making such a sweeping assertion they are giving a proper meaning to the language they use?

Until we can truthfully assert that we fully understand all the laws of nature we have no right to assert positively that what is commonly called a miracle cannot exist. From a scientific stand-point we may doubt whether what are generally understood to be miraculous events ever occurred; and from experience we are justified in disbelieving the present working of miracles; and this is as far as we can rationally go. When one denies that anything miraculous can exist does he not forget that the very existence of both mind and matter is inexplicable? Who can explain how either of these originally came to be in existence? To say that they always existed and did not originally come into existence does not help their position, for it is as easy to imagine that they were in some way brought into existence as it is to conceive that they could have no beginning. In all ages events out of the commonly observed course of nature have been regarded as inexplicable, wonderful, miraculous; but I suppose that, to an intelligence high enough to understand the operations of the laws under which these unexplained events have taken place, they would seem no more wonderful, i.e., miraculous, than the gathering of a thunder-cloud does to ordinary observers.

To assert that such a thing as a miracle never existed is going beyond what any human being has any right to assert. That designing parties, for the sake of paltry gain, or for the sake of gaining undue influence over the minds of credulous or deluded followers may, in some cases, pretend to work miracles, or be the witnesses of miraculous acts, is in accordance with experience; and hence, if a person should now appear pretending to work miracles, every unprejudiced person would

be justified in believing that this pretension is prima facie evidence either of insanity or fraud. It is certainly in accordance with the laws of nature for unprincipled men to lie and in many plausible ways, to deceive; but it is not in accordance with experience that good and honest men should lie. Thus the testimony of eye and ear witnesses to the works and words of Christ, if the men were really good and honest, and not themselves deceived, must be received as valid testimony; and this testimony cannot be impeached until it can be shown that they either were themselves deceived, or else had some selfish motive in reporting untruths. If the above views are rejected, the only alternative is to assume that these witnesses were bad men, and bent upon deceiving the people.

The writer has heard intelligent men who, while admitting that the miraculous acts of healing reported by the Evangelists actually took place, ventured the assertion that Jesus Christ understood certain laws of nature not before or since so well understood by any other man, and hence He was able to do what no man in any succeeding age could do. I suppose that such have a right to believe so, if such views seem reasonable to them, but Nature herself never deceives her proper interpreters. Some are accustomed to treat all religious experiences as delusions. But is this treatment philosophical?

Such men as Matthew Arnold, Herbert Spencer, and Prof. Tyndall believe that religious feelings are as really a part of man's nature as their physical appetites are.

Prof. Tyndall writes (p. 542, "Fragments of Science"): "No atheistic reasoning can, I hold, dislodge religion from the heart of man. Logic cannot deprive us of life, and religion is life to the religious. As an experience of consciousness, it is perfectly beyond the assaults of logic.”

RELIGION v. FORMS.

343

In this case Prof. Tyndall is speaking of religion as an actual fact, in its substantial and pure sense, and not the forms of religion. And is it not to be feared that with too many religion consists more of mere forms than of genuine substance?

The agreement of these forms with religion itself may well be questioned, for forms may be only shadows. of the substance. While one is satisfied with the shadows he is little inclined to inquire into the nature of the substances by which these shadows are cast. And yet, when the reality of these shadows is denied or questioned, many think the substances themselves have been attacked or denied. Bear in mind that the real substance exists, even if men mistake the shadow for the substance.

When we come to understand the actual truth we are often surprised at its simplicity. From its nature, truth must appear simple when fully comprehended; for it is interwoven with the very laws of nature, and these laws are in every respect perfect. That which we know of our knowledge is (beyond any cavil) truth. Then the absolute truth is not, as some would have us believe, an indistinct and nebulous thing which can only be dimly discerned; but, when properly understood, it must appear simple. The really important thing to decide is, whether we properly comprehend truth. Who has not fairly wondered at the simplicity of scientific or moral truths when he has become able to clearly understand them? And the more simple the truth seems to us the more likely that we really comprehend it, and thus that our views are correct. Hence, also, those who see the truth most clearly and best comprehend it can generally explain it in a manner so simple that other intelligent men can understand it. Cicero asserted that those who think clearly can also write or speak clearly. And it is

doubtless generally true that those who so puzzle us in their writings with misty or cloudy statements are themselves mentally in the clouds or mists.

Those who attempt to be teachers of truth should be clear in their apprehensions of the truth. And yet those who appear to be most positive and certain in their own minds that they see the truth clearly are not the safest to follow. The writer once heard it remarked concerning a very dogmatic lecturer, "He seems to know everything but comprehends nothing."

The writer has very often been painfully impressed with a like idea while reading the writings of that large class of writers who deal in positive and rash assertions about matters concerning which no certain or positive knowledge has yet been obtained or is obtainable through human intelligence or intellectual inquiry. And on no subject does it seem that there is need of more careful inquiry and conscientious reflection and meditation, coupled with a sincere desire to understand the actual truth, than the subjects previously discussed, viz., the problem of life, and our inherited tendencies as bearing upon our welfare during the whole of our conscious existence (be it longer or shorter), and the limits and extent of our moral responsibilities. Where do these begin and end?

INDEX.