Mr. DELANEY. Of course, it is generally understood that we want to have peace at any price in consonance with our national honor. We are bringing this bill out at the present time proposing to raise all these categories, cruisers, battleships, and so forth, and this program would not be necessary today if during these years since the war, from 1921 to 1930, we had kept on building. We made a gesture at that time to see if we could not agree with the other nations to disarm to a great extent, scuttling, ruining, or destroying a lot of ships. that were building at that time. If we had kept on with the building program constantly from 1930 on, it would not be necessary to have this large building program that we are discussing at the present time.

Admiral LEAHY. If we had kept up our Navy as it was organized at the end of the World War, there would be no occasion for increasing now, because we would already have at least as much naval power as any other nation.

Mr. DELANEY. I recall in 1932 the Naval Affairs Committee proposed that we embark on a building program amounting to $625,000,000. That was taken to the other end of the Avenue and the occupant of the White House at that time decided we were not in fear of any nation and did not expect any war. We were at peace with the world, but that program was discussed completely. Is that so? Admiral LEAHY. I think it is correct.

Mr. DELANEY. At the present time with this building program, which we have discussed this morning, that will bring our tonnage up to approximately 1,500,000 tons, will it not?

Admiral LEAHY. Approximately that.

Mr. DELANEY. That will compare as of July 1, 1937, with that of Great Britain, 1,757,000.

Admiral LEAHY. Great Britain at the present time has 1,256,648 tons built.

Mr. DELANEY. I am speaking of the proposed building, also appropriated for, which would be 500.000 more tons.

Admiral LEAHY. Five hundred thousand tons are building in England now.

Mr. DELANEY. At the present time we are almost, when this program is finished, on a par with Great Britain, or within a couple of hundred thousand tons.

Admiral LEAHY. We will not have reached parity with Great Britain. I do not know how far below we will be at that time.

Mr. DELANEY. Italy, Germany, France, and Japan-their combined tonnage is around 2,500,000 tons. We have 1,500,000 and Great Britain 1,700,000, so that the combined tonnage of England and America would be greater than all the other four powers put together.

Admiral LEAHY. I believe that is correct.

Mr. DELANEY. I am bringing out the point that this program would not be so extensive or so large if we had continued an orderly building program from 1921 to 1932.

Admiral LEAHY. If we had begun building then and continued an orderly building program, there would be no reason for an increased building authorization in the Navy. That is correct.

20680-38-No. 620-2

Mr. DELANEY. The spending of this money at the present time is simply to make up for the retarding of the program during those years.

Admiral LEAHY. The authorization is asked for the purpose of catching up with the building program of the other naval powers, which have gone forward while ours was not moving forward.

Mr. MAAS. In other words, we can charge this up to the "noble experiment"; this increase is due to the "noble experiment" of the disarmament and later conferences.

Mr. DELANEY. It was an error to have stopped building up our Navy due to that policy, and during the last 3 or 4 years the United States has come nearer to carrying out its treaty obligations than at any time previous to this.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brewster, have you any questions?

Mr. BREWSTER. I would prefer to defer my questions until the last of the admiral's statement. I will defer my questions until

tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. KNIFFIN. I understood you to say that the purpose of our Navy was to defend the continental United States, our outlying possessions, and the commerce of the United States.

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct; the approved policy of the United States.

Mr. KNIFFIN. Do you include the Philippine Islands in our outlying possessions?

Admiral LEAHY. The Philippine Islands at the present moment are an outlying possession of the United States. The Navy at the present time, and as contemplated under this bill, will not be sufficiently strong to arrange for the protection by the United States of the Philippines against any major power. That is one of the things in the approved policy that we are unable to do.

Mr. KNIFFIN. You stated we would have to have three times our present naval strength in order to land troops on the shores of a major foreign power.

Admiral LEAHY. Not exactly. I said it would require at least three times this amount of increase of our present Navy to warrant undertaking such an expedition. I do not say that we could accomplish it with that much, and I doubt if we could with three times the increase.

Mr. KNIFFIN. Conversely, then, it would require approximately three times the strength of any foreign Navy to land troops upon our shores, would it not?

Admiral LEAHY. No. The only thing that it is necessary to do in order to land troops on our shores is to destroy our fleet.

Mr. KNIFFIN. And it would be necessary for us to destroy the fleet. of another power before we could land troops on their shores?

Admiral LEAHY. That is correct, unless we should have a sufficient

fleet to move the fleet and the expeditionary troops together.

Mr. KNIFFIN. Assuming that that is true, no two foreign navies could land troops upon our shores at the present time.

Admiral LEAHY. Not so long as our Navy remained in existence on the sea.

Mr. KNIFFIN. It would remain in existence if what you say is true. Admiral LEAHY. Until it was destroyed, but there may possibly be several combinations of foreign navies that could destroy our

fleet with the thought that then there would be no difficulty in landing.

