims would afford leverage for a liberal interpretation. Polk made their settlement an indispensable object of the mission. It is certain that he desired the negotiations to succeed, though the degree of his actual faith is open to conjecture.

Bound up with territorial and other claims was a vast scheme of empire to carry the southern boundary of the United States to the Pacific. Starting from the independence of Texas as "a settled fact, and not to be called into question," Slidell was ordered to uphold the Rio Grande as the established boundary, and in compensation to assume payment of our claims. For actual cessions of Mexican territory a sliding scale of prices was prepared."

For such a line as would include New Mexico and thus "obviate the danger of future collisions," the claims would be cancelled and a bonus of five millions would be paid. For the grander scheme of a cession of California, "money would be no object compared with the value of the acquisi

5 Smith, Justin H., Op Cit. I, 93.

Sears, Louis Martin, John Slidell (Durham, N. C., 1925), 48-73.