ary was Florida. Saving certain islands assigned to Nova Scotia, all others within twenty leagues of the coast were assigned to the United States. It will be recognized at once that in as much as the Mississippi lies not west but southeast of the Lake of the Woods, the boundary would require further definition as soon as its geography was better known.

Both Great Britain and the United States were granted by the treaty free navigation of the Mississippi. Here was another item for future negotiation, in as much as the boundary as actually drawn placed the Mississippi wholly within the territory of the United States.

On the question of American debts held by British creditors the most the Americans would promise was not to impede collection. In practice collection proved to be very difficult.

The Loyalists fared badly. Great Britain wished the United States to offer compensation for Loyalist property destroyed or seized. The American negotiators refused any such demand. Negotiations might have terminated then and there, had not the British government been determined to present to Parliament at its next session the project of a treaty. Finally the Americans so far yielded as to promise to recommend to the several States legislation on the Loyalists' behalf. As was foreseen the States paid no attention to these recommendations, and Loyalist compensation finally was assumed by Parliament. Provision was inserted in the treaty that Loyalists might have twelve months in which to recover their property, if they were able. Later this time restriction was removed.

The right to fish off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland was ably argued by John Adams, to whom is chiefly due the credit for securing what we sought. He contended that if Americans were excluded from the fisheries, they would not be able to carry fish to Spain and Portugal, and with the proceeds of their sales to buy commodities in England. Worse still, exclusion of Americans would simply hand the fisheries to France, who would utilize them as a nursery of sailors for the fleet. These arguments prevailed and Americans were granted the coveted privilege.

Since independence was the foremost object of the treaty, it followed naturally that British forces were pledged to a withdrawal from the country. On recommendation of Henry Laurens, one of the commissioners, a slave-holder of South Carolina, it was further provided that the retiring troops should leave behind them "any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants."

By a secret article of the treaty it was provided, strangely enough, that if England in her separate negotiations with Spain should secure West Florida, then America would be content with a southern boundary drawn about one hundred miles north of that drawn in the published treaty. Here was preferential treatment of the enemy, Great Britain, as contrasted with the supposedly friendly Spain. When this provision came eventually to Spanish knowledge, the anger at Madrid was deep, and, one would say, quite justified.

Such in brief were the terms of peace in 1783-beyond all expectation generous on Great Britain's part, but wise in their belated effort at conciliation with America. The colonies indeed were lost, but their good will might be recovered and their trade retained.17

THE ETHICS OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATION

The preliminary negotiation of the American commissioners with Oswald raised a question of morality which even yet is matter of controversy. James Madison and others in the Congress considered it as dubious. It is true that only the project of a treaty was drawn up, and the responsibility of accepting it lay with Congress. It is further true that the commissioners very particularly stipulated that the treaty should take effect only when peace was also made with France. Nevertheless Vergennes was correct in maintaining that the terms sent to Congress and of which he was not until the last moment informed, outlined the treaty as it must be finally accepted, if at all; and he was

17 The treaty is to be found in Malloy, William M. (Editor) "Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, and Protocols Between the United States and Other Powers, 1776-1909, 2 vols. (Washington, 1910.)

18

further correct in asserting that the commissioners had violated in spirit, if not in fact, the instructions given them by Congress, and the pledge to France implied therein. Granted that the relations of the commissioners with their own Congress were no affair of Vergennes, his indignation was natural at the secrecy of the negotiation, and his reproach to Franklin betrays a righteous indignation. Somewhat embarrassing it was that just at this juncture, when striving to play an independent and sovereign rôle, the Americans were compelled to approach their ally for a fresh loan. It was granted, and Vergennes was even magnanimous enough to declare that Jay and Adams were shrewder diplomats than he.

The question further arises as to whether the secret methods followed by the commissioners attained the best results. True, British concessions were liberal beyond expectation. To many it appeared that Britain purchased rather than made peace. The Mississippi boundary where many expected the Alleghenies, a share in the Newfoundland fisheries, a liberal boundary on the north, even abandonment of requirements concerning the Loyalists were proof that Britain, having reconciled herself to the loss of the colonies, meant to retain as much of their good will and incidentally their trade, as could be salvaged from the wreck of war. On the other hand, and this gave point to the opposition, Britain seemed for a moment willing to throw in for good measure the great province of Ontario. It has seemed to some historians that if Franklin had not been outvoted by the impetuous Jay and the hardheaded Adams, she would have done so. But this belief fails to take account of Lord Howe's success in raising the siege of Gibraltar. Once it became evident that no combination of France and Spain could wrest this fortress from British hands, resistance stiffened, and America was perhaps fortunate that negotiations were already so far advanced.

18 Corwin, Edward S., Op. Cit. 340-341.

AMERICA'S LONE HAND

America at this juncture avoided a serious embarrassment in the timely decision of Spain to abandon the struggle and of France to make an immediate peace. The further hazards of war might have led to ultimate victory for Britain over the Franco-Spanish combination, now that the energies of the Empire were no longer drained away in the American war. Under such conditions to keep faith with her allies might have cost America most of those gains assured by the preliminary draft of a treaty not yet definitively signed and sealed. Whereas a separate peace made in defiance of the French alliance and adopted in too cynical a regard to our own interests solely, would have constituted an unhappy entrance into the family of nations, where an outward regard for treaties and the semblance of national gratitude and honor are applauded if not imitated. Here as in so many aspects of the War, military as well as diplomatic, a kindly Providence seemed to guard American welfare.

Even as it was, the lesson of America's separate action was not misunderstood. The French seem speedily to have lost what few illusions they may originally have cherished as to the likelihood that America would come economically or even politically under French influence. Even in 1778 when drafting the alliance with us, France anticipated precisely the benefits which did accrue, and those only. The alliance was a necessary step to the abasement of England. And in the immediate aftermath of the War, the increased prestige of the House of Bourbon seemed to justify the blood and treasure spent. The latest proof of the new position of France in world affairs came in 1785 when France intervened in the domestic concerns of Holland as the acknowledged arbiter of Europe. On the moderation with which he wielded this influence, Vergennes congratulated the King, while at the same time giving himself a little pat for the diplomacy that made it possible.

19

But if the hopes of Vergennes were realized, so, too, were the fears of Turgot. Vast war loans piled on the 19 Corwin, Edward S., Op. Cit. 374

mountain of inherited debt completed the derangement of French finance, and proved the connecting link between the American revolution and its aftermath in France. The diplomacy of the old régime was as bankrupt as the finance. Yet the hope of a new era lay in the new republic erected by the genius of an ancient monarchy, and itself the tutor of that monarchy's successor. All this was undreamed of by the men of 1783. As realists they dealt with facts, not fancies.

If the vigor and independence of the peace commissioners revealed that America thus early comprehended the lesson of national selfishness, even as the urbanity and charm of Vergennes failed to disguise the similar character of French motives and objectives, it was already apparent that the future relations of America with her old ally would be as much a matter of prudence as her relations with her former foe. With such premises one does not look for brilliant results from the diplomacy of the Confederation. The weak and distracted America of the "Critical Period" offered few inducements to the courtship or concessions of Europe. An account of our appeals makes sorry reading.