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It may be that Lemuria and will We cannot teach,

In the fossil types the lower developments are absolutely wanting. That only the higher geniuses of the quaternary period were preserved I dare not suppose, but this can be said, that one fossil monkey skull or ape-man has never been found. It is possible in some special spot on earth tertiary man lived, for the remarkable discovery of the fossil ancestors of the horse in America, from which the horse had entirely disappeared, gives countenance to the idea. tertiary man has existed in Greenland or be brought to light somewhere or other. we cannot designate it as a revelation of science, that man descends from the ape or any other animal. Bacon said, with perfect truth, 'scientia est potentia' (knowledge is power); but the knowledge he meant was not speculative, not the knowledge of problems, but the objective knowledge of facts. We should abuse and endanger our power if, in our teaching, we do not fall back upon this perfectly justified, perfectly safe, and impregnable domain."

There is no reliable evidence that apes from which men could be developed lived before man existed. If they did not so exist, how can man be descended from them? If they did so exist, why has not a fossil monkey or ape-man's skull ever been found? Such remains may

yet be found; but until they are found, the acceptance of the above theory of descent must be received as provisional only.

What is stated to be fact in the above can be safely considered fact, and one fact is worth more than a score of scientific suppositions. Another stubborn fact that seems to go against the Darwinian theory of human descent is, that man, in the very earliest stages of his existence, even to the

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oldest skeleton ever discovered, shows no greater resemblance to the apes than present races of men do. The Duke of Argyll, as previously quoted, says (p. 73, "Primeval Man"): "The other skeleton, respecting which the evidence of extreme antiquity is the strongest, is not only perfectly human in all its proportions, but its skull has a cranial capacity not inferior to that of many modern Europeans. This most ancient of all known human skulls is so ample in its dimensions that it might have contained the brains of a philosopher."

The point mentioned by Virchow concerning man in the tertiary period is of importance; but, even supposing that man dates back no farther than the quarternary period, one is naturally inclined to ask a mathematical question, viz., if we go back 30,000 to 50,000 years, and find that at that time there was a smaller proportion of individual men of a low type than there is at the present time, how far back must we go to make a connection between men and apes? It is one thing to be possible, and quite another to be probable; and even probability falls very far short of proof. Is it fair and philosophical to claim that a mere hypothesis is already equivalent to a fact, because no one has yet been able to show that the hypothesis is not founded in fact? It is common for parties to make rash statements, and then, if no one can show that these statements are actually

untrue, to claim that they have shown them to be true. Thus a thousand statements may be made concerning which no demonstrations exist either for or against; but what do such statements amount to? Is it not unphilosophical to claim all things which are uncertain to be on our side of the argument? Suppose one should lay claim to all property, real and personal, concerning which there is uncertainty of

ownership, how would that work? Thus, in arguments, the class of uncertain claims should have its due weight; but its due weight, in many cases, amounts to about zero. Some one has said that it will not do to tell school-boys that some things are certain and others uncertain; for they will get things mixed, and believe the facts to be the uncertain things, and some of the uncertain things to be facts; but when we are talking to educated men, or to philosophers, it will do to confess that there are many things which we do not know for a certainty. I trust my readers will be so much like philosophers that they will not mistake the uncertain things for the certain, or reject positive facts, and receive as facts things which are uncertain. Certain writers have accused the believers in a creative theory with accepting absurd notions. Can there be greater folly, while the atheistic are themselves ignorant of the character or mode of existence of that almighty force or power which underlies all the manifestations and phenomena of life? Man has the highest intelligence of any being concerning whom they have positive knowledge. How can they, in their own minds, form a conception of an intelligent being, acting from reason, who does not reason in a manner somewhat similar to the reasonings of the most intelligent men? They extol reason, and call it the only unerring guide. Why then, should not the highest intelligence we can conceive of work also in accordance with some unerring guide?

I am aware that Omniscience may have no need of any process of reasoning; for, knowing all things, He must be without the necessity for any course of reasoning; yet I cannot understand how Omniscience and Omnipotence combined should have ordained and established the immutable laws of nature without some reasons for so doing.

INFINITE INTELLIGENCE.

189

Could we conceive of a man with infinite intelligence, would he not be likely to reason in some respects as a finite being does? How do we know that finite reason may not be in some respects typical of infinite reason? Let the wisest show us the actual truth concerning infinite wisdom and intelligence, if he can.

CHAPTER VIII.

DOES LIFE INHERE IN MATTER ITSELF?

Ir would seem to ordinary observers that there must be a distinct line between the dead and the living. Hæckel denies that such a line exists in such a sense as is generally supposed. Others have, in substance, stated that organic and inorganic matter shade into, or so intermingle with each other that no distinct line between the dead and the living can be drawn.

If asked to state upon what facts they base the opinion that there is no absolute vital difference between dead and living matter, they may cite the ultimate atoms, and assume that they are endowed with the principle of life, providing there be such a thing as a life principle. They might also mention the theory of Leibnitz in relation to monads. Leibnitz believed monads to be mathematical points, "the simple active elements of things, the veritable, living atoms of nature, the immaterial, indivisible and final forces of the universe."

He held that both mind and matter are composed of monads, but that mind is represented by conscious monads, and matter by unconscious monads. "But these two classes of monads are wholly unlike, and exert no influence on each other," conclusion to which materialists will hardly assent.

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If all the original and ultimate atoms are alike, and endowed with the same properties, then the living and the dead are composed of these atoms.

Materialists do not acknowledge a vital principle separate

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