tions which the committee seem to wish to have enunciated. 1st-The Attorney General introduced in the commissions of Notaries, on the demise of his late Majesty George the Fourth, alterations contrary to the spirit of the ordinance of the 2d George III., ch. 4, and assimilated these commissions to those of public officers whose appointment depends upon his Majesty.

2d-That the Attorney General omitted to leave out in the forms which he has prepared the words "during pleasure," inserted in the previous commissions of Notaries, and which ought not to have been done.

It has been already shewn, that the only alterations made in the commissions in question were of a merely technical character; and, at the same time, they gave a superior technical accuracy to the instrument, which did not touch its substance. Now, so far as the mere technical form of an instrument is concerned, it lies within the peculiar province of the law officer of the crown to take care that it be accurate; his reputation for professional skill and learning, if there were no other and higher obligation, rendered this imperative upon him; but in what concerns the substance of the commission, he is not justifiable, when ordered to renew it, to change its substance and alter its nature. Now, the words "during pleasure" constitute a substantial part of the commission; yet it is because he did not omit or change these words, and substitute in their place others, not sanctioned by law or usage, and depending for their introduction upon his own mere arbitrary will and choice, that the committee have passed their censure upon him.

Having thus gone over the various grounds stated by the committee, and to avoid all possibility of misrepresentation of them, having given them in their own words, I come, in conclusion, to the consideration of the resolutions which are predicated upon them by the committee. These are, in substance :

1st-That the renewal of the commissions of Attornies and Notaries was not necessary.

2d-That the Attorney General had no right to the fees received by him upon the new commissions.

3d-That he has introduced alterations by which these commissions are assimilated to those of public officers, whose appointment depends upon his Majesty, and has therefore been forgetful of his duty, and rendered himself guilty of a contempt of the law, which did not allow of the introduction of the said alteration.

4th-That the words "during pleasure" were introduced in the commissions of Attornies and Notaries, contrary to law, and ought to be omitted.

Having said all that I think material upon these deductions of the committee, it remains for me only to state such reflections as occur upon the propriety of the course of proceeding taken by them generally, without reference to the question of the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions. The first resolution is a resolution declaratory of the law proposed to be adopted by one single branch of the Legislature. I apprehend that this is of dangerous precedent: where the law is doubtful, it is the province of the King's Courts to determine it. No one branch of the Legislature can do so by resolution, nor can, nor ought any Court of Justice to take notice of such resolution. A contrary doctrine would involve a subversion of all law. Resolutions of this nature can serve only to mislead the public; they have about them a semblance of public authority, calculated to give them an extensive weight, which does not belong to them.

It is still more exceptionable to try the private rights of a subject of the king incidentally, and punish him by censure; for censure is a punishment, and a very severe one, without having jurisdiction of the question of right.-A fee of office is a right of property; a title to it is to be tried in two ways, either by a civil action, or by an indictment for extortion.

These remedies are available as well against the highest as against the lowest officer of government. These proceedings being of a public character, regulated by the known and established rules of law, are manifestly most conducive to the ends of right and justice; whereas, on the other hand, a course of the nature of that pursued by the committee subjects the individual complained of to inconveniences which he ought not to be made liable to.-The following observations of a distinguished writer have so direct a bearing upon this branch of the subject, that I cannot refrain from here inserting them. They relate to the proceedings had by the House of Commons against Lord Melville.

"Of all the privileges enjoyed under the British Constitution, the most valuable is the security which it affords to every individual, of whatever rank or station, that he shall not be found guilty of any charge without a hearing. That is, without a fair and impartial trial.

"This privilege is even more valuable than the protection which the constitution affords to all who live under it, against every act of despotism on the part of government. For the instances in which individuals are liable to be sensibly injured by a despotic use of the powers of government are few, and of rare occurrence; and they are scarcely ever tobe found in the private walks of life. But every individual, at all times, wants the protection which can be afforded only by a fair and an impartial administration of justice. Indeed, were justice well administered, the powers of government, though despotic in their form, and free from other necessary checks, are subject to so efficient a controul, that they can seldom be exercised for the purpose of individual oppression. To secure this, its favourite object, an impartial administration of justice, the constitution has made it an essential principle of its judicial polity, that no person shall be condemned unheard. Trial by jury, which is also a grand means for the attainment of the same end, as being most admirably calculated to secure to the accused a fair trial, is, in various instances of minor delinquency, dispensed with. But the principle that the accused shall be heard before he can be condemned admits of no dispensation, no exception, no qualification. It can in no instance be departed from without a violation of the constitution. This principle is, indeed, so obviously deducible from