Mr. KNIFFIN. I do not know whether I will be for this bill or not. Ordinarily I would resolve the doubt in favor of our safety, and I would rather have a few ships too many than too few. May I ask you to definite the line of defense as the Navy contemplates it beginning with the Aleutian Islands? You stated something about that at the outset of your remarks, and if you do not care to do it now, you may put it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a map here?

Admiral LEAHY. Here is a map. It is impossible for anybody to say where the line of defense is going to be. We have a line shown on the map which we are going to cover in order to obtain information of the enemy. It is not a line of defense. The line of defense may be much closer to our own shores than that; it may be beyond that, but that is a line where we expect to obtain sufficient information upon which to base our operations.

Mr. KNIFFIN. If we are building a defense Navy, there ought to be a clear-cut field in which it would operate as a defense Navy. Admiral LEAHY. The Navy proposes to operate wherever the enemy fleet is attacking us.

Mr. BREWSTER. You want to know the line they are going to defend?

Mr. KNIFFIN. I want to know the area in which the United States Navy will operate as a defense Navy.

Mr. PHILLIPS. I object to that question.

The CHAIRMAN. A member of the committee has a right to ask any question.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Would the gentleman wish to ask the Admiral a question which might divulge important information to a foreign power?

Mr. KNIFFIN. No. The Admiral is eminently capable of taking care of that feature.

Admiral LEAHY. As I understand the question, it was for me to state an area within which the United States is going to operate in defending the coast of the United States. It is not possible for me to make an answer to that question because in case the coast of the United States is threatened the American Navy is going to operate wherever the enemy fleet can be forced to fight.

Mr. KNIFFIN. That is an answer to the question. You said a moment ago that the other fundamental, primary purpose of our Navy was to defend our commerce, and I would like to have you define what that consists of.

Admiral LEAHY. That is another question to which it is almost impossible to make an accurate reply, because, until conditions arise which necessitate protection of our commerce, it is not possible to say just what we will do.

Mr. KNIFFIN. I want to know more, perhaps at a later date, about this line that you drew at the outset of your statement beginning with the Aleutian Islands.

Admiral LEAHY. The Navy Department would not like to have any restriction placed upon our naval arm. I would consider it extremely unwise to put any statutory restriction on the use of the Navy.

Mr. KNIFFIN. I am opposed to this policing phase of it. I am opposed to the use of the fleet as a policing organization for private interests, which just leads you all over the world and into unexpected difficulty. I am in favor of a strong Navy, one that is sufficient to defend our shores and our possessions; and I think the place to draw the line, Mr. Chairman, is somewhat in accordance with that chart, but not to use naval vessels, our land and sea forces, as a subsidiary to some concern that wants to exploit people on the other side of the globe. I might offer an amendment.

Admiral LEAHY. A navy of sufficient strength to protect the shores of the United States must be sufficiently strong to defeat the navy of a possible enemy. That is all there is to it. It is simple. Where you are going to use your fleet and how you are going to use it is a matter for the individual at the time on the spot to decide, and it is my business as Chief of Naval Operations to recommend to you that we provide a navy which is strong enough to defeat the navy of any possible enemy in an attack on our shores. If they can destroy our Navy, they can land on our shores; if they cannot destroy our Navy, they cannot land.

Mr. MAAS. It seems to me the gentleman is confusing the mission of a fort with the mission of the Navy. As I understand it, the mission of the Navy is to go to sea and prevent a hostile fleet from ever reaching our shores.

(Thereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the committee adjourned to meet again at 10:30 a. m. Tuesday, February 1, 1938.)

ESTABLISH THE COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED

STATES NAVY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1938

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:30 a. m., Hon. Carl Vinson (chairman) presiding.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY, UNITED STATES NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. This is a continuation of the hearing on H. R. 9218. Yesterday when we recessed Mr. Kniffin was propounding some questions to the admiral, and I will ask if Mr. Kniffin has finished?

Mr. KNIFFIN. I consumed considerable time yesterday, and while I have some more questions to ask, I would prefer to reserve them until a later time in the hearing.

Mr. COLE. Admiral, how many ships are capital ships as contemplated by this increase?

Admiral LEAHY. If the present tonnage limitations are continued, it would authorize the construction of three additional capital ships, making a total of 18 instead of 15.

Mr. COLE. The tonnage limitation is fixed by what?

Admiral LEAHY. The tonnage limitation on capital ships is now fixed by the London Treaty of 1936 at 35,000 tons.

Mr. COLE. Is the treaty being observed by the signatories of it? Admiral LEAHY. It is; the signatories being the United States, Great Britain, and France.

Mr. COLE. What is the largest capital ship built by any nation? Admiral LEAHY. At the present time the largest capital ship is 35,000 tons, except the British battle cruiser Hood, which is 42,100 tons displacement.

Mr. COLE. No nation in the world, except Great Britain, has a ship larger than 35,000 tons?

Admiral LEAHY. So far as we know, no one has a larger ship under construction, although we have information published in Italy that Japan is building ships very much larger than that.

Mr. COLE. On what information is based your statement of the comparative strength of the navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan?

Admiral LEAHY. Upon published information.