Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

tions displeasing to the Soviet Union were up for discussion. This action put the Russians in a particularly poor light. As a result of the publicity given this attitude on the part of the Soviets and with behind-the-scenes pressure exerted by UN members, the Soviet Union belatedly ordered its troops back within the borders of the U.S.S.R. A threat to world peace was thereby averted and proponents of the UN were quite encouraged by this display of the potential strength of the new organization.

The question of Indonesia was another instance of the UN's ability to act to settle an issue endangering the peace. On January 21, 1946 the

The Security Council orders a cease-fire in Indonesia

Ukrainian Republic-one of the autonomous units of the U.S.S.R. with membership in the UN— directed the attention of the Security Council to fighting in Indone

sia between the local population and British and Japanese forces in the islands. The Council rejected several moves to investigate the circumstances. Then, on July 30, 1947, Australia and India raised the question anew-this time over the clashes between Netherlands forces and the armies of the newly declared Republic of Indonesia. The Council called on both elements to cease fighting. On August 25, 1947 the Council appointed a Good Offices Committee to study the dispute on the ground. The visit of the three-man Committee one member from Australia, one from Belgium, and a third from the United States -to Indonesia resulted in a truce agreement between the Netherlands and the Indonesians, signed on January 17, 1948. This truce was later broken and on January 28, 1949 the Security Council demanded that all parties cease hostilities. Prolonged negotiations followed, including a Round Table Conference at The Hague from August 23 to November 2, 1949, at which the UN was represented by a commission for Indonesia.

[blocks in formation]

delays and occasional Soviet opposition, the UN again accomplished a great deal in helping to settle peaceably the vexatious problem of the postwar situation in the islands formerly under Netherlands control.

Another issue raised by Syria and Lebanon on February 4, 1946 was solved more quickly. These Middle East nations complained to the Security

Syria and Lebanon evacuated by British and French troops

a

ex

Council regarding the presence within their borders of French and British troops. The U.S.S.R. vetoed which Council resolution pressed the confidence that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible. However, the British and French governments announced that they would respect the majority opinion of the Council. Both nations took action to get their forces out of Syria by mid-April and from Lebanon before the close of summer 1946. Here again, public opinion and the pressure of debate in the UN achieved results.

In addition to these political matters, the UN made progress during its first year in promoting cooperation in economic, social, cultural, human

The non-political agencies of the UN

itarian, and communications matters. In some of these spheres, the Soviet Union or other communist states threw up barriers to achievement. The Soviets, for example, did not become members of the International Bank or the International Monetary Fund. Nor did Poland. Likewise, the U.S.S.R. remained outside the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), among other UN ancilliaries. And in 1949-50 the Soviet Union, along with several of its "captive" states (as the satellites are also called) withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO). In later years the work of these subsidiary agencies of the UN was greatly expanded, and many beneficial results were reported from various countries where the field activities of these various units were carried out.

American participation in the activities of the UN was complete and enthusiastic from the be

ginning. American public interest in the United Nations was at a high level in the High quality early years. When one recalls the of American apathy, ignorance, and antagonism representation which characterized American opinin the UN ion on the League of Nations, the changed atmosphere is remarkable. The delegates sent by the United States to the various elements of the UN were, and continue to be, some of our ablest public figures. The names of Dean Acheson, Warren Austin, Bernard Baruch, John Sherman Cooper, John Foster Dulles, Ernest Gross, Hubert R. Harmon, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., George C. Marshall, Charles Mayo, James T. McNarney, Matthew B. Ridgway, Eleanor Roosevelt, John J. Sparkman, Adlai Stevenson, James Wadsworth, are only a sample of the leading members of the United States representations at the UN sessions in the past decade. Perhaps the only instance in which the United States has shown reluctance to enter into UN activities without reservation is in connection with the judicial body set up under the Charter, Articles 92-96. When the Senate voted adherence to the Court by a vote of 60 to 2 on August 2, 1946, it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court as to interpretation of treaties, questions of international law, breaches of international obligations, and the nature and extent of reparations to be made in cases involving such breaches. However, the reservations proclaimed by the Senate are significant.

Senate reservations to compulsory jurisdiction of International Court of Justice

[ocr errors]

RESERVATIONS BY UNITED STATES SENATE ΤΟ ACCEPTANCE OF COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 2, 1946: ... the United States. recognizes as compulsory the jurisdiction of the court. Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to ... disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States . . . as determined by the United States. . . or . . . disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless . . . the United States . . . specially agrees to jurisdiction. Since the power of the Court to enforce its decisions is as yet undeveloped and since any complaint against the United States likely to arise under actions by the Court would probably come before the Security Council, where the

United States holds the right of veto, this reservation may seem to be unnecessary. It was an evident indication by the American Senate that internal politics are still of importance in these days of international politics.

