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ways with the people's money and for the people's use; why, then, should not the people, through a government engineer, scrutinize the work while it is going on, to see that it is honestly and safely done? Such governmental supervision of road building would prevent a recurrence of what has been too frequent an experience in the past; of roads, after a brief period of use, having to be nearly rebuilt at the expense of their unfort unate bondholders and stockholders. In every city there are inspectors whose duty it is to look after buildings in the course of erection, to see that the work upon them is properly and safely done. Would it not be just as practicable for government engineers to make inspection of railways in the process of construction, to see that they are properly built? And why should not the code require that sworn detailed reports of the actual cost of all railway construction be rendered to the commission, such reports to be made, by the commission, matters of public record?

Besides what has been suggested, why should not the law restrict the capitalization of railways hereafter to be built, if not to their actual cost, to within reasonable limits? To overcapitalization, more than to all other causes combined, are directly due all the troubles connected with our railway system. If our railways had been stocked and bonded for no more than their actual cost, what a world of trouble and loss would have been saved to us, and how different would be the situation confronting us to-day! What is called "water" in railway capitalization has proved a very fountain of evils. Though it has made millions upon millions for individuals, it has been and it is so direct and so heavy, and withal so unjust, a burden upon the people, that it is marvelous that the government which is "of, for, and by the people" should so long have permitted its creation. and existence.

Of course to this proposal there is the instant objection that to deprive railway building of the chance to make large profits through watered capital would be to cripple enterprise and to check the construction of new roads. When the railway interest was in its infancy it may have been necessary to foster and encourage it by every possible inducement, but the case is different now. There are railroads in plenty to-day for the coun

try's needs; indeed, there are in very many sections more roads than there is business for, and the need of the hour is for a check upon railway building rather than for a stimulation of it in any way. To forbid the over-capitalization of new roads would not prevent the building of a single mile of track that is needed. Without entering further into discussion of this feature of the subject, it is safe to say that the common sense of the country demands that there shall be an end to the practice of building roads for bonds. No longer should insiders be permitted to pay for railway construction out of the proceeds of bonds sold to the public, and to pocket, as profit, stock representing control of the properties, and issued, in almost every instance, to a greater amount per mile than the bonds.

Further, why should not the railway commission have power to establish uniform rates for traffic, that is to say, uniform for roads in the same locality: so much per mile for local business within certain boundaries, and so much per ton and per passenger for through business between certain principal points, the through business to be equitably pro-rated by all the roads over which it passes? No reflection is needed for any one to appreciate how incalculably beneficial, from every point of view, would be the result of carrying out this suggestion. It would put a stop to the, at times, ruinous competition between the roads, and prevent the so frequent recurrence of railroad wars which have caused the needless loss of so many millions of dollars in the past, with no appreciably beneficial result to anybody. It would end the everlasting seesaw of rates that goes on in some sections, where the roads are so many and the relations between them of such a "cat and dog" nature, that scarcely a day passes without the announcement of a fresh "cut" among them.

Competition is the life of trade," and were the railroads the private property of those who manage them, nobody would care how much they might "cut each other's throats;" in that event, indeed, the more "cutting" that went on among the roads the better it would perhaps be for the public at large, provided that with the reduction came stability and permanence of rate charges. But the managers do not own the roads; on the contrary, they frequently have but little interest in the properties which they

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control; and the readiness of some of them to cut rates and to make the most heroic sacrifice of property, upon the slightest possible provocation, is of a piece with Artemus Ward's patriotic hope that the Rebellion would be crushed, even at the cost of all his able-bodied relatives. It is simply monstrous that a few irresponsible men should have the power, as they have, to gamble with railway properties. It is a condition of things that would not be tolerated anywhere under the sun but here. Take, for instance, the "Granger roads." They represent in value a thousand millions, more or less, and are owned by thousands of persons scattered from Maine to Texas. The managers of these roads, with comparatively no ownership in them"short" indeed, perhaps, at times, of the properties-over and over again, as we have seen, cut rates, make war, and sacrifice values by millions with a recklessness that has no precedent, and there is no one to say them nay. The real owners of the roads, who suffer the losses, are virtually helpless in the matter.

Railway managers stand between the people whom the railways should serve and the people who own the roads. Almost without restriction of any kind, legal or otherwise, and regardless of what they owe either to those whose servants they should be, or to those whose trustees they are, the managers are too often guilty of gross wrong to both. When they make war, they wrong bondholders and stockholders; when, having made peace, they unduly push up rates, they wrong the public at large. In either case the people suffer, and in very self-protection the people should, through the government, curtail the managers' power for evil. The commission should establish fair rates for all kinds of railway traffic--fair both to those who use and to those who own the roads; and the managers should be compelled, by severest penalty, to conform to them.

Combinations and consolidations between railway corporations are the fashion of the hour, and they are going on all over the country in a way that may be the source of much trouble in the future. Apart from the fact that, with scarcely an exception, every instance of consolidation is attended with the creation of millions of stock that is all "water," the conversion of competitive roads into vast systems should be regarded with grave con.

cern, to say the least. It is admitted that certain advantages to the public, in the way of more efficient, and, perhaps, cheaper service, may result from such consolidations, but it behooves the people to watch them narrowly. At least, why should not the national railway law, in the interest of the people and for their protection, either entirely forbid all such combinations, or define the circumstances under which, and the way in which, they may be made? And why should not the law surround them, after they have been made, with all the guards and restrictions that public safety may demand?

To resume the national-bank analogy, why should there not attach to the affairs of every railway the same publicity that attends the business of every national bank? Why should not the law prevent all secrecy of railway financiering and management? As government examiners at frequent intervals go through every national bank, and make careful report of its condition to the Department at Washington, why should not government experts make as frequent investigation, and report of the true condition, financial and otherwise, of every railway? The reason of the government's so frequent examination of the national banks is concern for the protection of the people's money invested in them as capital and deposits. Is there not far more reason why the government should as frequently and as carefully overhaul the condition of the railways, in the fact that there is so much more of the people's money invested in the railways than there is in the banks?

It is not proposed to enumerate all the points that might be covered by a national railway law, but the subject should not be dismissed without setting forth the vital necessity that exists for some sort of protection of minority shareholders in railways. That "the majority should rule," is a correct principle in the abstract, but by its application the greatest wrong and most flagrant injustice are far too frequently wrought. Individuals and corporations, through control of majority stock, in instances without number, are crowding minority stockholders in railways to the wall and robbing them. Every reader familiar with railway affairs can call to mind a dozen instances in support of the assertion. Very many of the cases are aggravated and outra

geous beyond words, but so common have they become that they excite nobody's special wonder; indeed, nobody cares a straw about them except the poor creatures who are robbed. Men who stand well before the community, who "say grace at table and carry around the plate at church," who would scorn to pick a pocket or to take part in a burglary, in cases without number unite in schemes to plunder minority stockholders in railways with as little compunction of conscience as footpads at night waylay the lonely pedestrian, and, while stifling his cries, rifle his pockets of watch and money. The crimes differ only in magnitude, the one being stupendous, the other contemptible; but while the footpad feels his guilt, and tries to hide from the loathing which he is sure every decent man has for him, and from the penalty which he knows awaits him if he should be caught, the greater robber has no thought of anybody's loathing or of any kind of punishment. On the contrary, the bigger thief rejoices in his crime and proudly displays his plunder, sure of the admiration and the envy it will excite. For the lonely pedestrian there is protection in the lights upon the streets, and the presumable policeman on the corner; and if he be robbed, there is speedy redress in the law if the robber should be caught. But for the holders of minority stock in railways there is absolutely no protection of any kind; and for them, if they be plundered, there is virtually no redress in the so-called "courts of justice." Of course, when minority stockholders have been wronged, they have the right to try to better themselves if they be so disposed; but invariably they are so widely scattered that it is almost impossible to combine them, and they must pay out of their own pockets the cost of lawyers and litigation in any attempt to secure their rights. The majority stockholders, on the other hand, are united. They rejoice in possession, which is "nine points of the law," and they have behind them a corporation treasury upon which to draw for the wherewithal to pay a horde of lawyers, if need be, to say nothing of the advantage which the law generally accords to the rich scoundrel as against his poorer victim. For minority stockholders, under such a condition of things, to seek redress for wrongs in court, is to incur vast expense, to suffer interminable delays, and, in the end, to have "their trouble for

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