the redress of grievances, it by no means authorizes the assumption of judicial functions, and it should never be allowed to treat upon the administration of justice, criminal or civil. It is of the utmost importance that all authorities, of whatsoever nature, should, in practice, keep within the bounds prescribed to them by the constitution. No despotism is so hostile to liberty as that of indefinite power. And such power is infinitely more to be dreaded in a popular assembly than in a monarch. The Commons should, therefore, take care lest they be tempted, by their freedom from restraint, and their exemption from responsibility, to consider themselves as judges in cases which may come before them in their inquisitorial character. They should remember that they cannot constitu tionally pronounce either upon the guilt or the civil rights of any individual. And if they suffer themselves to assume judicial functions, they will not only violate the constitution, but also invite so many applications to them under the pretext of inquiry, that a function which was given them only to be exercised in extraordinary occasions will, by its perversion and abuse, encroach upon the ordinary duties which are the main object of their institution; and, as has been said by a writer too well known to be named-The medecine of the constitution will become its daily bread.

"But it has been said, that the sacred maxim of justice, so dear to the British Constitution, was not violated in the case of Lord Melville; that his lordship was not condemned unheard; that, on the contrary, he had a full hearing, a fair opportunity of self defence, before the commissioners of naval inquiry, whose report was the ground work of the censure passed upon him by the resolutions of the House of Commons. Is then this grand and fundamental maxim of universal justice, that no one should be condemned unheard, satisfied, if the party be heard before one tribunal and condemned by another? Rather is it not a mockery of justice so to combine that maxim, or to suppose it capable of any other meaning than that the party must have a fair opportunity of meeting the charge, and those by whom it is preferred, in the very tribunal in which it is to be decided; that he must there have every facility afforded him of convincing those who are to be his judges, that he ought not to be found guilty of what is alleged against him? In this sense, certainly, Lord Melville had not a hearing.

"The Romans seem to have had far more correct notions upon this subject than appear to prevail in our House of Commons. We are told by high authority, that "it was not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die before that

he which was accused had the accuser face to face, and had licence to answer for himself, concerning the crime laid against him. -Acts xxv., 16.-This was the nature of a hearing de jure Romano. But Lord Melville was consigned to the most cruel pangs of reproach and obloquy, far more painful than death itself, without being allowed to face an accuser, without having licence to answer for himself in the assembly by which he was pronounced to be guilty, nay, without being apprized that any crime was laid against him."

"When commissioners, or committees, nominated with a view to reform or economy, become the accusers of the person whom, for the sake of obtaining these objects, they are obliged to examine, they not only step out of their province, but are guilty of the most unconstitutional abuse of the powers vested in them. Their censure is swallowed with such extreme avidity by the public, that it is scarcely possible to remove the prejudice thereby excited; even an injurious insinuation coming from such a quarter, and following what is fallaciously supposed to be a regular investigation, is sufficient to open the floodgates of calumny upon the best characters, and to overwhelm the reputation of those who have not been legally proved to have done any thing deserving of reproach. It is, therefore, much to be feared lest such commissioners and committees, perceiving how much their own popularity depends upon the quantum of abuse with which they can gratify some of the worst passions of the public, may be tempted, by the pursuit of so fascinating an object, incautiously to sacrifice the credit and character of the individuals whose conduct and transactions are submitted to their investigation; and lest, in the ardour of such a pursuit, overlooking not only candour, but even truth and justice, they may, however pure their intentions, be insensibly drawn on from error to misrepresentation, and at length be guilty both of the suppressio veri and the suggestio falsi.-To preserve them from the temptation of acting in such a manner, they should confine themselves to the objects for the sake of which they are instituted.

