upon Garfield. As the nomination convention of 1892 approached, increasing tension was apparent. Blaine's grief in 1890 over the loss of two of his children made him more reserved. The President grew less disposed to accede to his wishes. On June 4, 1892, just three days before the Minneapolis Convention of the party, the Secretary submitted abruptly and with no intimation of cordiality his resignation from the cabinet. Harrison accepted it in similar spirit with not a solitary expression of regret. Blaine's biographer and apologist thought the Secretary in the wrong, a victim of delusions which forecast his speedy dissolution. Before his term would normally have expired, he followed his children to the grave and the President, to whom he meanwhile had been reconciled, issued an official proclamation in which he declared that the late statesman's "devotion to the public interests, his marked ability, and his exalted patriotism have won for him the gratitude and affection of his countrymen and the admiration of the world. In the various pursuits of legislation, diplomacy, and literature his genius has added new lustre to American citizenship." 20

Not all Blaine's purposes and acts have met the tests of time. But his brilliant talents charmed contemporaries and still command the admiration of posterity. Victim of an age of low ideals in politics and business Blaine was none the less the most gifted Republican between Lincoln and Roosevelt. With his passing the curtain descended on an era.

20 Richardson, James D., Op. Cit. IX, 385.

T

CHAPTER XXI

VENEZUELA AND OTHER PROBLEMS

HE return to power of Grover Cleveland introduced a new spirit into our foreign relations. The selec

tion of Walter Q. Gresham, who had held the Treasury portfolio under Arthur, to be Secretary of State in a Democratic administration was not only a concession to progressives, for in spirit Gresham belonged with the followers of Greeley in 1872 and the Roosevelt Bull Moose of 1912, but it augured a radical departure in our foreign relations from the hectic attitudes of Blaine, and his temporary substitute, John W. Foster.

HAWAII

The problems most urgent for solution were the fur-seal controversy, whose outcome has been already briefly sketched, and a new phase of the Hawaiian question which in the closing days of Harrison's Administration had become acute. Its proper understanding requires some note of previous Hawaiian history. In 1874 the ancient royal race of Kamehameha became extinct, and the island legislature, under the influence of American missionaries, chose a new king, David Kalakaua, in preference to a candidate upheld by British influence. The new king owed a further debt to American marines, and the influence of the United States was paramount.1

An immediate result of this connection was a commercial treaty of 1875 with the United States profitable to both countries until the McKinley tariff bill of 1890 ruined Hawaiian sugar planters by cutting off their American market. In others respects, however, Kalakaua proved to

1 Callahan, James Morton, American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East 1784-1900, pp. 114-134.

be an unfortunate selection, and in 1887 his disgusted subjects offered him a choice between abdication and the granting of a constitution. The king chose the path of least resistance, but up to his death in 1890 had not grown reconciled to the curb upon his power. His sister, the new Queen Liliuokalani, shared his views and plotted the recovery of her rights.

The Queen in her political intrigue identified herself with an opium ring and lost the confidence of the better elements among her people. But the uprising of January 12, 1893, which drove her from the throne did not represent a national movement. The Provisional Government which then assumed control included only one Hawaiian native, and feared to base its power upon a referendum. Its members swore allegiance to an Hawaiian constitution and then with rare consistency delegated five of their own number, four Americans and one Englishman, to proceed to Washington with a petition to annex the islands.

The leader of this embassy, Lorrin A. Thurston, described its purposes as a defense of American property rights which had become so great that "it is no longer a simple question of political advantage to the United States, or of charity or justice toward a weak neighbor, which the authorities at Washington have to deal with; but it is a question involving the fortunes of thousands of their own flesh and blood and millions of dollars worth of their own property."

"2

Whatever their allegiance or their motives, the commissioners had some reason to anticipate a favorable reception, since they owed such measure of success as was already won to American assistance. While the uprising was in progress, American marines were landed from the Boston, then lying at Honolulu, and for seventy-five days remained at various stations assigned them by the American minister, John L. Stevens, and the Provisional Government. The Queen surrendered to superior force and in her later pleas for restoration stated that she avoided bloodshed fully con2 Thurston, Lorrin A., "The Sandwich Islands. The Advantages of Annexation." The North American Review, vol. CLVI, p. 280.

fident that on fuller information the government at Washington would disown this unwarranted interference in Hawaii.

Had considerations of international law in this instance possessed much weight with Harrison and his Secretary Foster, the Queen's contention would have been conclusive, since the only lawful pretext for employing the marines was to protect American property and lives from violence at the hands of the Hawaiians. To aid Americans in overthrowing a duly constituted government was an undoubted act of violence, and if upheld at Washington would signify that selfinterest outweighed respect for law.

That such was actually the case was evident in Harrison's desire to accept the offers of the Hawaiian commissioners. At his request, Secretary Foster, though much engrossed with the Bering Sea negotiation, drew up an annexation treaty. To make assurance doubly certain, Stevens, our minister in Hawaii, declared the islands under our protection and raised the United States flag above the government building. Foster disclaimed "protection," but the flag remained and in face of an accomplished fact strong pressure was exerted toward prompt action by the Senate. The treaty went before the Senate on February 15th. The administration trusted to its ratification before the fourth of March.

4

In announcing his "protectorate" of February first, Stevens had written that "the Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to pluck it." But the Senate was not quite prepared to do so. Distant annexations raised various constitutional problems, and time was needed for discussion. The treaty was still before the Senate when Cleveland took office. One of his first acts was to withdraw it. So far as the President could influence events, Blaine's policy of grab was outlawed.

Withdrawal of the treaty was too vigorous a slap at Cleveland's predecessor to escape the censure of Republicans, and

3 For the Secretary's own account of these events see, Foster, John W., American Diplomacy in the Orient, 365-385.

4 McElroy, Robert, Grover Cleveland the Man and the Statesman (New York, 1923), II, 55.

the administration determined on an independent investigation of the facts as a weapon against opposing arguments. To this end James H. Blount, former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives, was given plenary powers of investigation and superiority to any naval or diplomatic authorities in the islands. This preliminary move was opposed, but the President cited precedents and had his way.

Blount increased the storm of opposition by lowering the flag which Stevens unlawfully had raised, and ordering our sailors and marines back on board their ship. His inquiries led to the conclusion that our intervention was utterly unwarranted, and his report formed the basis of Gresham's recommendation that the United States immediately withdraw from a position so inconsistent with its principles. Gresham's predecessor, John W. Foster, and his fellow annexationists were handled without gloves in a paragraph bristling with contempt for their insincerity. "It is fair to say," writes Gresham, "that Secretary Foster's statements were based upon information which he had received from Mr. Stevens and the special commissioners, but I am unable to see that they were deceived. The troops were landed, not to protect American life and property, but to aid in overthrowing the existing government. Their very presence implied coercive measures against it.” 5

Opposing this unrighteousness, Gresham closes his memorial with two paragraphs that strike the true note of American idealism, "Should not the great wrong done to a feeble but independent state by an abuse of the authority of the United States be undone by restoring the legitimate government? Anything short of that will not, I respectfully submit, satisfy the demands of justice.

"Can the United States consistently insist that other nations shall respect the independence of Hawaii while not respecting it themselves? Our government was the first to recognize the independence of the islands and it should be

Gresham, Matilda, Life of Walter Quintin Gresham (Chicago, 1919), II, 750.