the first rudiments of universal justice, that any judicial code which should fail to recognize it would be radically defective. But it is peculiar to the British Constitution to give full effect to this principle, which it professes to hold sacred and inviolable. It is, however, undeniable, that in the case of Lord Melville the above principle was violated. In that case an accused individual was condemned unheard. Lord Melville was pronounced by the House of Commons to be guilty of a gross violation of the law, and a high breach of duty, without a hearing, without a trial, without being called upon, in any way, to answer the charges on which so severe a sentence was founded, without being informed that such charges were prepared against him.

"It will hardly be pretended that the operation of the principle in question is confined to the ordinary administration of justice, and that the House of Comnions has a constitutional right to dispense with it, by proceeding to condemnation without a hearing of the party accused, or without affording him any opportunity of self defence. If this be the case, then is the principle itself a mere cypher. For its value depends upon the universality of its operation, in the security which it affords to all persons, under all possible circumstances, and against every possible species of power, whether regal, aristocratical, democratical, or judicial. If, in any case, it be inadequate to afford protection, then is there no effectual bulwark secured to the dearest liberties, to the most sacred rights of the subject.

"But of all the powers and authorities in the state, there is no one in which an exemption from the obligation of this principle would involve so gross a violation of the constitution, or be fraught with so much danger to the rights and liberties of the subject, as the House of Commons. That House which superintends all inferior jurisdiction is itself amenable to no jurisdiction whatever. It is the sole judge of its own proceedings, which are, therefore, superior to controul, and against which, though productive of the grossest injustice, there is no redress. It is also a democratical body, a popular assembly, and, consequently, liable to that sudden effervescence of passion, to which such bodies and assemblies are particularly exposed, and which, indeed, is one of their characteristic qualities. It is, further, the great scene of party contention; and party feelings are apt to mix themselves, more or less, with its proceedings. But the influence to which the House of Commons is subject from without, particularly disqualifies it for an absolute and unqualified exercise of judicial powers. Its members, such of them at least as are re

turned by means of popular election, are certainly looking forward to the period when they shall again solicit the suffrage of their constituents. To ensure those suffrages, they will even feel a strong inducement to gratify popular feelings; and every one who is at all acquainted with human nature, must know that the readiest way to produce that effect is, to display an eagerness to detect abuses, and to hold forth the persons who are but even suspected of them to public indignation. When ever, therefore, an individual is charged with any species of delinquency, which is calculated to agitate the public mind-ever ready to condemn without proof-the House of Commons is the very last place in the world in which he is likely to enjoy the advantage of a fair trial. Such a person is there exposed, (and unless a seat happens to afford him an opportunity of self defence,) absent and defenceless, to all the violence of popular feeling, perhaps to all the bitterness of party resentment, eager to avenge exertions which may have merited the gratitude of the country. While ministers, with all their weight and influence, may be unable to stem the torrent of prejudice or clamour, or may fear to lose, in the attempt, that popularity which is the prop and support of their power.

"The Constitution, it must be observed, is not chargeable with the anomaly of investing a body of men, so constituted, and so exposed to the very worst kind of influence, with judicial powers, except in the single instance of the election of its own members. The House of Commons is not to be found in any enumeration of the courts of justice known to this country. It does not even possess the power of applying an oath to the conscience of any individual-a power, the exercise of which is the main spring of the administration of justice. Powers of investigation it certainly possesses, and that to a very great extent; and such powers are essential to its grand function of accusation, by impeachment before the House of Lords. But it is clear that this function, which is precisely analogous to that of a grand jury, authorizes it only to enquire and accuse, but not to condemn. And whenever, instead of confining itself to inquiry, with a view to impeachment, it proceeds, as in the case of Lord Melville, to convict, or, which is in effect the same thing, to censure, it exceeds its province, and violates the constitution. The House of Commons has also the power of inquiring into abuses; a power which seems rather to have grown into usage than to be founded in any settled or original principle peculiarly applicable to the representatives of the people. But as the object of this power is the controul and correction of abuses, and

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