"When such bodies employ the powers with which they are entrusted in an inquisitorial manner-when they convert the answers which they themselves have drawn from the individuals examined before them into grounds of inculpation -and thereby expose those individuals to public indignation -they are the occasion of far greater abuses than any which they are appointed to correct. They then become an inquisition of the very worst kind-one which extorts from persons whom the law presumes to be innocent, (and who, probably, if regularly put upon their trial, would, like Lord Melville,

prove to be so,) not proofs but presumptions of guilt, presumptions, too, which, by such a course of proceeding, are made to have all the effects of proofs. Practices of this nature lead, also, to frustrate the very objects for which such bodies are instituted, and the attainment of which is of incalculable importance. Those objects, indeed, involve the best modes of reform. They secure the ends of government without its rigour. They operate by means of prevention, without the severity of example. But they can be attained only by a calm, patient, undeviating pursuit. If, however, instead of steadily adhering to such a course-the only one which affords a cause of success-boards of inquiry assume the character of inquisitors and accusers, they will render themselves odious and intolerable, they will forfeit the public confidence, and they will close those channels of information, through which alone they can hope to render any effectual service to the state. Such boards, acting in such a manner, may terrify, but they will not reform. They may harrass, but they will not correct. And they will deprive the public of the service of men of real respectability, who would not choose to be subjected to an investigation, before which the best character has no security, and innocence itself an ineffectual protection.

"How far the foregoing observations are exemplified in the case of Lord Melville, is a question which must be left to the decision of the intelligent reader. Certain it is, that, in that case, the resolution of the House of Commons of the time, pronouncing his lordship guilty of a gross violation of the law, and a high breach of duty, was a violation of the first principles of justice, and of the most sacred maxims of the constitution. Happily, may it not be said providentially, the result displays, in the most striking and impressive manner, the danger of a departure from established forms. The nobleman in whose instance those forms were sacrificed, and who was, in consequence, most deeply wounded in those feelings which are ever most acute in minds that are most susceptible of virtue and honour-feelings, the anguish of which, in such minds, renders even martyrdom an enviable lot. This nobleman, upon a full and regular investigation of his case, was acquitted of all the charges preferred against him, and in particular, of that very charge of which the House of Commons had assumed him to be guilty, and which that House made the foundation of a vote of censure, alike unjust, cruel, and unmerited.

"Let it not, however, be supposed, that the mischief of such proceedings is confined to the individuals who immediately suffer from them. They are inexpressibly injurious to the best interests of the state, and they tend ultimately to its

subversion. All constituted authorities, however high, the Commons as well as the Lords and the King, are morally bound to respect the principles of the constitution; and this moral obligation is particularly binding upon the House of Commons, on account of its peculiar character and functions, as the grand bulwark of freedom, and defender of the rights of the subject, to which those principles are inseparably allied. Such, indeed, are the real value and importance of that House -so essential is it to the secure existence of genuine freedom -so necessary is it as a restraint upon power, and a check to corruption, that to maintain its privileges should be an object of the utmost solicitude to every lover of the constitution. But if that House, availing itself of its high and uncontrolable powers, and of its irresponsible situation, should act arbitrarily and oppressively, and invade those rights of which it professes to be the vigilant defender, then it would give a mortal wound to that constitution which it was intended to preserve and to perpetuate; then would it prove, not the guardian, but the subverter-not the sanctuary, but the tomb of liberty."

Having thus disposed of the first report of the Committee of Grievances, I shall next proceed to consider the general messages sent to the Assembly by his Excellency the Governor in Chief, respecting the regulation of the Currency of the Province, and shall attempt an examination of the proceedings had in relation to that important subject.

NO. IX.

CURRENCY.

Money is the measure of Commerce, and of the rate of every thing; and. therefore, ought to be kept (as all other measures) as steady and invariable as may be.-Locke's considerations of the lowering of interest and raising the value of money.

THIS important subject having been brought under the consideration of the two branches of the Provincial Legislature, in the speech of his Excellency Sir James Kempt, the late Administrator of the Government, at the opening of the Legislature on the 22d day of January, 1830-was considered in special committee of each of the Houses, whose reports are now before the public.-Very shortly before the close of the session of the Legislature, a bill was introduced, and passed both Houses, and received the sanction of the then Administrator of the Government, regulating the value at which certain coins were to pass within the Province. The measure was understood, however, to be only a partial one. The main subject was renewed the last session of the Provincial Legislature, and the following message transmitted by his Excellency to the Assembly:

"In compliance with the request of the House of Assembly, conveyed to his Excellency by their committee appointed for that purpose, he transmits to them a copy of a communication which he has received from Mr. Commissary General Routh on the subject of the Currency. The Governor in Chief takes this opportunity of informing the House of As