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to be not quite so formidable as they had seemed on Christmas Eve when the news of the vote against rearmament disheartened the allied world. Western European unity, which had seemed possible in Paris in October, and then improbable in Washington on December 24th, once again seemed

not only possible but probable on New Year's Day 1955.103

103 By April 1, 1955 all the principal signatories of the Paris Pacts had ratified the agreements. In mid-April it was announced that the formal admission of West Germany to NATO and to the Western European Union would take place early in May. However, it would be a matter of several years before German military forces would be available to WEU and NATO.

The United States Combats Communism

In The Far East

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in connection with the Far East has been mixed up in American politics, in the most unpleasant sense of that term. While partisan politics have not been totally absent in our dealings with European matters since 1945, they have not operated there to anything like the degree we find them present in all aspects of our Far Eastern affairs. With politics-partisan, personal, local, and vindictive

exercising so profound an influence upon the picture in the Far East, it is difficult to present an objective view of the course of American foreign policy in respect to that area since 1945. However, the attempt will be made. Caution is advised, nevertheless. And it is well to remember that only after many years will it be possible to assess measures of blame and praise, and to judge degrees of failure and success. It is the nature of Americans to be impatient and to ask for immediate results. In respect to the Far East, particularly, some of this impatience must give way to the Oriental characteristic of delay, timelessness, and the realization that answers are not always readily available.

At the close of the Pacific fighting in 1945 five factors of international relations were pre-evident.

Five factors controlling Pacific affairs in 1945

First, Japan had been removed as the dominant power of the Orient. Secondly, China, though weakened and weary, had taken its place as one of the potentially great powers of the world and was clearly believed to be the nation which would have to fill the vacuum left by the defeat of Japan. Thirdly, the Soviet Union, although a latecomer into the Pacific war, would have to be reckoned with as a Far Eastern power, especially in respect to its interests in Manchuria, Korea, Outer Mongolia, and the islands north of Japan. Fourthly, the day of European control over Oriental peoples and dependent areas was near its end, with nationalism rampant following the Japanese defeats of the imperial nations in European-held possessions in Indonesia, Indochina, Malaya, and other portions of southeast Asia, including the Philippines. And lastly, the United States, for good or ill, was as irrevocably committed, by reasons of humanity, economics, politics, strategy, and destiny, to involvement in affairs of the Far East as it was in Europe or in its own hemisphere. Other compelling factors existed, but these five dominated the Pacific scene in 1945 and time has not lessened their importance since then.(66) With what equipment did American statesmen face this situation? Americans in large numbers for the first time in our history had fought throughout the Orient all up and down the International Date Line and westward into the vast reaches of the Asian continent. American materials and vehicles, ships, planes, and fuel had supported the war efforts of the allied nations over a wide sweep of

Word War II brought many Americans into contact with the Far East for the first time

the world's largest ocean and the world's largest continent. American money had flowed into the treasuries of allied powers, underground resistance movements, and the coffers of useful, if unprincipled, native leaders to support the war against Japan. And American military, intellectual, industrial, and political figures shared the direction of the campaigns with European and native Oriental individuals of every race, color, creed, and political persuasion-all united in their determination to push back the Japanese invaders.

Paucity of American "experts" on the Far East

However, and this would seem to be the cardinal cause of the indecisive nature of American Far Eastern policy in the postwar years, the United States had never built up a body of knowledge and a large corps of experts on the Far East. Thus the United States faced its new and vastly increased responsibilities in that area with relatively few trained diplomats and with a paucity of experience in dealing with the Orient on the scale which our postwar involvement made necessary. There were individuals who knew the Orient well and there were reservoirs of good will toward America in the Far East which could be tapped. But there was not the practiced familiarity at high levels and low to correspond with American knowledge of Europe and the Western Hemisphere. This is not said in extenuation of what happened in the Orient, but rather as an indication of the rapidly enlarging sphere of American interests which confronted the postwar leadership of American foreign policy.

The occupation and pacification of Japan was the first concern of the allies upon United States the surrender of that nation on given major September 2, 1945. America was asresponsibility signed the major responsibility for for postwar this task. Under the terms of the policy toward surrender, General Douglas MacJapan Arthur was named Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The first announcement of United States policy came from Washington four days after the surrender.

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of the United States in regard to Japan.

. are: (a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world. (b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the... United Nations. . . . it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people. These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means: (a) Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as shall be determined, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements. . . . (b) Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic, and social life. . . . (c) The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights. . . . They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations. (d) The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met. . . . There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands. . . . Although every effort will be made . . . to establish policies. which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern. . . . The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander. . . . The policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not to support it. Changes in the form of Government .. in the direction of modifying its feudal and authoritarian tendencies are to be permitted and favored. . . . Japan is not to have an army, navy, air force, secret police organization, or any civil aviation. .. high military and naval officials . . . leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. . . . Persons charged . . . with being war criminals .. shall be arrested, tried, and, if convicted, punished. . . . Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly. . ... it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion. . . . Democratic political parties. . . shall be encouraged. Laws . . . which establish discriminations .. shall be abrogated. . . .

Severe restrictions

on Japan to be enforced

...

...

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.... Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces.... Japan shall be permitted eventually to resume normal trade relations with the rest of the world.

General MacArthur administers occupation policies

This initial policy statement was buttressed by a basic post-surrender policy directive sent to General MacArthur on November 1, 1945 by the American government. The directive elaborated on many of the points laid down in the September statement, but did not materially change its provisions. General MacArthur proceeded to set up occupation headquarters in Tokyo and to issue a series of orders to carry out the terms of his authorization. The subsequent events of the occupation of Japan leading up to the negotiation of the Japanese peace treaty in 1951 are dealt with in a later section of this part of the study. It is sufficient to note at this point that although postwar policy toward Japan was ostensibly Allied policy, it was in reality American policy. Unlike the situation in Germany, the Allied occupation of Japan was actually a one-party arrangement with the Americans running the show and the other allies relegated to the role of observers.

Allied policy toward Japan

was actually American policy

While the problems of Japanese occupation were complex enough, they were simplicity itself compared with the dilemma posed by Korea. At

Korea is divided between

Soviets and Americans

Cairo in 1943 the powers had promised the Koreans, under Japanese control since 1910, independence at an unspecified date. With the collapse of Japan in the summer of 1945, the Koreans believed the time of deliverance had come. