Bulwer Treaty, and his knowledge gleaned at London of British subterfuge in its interpretation, introduced a personal equation not altogether friendly to a mutual understanding. But what might have threatened war had Buchanan persisted in the courses of Pierce and Southern fireeaters, subsided in the face of Northern disapproval of the South's imperialism, and of British conviction that peace with the world's great cotton grower counted more than petty gains along the Caribbean. With Buchanan a new tone became apparent in our Isthmian relations. The diplomatic change was merely a reflection of a shift in fundamental interests. The burdens of a war in the Crimea had turned aside Great Britain at the crisis of her American controversies. When the war was over she discovered that protectorates and tiny kingdoms near the Isthmus were of less commercial benefit than a stable government in that region, subject to American control. Barring a possible construction of the canal in some distant future, Great Britain discovered that her rivalry with the United States was really not worth while. At the same time, Buchanan and the statesmen of the Southern school thought less of constructing the canal and more of extending the area of slavery. The interests of the two powers seemed to coincide, and with harmony of interest, agreement was inevitable.2 Lord Clarendon endeavored to promote this by a means that proved successful in 1842 when the American connections of Lord Ashburton contributed so greatly to the success of his mission. An American wife and numerous connections over here were in fact the chief recommendations of Sir William Gore Ouseley, who was commissioned to open negotiations directly with both the United States and Central America. He came to Washington, lingered there too long, and finally reached Nicaragua too late to accomplish much against concession hunters. But though Great Britain thus expressed conciliatory purposes, she 21 For later aspects of the British-American controversy in Central America see Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 224-269. would not quit Belize. And in time the United States took the initiative in what became a compromise. It was brought about by a series of treaties negotiated by Charles Wyke, in which Great Britain abandoned the Bay Island Colony and her protectorate over Greytown, and agreed to a boundary settlement between Guatemala and Belize. These concessions were most gratifying to Buchanan, who amid the trials of 1860 could remind his fellow citizens of one bright spot at least. "Our relations with Great Britain are of the most friendly character. . . . The discordant constructions of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty between the two Governments, which at different periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government." 22 There was in this message a new note of cordiality to Great Britain, more noticeable, as Lord Lyons, the new British minister at Washington, reminded his superior, than in any previous message of a President to Congress. The passing of the notorious filibuster, William Walker, was, no doubt, in part responsible for this unwonted harmony in Anglo-American Isthmian relations. That trouble breeder, first encouraged then discouraged by President Pierce, returning to New Orleans for recruits, was making his way back to Nicaragua when arrested at sea by Commodore Hiram Paulding, and returned to the United States.23 Here Buchanan, whose first message to Congress had condemned filibustering in strongest terms, joined with Southern men in Congress, and, it may be said, with Northern too, in denouncing Paulding's action. The Commodore undoubtedly exceeded his instructions. In seizing Walker, moreover, he violated international law, for Walker was beyond the limits of American jurisdiction, and besides was no longer an American citizen. Paulding admitted error and apparently bore no resentment when for the remainder of Buchanan's term he was retired from service. His action bore good fruit, however, in im22 Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 266. 23 Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 461-462 and passim gives a lively debate on this incident. proved sentiment throughout Central America. Nicaragua and Costa Rica in particular gave tangible evidence of good will by revoking unfriendly ordinances and by disavowing a canal-building grant previously conceded to the French. Meanwhile Walker was released on bond, and acquitted by a New Orleans jury from whom no other verdict could have been imagined. But it was not till 1860 that he fitted out another expedition, and in this he met his death. While Central America was rejoicing in the curb on William Walker, South America was receiving an object lesson in American efficiency. Before Buchanan entered office, an American vessel, the Water Witch, while making soundings in the Parana River to determine how far it was navigable, was fired upon by order of the President of Paraguay and one of its sailors was killed. This was on the first of February, 1855. The situation hung fire for the rest of Pierce's term, but Buchanan, in his first message to Congress, sought authority to obtain reparations. Congress voted this in June, 1858, and an expedition started southward, reaching Asuncion, the Paraguayan capital, in January, 1859, and departing little more than three weeks afterward with its mission accomplished. The President apologized most handsomely for his unwarranted attack; the Congress voted ten thousand dollars to the family of the lost sailor; and the government entered into treaties of commerce and navigation with the United States. All of which was accomplished, as Buchanan "points with pride" in his third annual message and again in his defense of his administration, at a cost of only $289,000, or no more than the ordinary naval appropriations for the year. Moreover, as the President no doubt truthfully asserted, "the appearance of so large a force (there were nineteen armed vessels and 2500 sailors and marines employed), fitted out in such a prompt manner, in the far distant waters of the La Plata, and the admirable conduct of the officers and men employed in it, have had a happy effect in favor of our country throughout all that remote portion of the world." 24 Richardson, James D., Op. Cit. V, 560. " 24 In foreign relations on the whole, Buchanan and his Secretary may be said to have achieved a moderate success. But on the eve of Civil War, diplomacy was not the measuring rod of an administration, and the overshadowing failure in domestic issues obscured the technical and routine successes of the two elderly statesmen. On domestic issues, even foreign policy finally split. For Secretary Cass, however good a Democrat, was too good a Northern man to uphold his chief in an attitude of 'After us the deluge.' Secession had no place in his political philosophy. And the President's denial in his crucial message of December, 1860, of a power to coerce the States, followed immediately afterward by his refusal to strengthen Federal garrisons at Charleston, brought about his Secretary's resignation, December 14, 1860. For the brief remainder of Buchanan's term, the State Department fell to Jeremiah S. Black, more noted as a lawyer than as a statesman, whose chief imprint on history is in the administration of Andrew Johnson. The rupture of the President and Secretary symbolized the rupture of their party, and the conclusion of an era. Diplomacy from 1823 to 1861 was the foreign business of a going corporation. Diplomacy during the Civil War was a struggle for national existence. Its issues were as vital as the decisions of the battlefield. T CHAPTER XVI CIVIL WAR HE key-note of Civil War diplomacy was the counterpart of military tactics. Each strove to isolate the South. Each "muddled through" to final victory. But with both the issue was for long uncertain. In diplomacy as on the battlefield, the weapons must be forged. But in the former the choice of agents was more happy. Here the government selected wisely from the first. Whereas for service on the battlefield, the rush of civilian volunteers under political commanders necessitated a winnowing of wheat from chaff not completed fully till the closing months of war. WILLIAM H. SEWARD The first place in the cabinet went naturally and properly to the President's chief rival, the disappointed candidate at the Convention in Chicago, William H. Seward, of New York, a man of much political experience as Governor of his State, and of late its Senator at Washington, a man capable of growth in his new office and destined to win a place as one of the greatest men who ever held it, but handicapped at first by serious limitations. It was unfortunate, for example, that Seward should approach his task with the conviction of his own superiority to Lincoln. Discipline and esprit de corps required subordination, which Lincoln tactfully secured. Nor when he was first called to office had Seward quite thought through the situation. He did not comprehend how utterly the North and South had grown apart. A narrow formula of traditional diplomacy which holds that when internal politics prove troublesome the proper remedy is foreign war became with Seward somewhat of a shibboleth. He fancied that a war with England |