The resolution in the language above quoted was adopted by large majorities in both branches of Congress, and now stands an authentic, definite, and solemn proposal of the Nation to the States and people most immediately interested in the subject matter. To the people of those States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue-I beseech you to make arguments for yourselves. You can not, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times.

I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics.

This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dew of Heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done, by one effort, in all past time, as in the providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.

Jackson opens his famous "Valley Campaign," aiming to do just what he succeeds in doing terrify Washington and prevent the concentration of the Federal forces before Richmond. Jackson's movements threaten the commands of General Banks and General Fremont.

24th. (To McClellan.) I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' command is there, but it is so worn that he can not move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces under General Anderson now opposing General McDowell's advance, have, as their line of supply and retreat, the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men; and if you succeed in saving the bridges you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to move cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your long despatch to us of the

21st.

I P. M. Geary reports Jackson with 20,000 moving from Ashby's Gap by the Little River turnpike, through Aldie, toward Centerville. This, he says, is reliable. He is also informed of large forces south of him. We know a force of some 15,000 broke up Saturday night from in front of Fredericksburg and went we know not where.

4 P. M. (To General J. C. Fremont.) The exposed condition of General Banks makes his immediate relief a point of paramount importance. You are therefore directed by the President to move against Jackson at Harrisonburg, and operate against the enemy in such way as to relieve Banks. This movement must be made immediately. You will acknowledge the receipt of this order, and specify the hour it is received by you.

4 P. M. (To McClellan.) In consequence of General Banks' critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you.* The enemy are making a desperate push on Harper's Ferry, and we are trying

*See note, p. 281.

to throw General Fremont's force and part of General McDowell's in their rear.

5 P. M. (To General Samuel T. McDowell.) General Fremont has been ordered by telegraph to move from Franklin on Harrisonburg to relieve General Banks and capture or destroy Jackson's and Ewell's forces. You are instructed, laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, moving on the line or in advance of the line of the Manassas Gap Railroad. Your object will be to capture the forces of Jackson and Ewell, either in cooperation with General Fremont, or, in case want of supplies or of transportation interferes with his movements, it is believed that the force which you move will be sufficient to accomplish this object alone. The information thus far received here makes it probable that if the enemy operate actively against General Banks, you will not be able to count upon much assistance from him, but may even have to release him. Reports received this moment are that Banks is fighting with Ewell eight miles from Winchester.

(To General H. W. Halleck.) Several despatches from Assistant Secretary Scott and one from Governor Morton asking reinforcements for you have been received. I beg you to be assured we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame when I tell you each of our commanders along our line from Richmond to Corinth supposed himself to be confronted by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure we thinned the line on the upper Potomac, until yesterday it was broken at heavy loss to us, and General Banks put in great peril, out of which he is not yet extricated, and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. My dear general, I feel justified to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with you can and will get the victory at Corinth.

2 P. M. (To McClellan.) The enemy is moving north in

sufficient force to drive General Banks before him, in precisely what force we can not tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and south, in precisely what force we can not tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one,* such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington.

Let me hear from you instantly.

(To General McClellan.) Can you not cut the Aquia Creek railroad? Also, what impression have you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you get near enough to throw shells into the city?

27th. (To General Fremont.) I see that you are at Moorefield. You were expressly ordered to march to Harrisonburg. What does this mean?

28th. (To Fremont.) The President directs you to halt at Moorefield and await orders, unless you hear of the enemy being in the general direction of Romney, in which case you will move upon him.

(To McDowell.) You say General Geary's scouts report that they find no enemy this side of the Blue Ridge. Neither do I. Have they been to the Blue Ridge looking for them?

5:40 P. M. (To McDowell.) I think the evidence now preponderates that Ewell and Jackson are still about Winchester. Assuming this, it is for you a question of legs. Put in all the speed you can. I have told Fremont as much, and directed him to drive at them as fast as possible. By the way, I suppose you know Fremont has got up to Moorefield, instead of going to Harrisonburg.

*This was a complete misapprehension and shows how entirely the Confederate ruse had succeeded. Jackson had with him only some 15,000

men.