agents, and the French Court. But it was far from Britain's cue to precipitate an intervention which her anticipated victory in North America might possibly avert."

Before embarking alone upon the hazards of war, the French ministry represented to Spain the full advantages of participation. Apart from the traditional dilatoriness at Madrid, special reasons prompted the Spanish Court to caution. In spite of the blood relationship of the royal houses, the average Spaniard-and this is a strange circumstance in view of the differences in religion and institutions and the frequent wars of the past two centuries-found more to admire in the British than in the French character. Moreover, humiliation of England, an important motive for French action, raised no echo in Spain, because, while the French had a world position to retrieve, Spain had so definitely forfeited any claim to being a power of the first rank that no conceivable result of the war could change her situation. Spain also, decadent though she was, still had vast hostages to fortune in her dominions beyond the seas. To aid a neighbor's colonies in revolt might all too obviously prove a boomerang to a nation having American colonies of her own. There was, too, the added inconvenience that the Americans having achieved independence might set up a government more menacing to Spanish interests than colonial dependencies of Great Britain could possibly prove.

While Grimaldi, a Genoese by birth and insensitive to Spanish prejudices, was in power and while the Count de Aranda, no friend of Britain, was his ambassador at Paris, the Court at Madrid did, indeed, manifest a temporary enthusiasm for an attack on England. But this coincided with critical relations between Spain and Britain's old ally, Portugal. The only consideration which could interest Spain caused France to hesitate. A proposal from the Continental Congress for a triple alliance, Spain to be rewarded by Portugal, France by renewed empire in North America, and the United States by independence, awakened

3 Bemis, Samuel Flagg, "British Secret Service and the FrenchAmerican Alliance." Am. Hist. Rev. XXIX, 474-495.

no enthusiasm in Vergennes, who saw no cause for satisfaction in Spanish acquisition of Portugal. An accession of power which would signify Spanish equality with France could scarcely be an object of French policy.

When, therefore, Grimaldi surrendered the seals of office, and on Portugal's side a better disposed sovereign dismissed the warlike minister, Pomba, the advent of peace in the Iberian peninsula diminished whatever zeal Spain may have. felt for a belligerent course against Great Britain. Such grievances as remained were chiefly the chronic irritation at British possession of Gibraltar, and this, in the existing posture of affairs, scarcely warranted military operations. The Count de Florida Blanca, who succeeded to the Spanish ministry of foreign affairs, treated the overtures of Vergennes with coolness. The most that Spain seemed willing to contribute to the Family Compact was financial aid to the Americans. Alliance with them she resolutely declined, even when in 1779 she finally joined France in war against England.* Meanwhile she did advance materials and supplies through the firm of Hortalez and Company, the trading company created by the enthusiasm and enterprise of the French dramatist, Beaumarchais, to which allusion has been already made.

THE FRENCH ALLIANCE

It is the diplomatic consequences even more than the military which render Saratoga one of the "Decisive Battles of the World." For on its outcome depended the alliance without which the full attainment of America's independence is inconceivable. The first reaction of Vergennes to the news from America was, in fact, a belief that independence was already won. On further reflection, he concluded that while it was practically secured, British pride would never consent to recognize it. Then came the fear that Britain and America, instead of completely separating, might together work out an entente which would more than match the House of Bourbon and its Family Compact. He dreaded

more than aught else British resumption of commercial monopoly and utilization of America's resources for the attainment of predominance in Europe.

So concerned did Vergennes become lest the golden opportunity for a blow at England had been already lost, that recognition of America and a French alliance seemed to him almost a race for time against the mother country. His premises were deceptive. At no time in the Revolution, save perhaps in the early days of Lord Howe's command, was there a likelihood that England would voluntarily make the necessary concessions. Saratoga, while it amounted in a sense to the handwriting on the wall, afforded no basis to either side for the agreement which Vergennes feared. Nevertheless, that his idea was logical in theory and partly supported in fact is apparent from certain pour parlers which led to no result. Confronting what he feared was a lost opportunity, Vergennes decided to move Louis at all hazards.

The Family Compact itself now seemed of less importance than alliances with American colonials, and he played upon the King's feelings partly by the old fear for the West Indies, partly by the lust for power and the humiliation of an ancient foe.

These efforts were ably seconded by an American provincial now recognized by many as the first man in Europe, the first character, in fact, of the Eighteenth Century, for as John Adams said of him, Franklin easily outshone Newton, Leibnitz, Frederick the Great, and Voltaire. The first, a scientist, the second, a philosopher, were known only to a tiny group of the élite. Frederick the Great was anathema to half the States of Europe; Voltaire, by his attacks on the Church, to most of the plain people. Franklin, unlike his competitors, was the idol of all classes, and shrewd politician that he was, he capitalized genius and mannerisms alike into a furor of personal popularity which became the effective auxiliary of his mission."

In Franklin's hands were the threads of American diplomacy so far as they rested with any agent abroad. But in

Ibid., 93, quoting Life and Works of John Adams (Boston, 1856), I. 660.

all the negotiations with European nations, French leadership was evident. The problem of influencing Spain was wholly French. It increased rather than diminished when France avowed openly the American cause. Charles III felt affronted that so grave a step was taken without his concurrence, and the wounded dignity of Spain was not propitiated until France accepted a project for Spanish mediation. England's refusal of the Spanish terms drove the King and Florida Blanca once more into the French entente. But precious time was lost on the question of terms for an alliance. Vergennes placed too high a value on Spanish coöperation, and knowledge of this in Spain encouraged her rulers to extravagant demands. Spanish aspirations for the Floridas, for complete control of the mouth of the Mississippi, and if possible for a share of the Newfoundland fisheries, raised questions disagreeable to the Americans, and it was unlikely that France could satisfy both her ill-mated partners. Nor did the contribution eventually made by Spain to the common cause justify the concessions she demanded. As the Count de Montmorin, French ambassador at Madrid, foresaw, Spain was more a hindrance than a help where swift action was indispensable to economy as well as to success."

Spanish claims to a more northern boundary for Florida, and in a vague way to previously unclaimed jurisdiction east of the Mississippi, conflicted with the "Continental" policy which Americans already held as the Eighteenth Century equivalent of a later "Manifest Destiny." French efforts to persuade them of the reasonableness of Spanish claims convinced the American colonists that French aspirations in the War were far from disinterested. The course of M. Gérard, his Most Christian Majesty's representative at Philadelphia, was far from easy, and he sighed for a recall." Diverging interests in the midst of combat presaged divergent action at the peace table.

• Corwin, Edward S., Op. Cit. 180. 7 Ibid. 261-262.

THE NETHERLANDS

8

With the United Netherlands also French policy rather than the efforts of James Carmichael, the elder Adams, and Henry Laurens, one or more of whom resided at The Hague throughout the War, proved determining. The influence of the Stadtholder, William V, whose mother was an English princess, was consistently pro-English, and he urged a rigid observance of existing treaties. His subjects, on the other hand, found huge profits awaiting the chief of neutral carriers. And France was at first well content to procure arms and equipment through the Dutch as neutrals, though taking pains through a most competent ambassador, the Duc de la Vauguyon, to promote a French party sufficient to counteract any disposition of the House of Orange to play into English hands.

ST. EUSTATIUS IN THE WAR

The Dutch island of St. Eustatius, little more than a great rock in the West Indies, was converted into a vast magazine of war material, large quantities of powder and shot, cordage and naval supplies being transported thither under the neutral flag of Holland. From there its reshipment to America was easy. As early as the closing months of 1774 a notable increase of the trade with St. Eustatius was evident. It is known that a very large part of all the powder America burned in 1776 came through this island port. A trade so profitable encouraged the governor of St. Eustatius on November 16th of this same year to an action more offensive to Great Britain even than the provisioning of her enemies. For when the Andrew Doria, an American ship carrying at its masthead the flag of the Thirteen Colonies, entered the harbor with a salute of eleven guns, the commander at Fort Orange returned a salute of nine guns. This was the first salute to the American flag in a foreign port, an event of note in naval and diplomatic annals. Great

8 Edler, Friedrich, The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1911), page 13.

9 Ibid. 20.