The fallacy in such reasoning lies in its starting-point, viz., the assumption that certain attributes must of necessity belong to the Great Overruling Power, when in fact neither theologians nor any other persons can know positively what the complete attributes of the Unknowable and Unsearchable are; and thus we are ignorant just where we seem the most to need information.

But, strangely enough, certain theologians, even in this nineteenth century, continue to assert that a disbelief in certain assumed tenets which they teach constitutes a heinous sin. What monstrous credulity must human nature be endowed with to allow such absurd assumptions to frighten men out of their undoubted right to honestly and conscientiously think for themselves in religious matters! It is, however, true that when a man rejects an important and evident moral truth because his moral state is such that that truth is repulsive to him he does violence to his moral nature, and hence will be likely to fall in with grievous error.

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCLUDING SPECULATIONS.

THE real issues or points now to be decided are, first, whether men are possessed of a spiritual nature, or, on the other hand, whether men are simply intelligent animals and nothing more.

If man has nothing but animal nature, and death is the last of him, and he becomes convinced that such is the fact, then it is evident that pleasure, present or prospective, will naturally be his highest aim; and, in fact, this is all that can reasonably be expected of him. The idea of duty as such implying any moral quality under such circumstances cannot have deep-seated influence with thinking men.

Yet, even if men are mere animals, it is better that animals should so conduct themselves as to gain general confidence in, rather than distrust of, each other; and they should be friendly, rather than hate each other. If life on this earth is all the life allotted to men it certainly is best that men should make the most of their friendships and social amenities. Thus the having of rules for the regulation of conduct towards each other is by no means useless.

But that the belief that certain acts are right and opposite acts wrong is universal among intelligent men I think will not be denied. Even savages have their moral and property laws, however they may vary between themselves in regard to what these laws should be. One may think a certain course right, and another think a like course

wrong; yet, from his point of view, every one who is not an idiot has certain ideas of wrong and right. Can we then doubt that a sense of right and wrong inheres in our very natures?

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Doubtless man is so made that he naturally connects moral conduct with the enjoyment of happiness, for I believe that this is founded upon a law of nature; but some carry their ideas of right and wrong beyond the point where they expect to experience happiness; and such are willing to suffer intensely rather than yield up their convictions of right. Something like wilfulness often shows itself in this connection. To illustrate this point I will quote from J. S. Mill's" Examination of Sir Wm. Hamilton's Philosophy," p. 131, in which he says: "If I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what the principles of his government, except that the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving does not sanction them, convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellowcreatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go."

Here, certainly, Mill carries his ideas of right and wrong far beyond the place where he can expect to experience happiness, and proves that he would be willing to be tortured rather than fall down and worship a false god, or one whose

character he could not reverence. What pleasure could he expect to experience from thus being tortured; and all this on account of his deep sense of right and wrong? Surely his sense of right and wrong must be very clearly cut, or he would not be willing to endure so much simply for an idea which may be a delusion, if it can be traced simply to inherited notions.

Mr. Jackson, in his "Prize Essay," remarks upon this peculiarity of Mr. Mill's reasoning, and says (p. 224) : “ We are equally sure that 'Godliness is profitable for all things,' and that Honesty is the best policy.' But then we are quite sure also that the final cause of godliness is not profit, nor its essential nature a love of gain; and that policy is not a true description of honesty, nor the being politic the true and proper aim of the honest man. And Mr. Mill, when his moral sentiments asserted themselves, felt these certainties as elements of his inner life. Rather than worship a Being whose unknown moral attributes fell beneath, not the dictates of Utility, but the purest instincts of his own inmost morality, Mr. Mill goes on to declare that he is willing to suffer the horrors of Eternal death. Hell is better than a violation of his own moral nature. Can this be a declaration deduced from the supreme law of Interest? Is it not rather a foundation maxim of independent morality? Violate such foundation maxims, says the independent moralist, and you need not even speak of Going to hell,' hell will come to you! Sooner or later you will find its undying torments within you."

Probably this sense of right and wrong is a part of the very nature given us from the Eternal Fountain of all morality and intelligence. The fact of inheritance of certain peculiarities is not doubted; but I must doubt the truth of the assertion that our moral sense is entirely dependent upon

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.

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ideas of utility, or upon inherited ideas of pain or pleasure experienced by our ancestors. The very fact of the universal prevalence of the moral sense in intelligent men seems to point to the origin from whence all that is valuable in humanity must have been derived, or to the Power which has constituted Man a Morally Responsible being.

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This opens the question as to who is responsible for the acts of men. Those who contend that an All-Wise Intelligence has absolutely and arbitrarily decreed everything which comes to pass, in such a way that nothing can or ever could happen otherwise than it does happen, virtually make this Intelligence the cause of all the deeds committed. deny moral freedom to man except in the sense that he has the power to choose one way and only one way, and thus, of necessity, he must choose as he does. This appears to destroy his moral responsibilities. But, says one, why did a wise God create man, when he must foreknow at the time of his creation all the trouble man would experience, as well as all the suffering he would have to endure? You ask me too hard a question; but I will suggest some thoughts connected therewith. In the first place we must understand what the design was in creating man, before we shall be able to pass upon the benevolence or otherwise of man's creation. What purpose did the Deity have in his creation? If He intended to create man a morally responsible being, He must of necessity give him a certain kind of freedom, or he could not be morally responsible. In this supposed case, it is also true, that, after purposing to make man a moral being, and creating him such, the Deity could not prevent him from making use of such moral freedom as He had bestowed upon him. It also appears to be true, that the Deity could not make man morally free, and yet at the same time place him under