This brief review of the early development of the UN gives some indication of its accomplishments during its first few years of existence. Other instances in which the UN contributed to the maintenance of world peace will be noted in the sections which follow. So, too, will the apparent failures and shortcomings of the organization. Enough has been said to show that the United States entered into UN membership in good faith and with a spirit of enthusiastic support for its aims. The same may be said for the majority of other nations which originally signed the Charter or were admitted to membership at later dates. But rough days were ahead for the UN and subsequent discussions will reveal the part played by the United States in the attempts to preserve the values of the United Nations.

4. Efforts to Establish an

International Control of
Atomic Energy

One of the oft-expressed hopes with which the United Nations was launched in 1945 was that this new world organization would be able to work out a formula for the reduction, if not the elimination, of international armaments. To a world weary of war and physically exhausted by its devastations, the prospect of a future free from armed conflict was enticing. If the UN could achieve the abolishment of war it would truly be called blessed. If it could even establish an international control of the weapons of that war, would be something for rejoicing. And, if it could solve the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy, perhaps mankind could look forward to decades of peace.

[blocks in formation]

Canada, in a joint declaration regarding the international control of atomic energy.

JOINT DECLARATION ON ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL, WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 15, 1945: . . . We desire to emphasize that the responsibility for devising means to ensure that the new discoveries shall be used for the benefit of mankind, instead of as a means of destruction, rests not on our nations alone, but upon the whole civilized world. . . . the progress we have made . . . demands that we take an initiative in the matter, and we have... met . . . to consider the possibility of international action. . . To prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes. . . . To promote the use of recent and future advances in scientific knowledge ... for peaceful and humanitarian ends. We are aware that the only complete protection for the civilized world from the destructive use of scientific knowledge lies in the prevention of war. . . . we declare . . . our willingness. to proceed with the exchange of fundamental scientific information and the interchange of scientists and scientific literature for peaceful ends with any nation that will fully reciprocate.. . . . In order to attain the most effective means of entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and promoting its widest use for industrial and humanitarian purposes, we are of the opinion that . . . a Commission should be set up under the United Nations. . . . [to] make specific proposals: (a) For extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends, (b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes, (c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, (d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. . . . Faced with the terrible realities of the application of science to destruction, every nation will realize more urgently than before the overwhelming need to maintain the rule of law among nations and to banish the scourge of war from the earth. This can only be brought about by giving wholehearted support to the United Nations.

...

to

[blocks in formation]

only eleven in number. It was to this Commission that Bernard Baruch, the veteran American businessman and statesman, made in the name of the United States whose representative he was on the Commission, the proposal which became known as the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy.

The Baruch Plan, 1946

...

...

...

BARUCH PLAN FOR ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL, NEW YORK, JUNE 16, 1946: . . . We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. . . . We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. we must answer the world's longing for peace and security. ... The basis of a sound foreign policy for all the nations. . . is that: anything that happens... which menaces the peace of the world . . . concerns each and all of us. The United States proposes the creation of an international Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy.... When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violation of the rules of control . . . we propose that-1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop; 2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of... and, 3. The Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy. . . penalties . . . should be fixed for: 1. Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb; 2. Illegal possession ... of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb; 3. Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the authority; 4. Wilful interference with the activities of the authority; 5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to ... a license granted by the international control body. . . . There must be no veto [in the UN] to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes. .. We must embrace international cooperation or international disintegration. . . . Purely national authorities for control and development of atomic energy should to the extent necessary for the effective operation of the Authority be subordinate to it. . . .

...

[blocks in formation]

the Commission, one to oversee the exchange of scientific information, the other to be responsible for preventing the use of atomic energy for weapons of warfare. Although the United States had willingly offered to share the secrets of the atomic bomb, it rightly insisted that adequate safeguards be forthcoming so that surrender of the valuable knowledge would not be on a purely unilateral basis. Likewise, as the only possessor of workable atomic weapons at that time, the United States could not look favorably on proposals that the bomb be outlawed and stockpiles be destroyed before control mechanisms were established.

Soviet veto of the Baruch Plan

When the UN Atomic Energy Commission made its first report, on December 31, 1946, to the Security Council the U.S.S.R. and Poland (then one of the Council members) abstained from voting approval of the Commission's support of the American position. The Soviet Union maintained its stand that control of atomic energy, and especially of punishments for violations of regulatory statutes, should be kept within the province of the Security Council where the U.S.S.R. could exercise the "big-power" veto, rather than assigning such matters to an authority where no such veto power existed.

The U.S.S.R. voted against the second report of the UN Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council which was made on September 11, 1947. By the time of the third report, May 17, 1948, the Commission was forced to admit that it had "reached an impasse." Russia still "insisted that a convention outlawing atomic weapons and providing for the destruction of existing weapons must precede any control agreement. The majority of the Commission considered that such a convention, without safeguards, would offer no protection against non-compliance."8 After 22 months of work and more than 200 meetings, the U.S.S.R. had not budged from its stand and the Commission recommended that negotiations be suspended.

The problem of international control of atomic energy, therefore, remained unsolved. In spite of sincere efforts by the United States and by other

[blocks in formation]

Russia blocks further efforts

to control atomic development

members of the UN to reach agreement on these matters, little save discussion and exploration of the subject has been accomplished inside or out of the UN. The world knows now that part of the effort of the U.S.S.R. to delay a settlement of this issue was because of the hope that Russia could develop an atomic bomb and produce such weapons in quantity before the United States and other western nations far outstripped the Soviet potentialities in this respect or some method of international control was adopted. While the scientific principles underlying the employment of atomic energy for military weapons have been widely known for some years, the technical skills and facilities for the productive processes were less universally possessed. The Soviet Union gained knowledge of some of these processes through espionage and subversion. How much the Soviet production of atomic weapons may have been accelerated by the information so obtained is difficult to estimate. But the announcement by President Truman, on September 23, 1949, that an atomic explosion had recently occurred in the

Russia produces an atomic explosion, 1949

9

U.S.S.R. indicated that a vicious arms race was in prospect between the Russians and the western world. Just that eventuality which the three-power declaration of 1945 and the Baruch plan of 1946 had sought to prevent by instituting international control of atomic energy had come to pass.

For several years after President Truman's announcement in 1949 the world's attention was centered on the war in Korea. The U.N. mem

[blocks in formation]

control the employment of atomic power internationally, the use of atomic weapons in a third world war would be likely to destroy a large portion of the habitable areas of the globe and with it most of the citizens of the nations of both the West and the East.

Yet, nothing very encouraging was coming out of the seemingly endless discussions about international control of atomic weapons. Though it carries us ahead of the chronology of these chapters, it seems fitting to include at this point excerpts from President Eisenhower's address to the U.N. on December 8, 1953, when he made a dramatic appeal to the nations of the world to turn the atomic arms race into a cooperative venture for the achievement of world peace. It was a long speech but it is so significant that it merits extensive quotation here as a concrete effort to end the procrastination that had marked the years since the failure of the U.N. to adopt the Baruch plan.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON "ATOMIC POWER FOR PEACE," NEW YORK, DECEMBER 8, 1953:

President Eisenhower's

"Atoms for Peace" plan 1953

.

Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. . . . I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. . . . I assure you that in our deliberations. . . [at the recent Bermuda conference] we sought to invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human dignity which are so clearly etched in your Charter . . . . I . . . decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my legislative and executive associates and on mine for a great many months—thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people. I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all-and, equally, that if a hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all. Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease even by the smallest measure the tension of today's world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations? . . . The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension. . . of the extent of this development,

of the utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the peoples of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's existence. . . . this subject is global, not merely national in character .. Today, the United States stockpile of atomic weapons exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theatre of war in all of the years of World War II .... But the dread secret, and the fearful engines of atomic might, are not ours alone . . . . If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago

... even a

vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression . . . . let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such easy solution... my country's purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward toward peace and happiness and well being we must start to take these steps-NOW10 The United States and its allies... have over the past months tried to take some of these steps. Let no one say that we shun the conference table . . . .11 I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past proposals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how dimly discernible, should be explored. There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not been well explored In its resolution of November

The United States offers to contribute atomic energy materials for peaceful uses

[ocr errors]

28, 1953, this General Assembly suggested. . . "that the Disarmament Commission explore the desirability of establishing a sub-committee . . . which should seek in private an acceptable solution [to the problem of disarmament] . . . and report on such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September 1954 "12 The United States . . . is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries . . . to seek "an acceptable solution" to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace, but the very life, of the world. We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks new conception. The United States would seek 10 Emphasis in original.

a

11 At this point Pres. Eisenhower reviewed the history of negotiations with the Soviet Union for the settlement of international tensions. See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX:849, Dec. 21, 1953.

12 Quoted from U.N. General Assembly resolution, Nov.

28. 1953, reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX: 838, Dec. 10, 1953.

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »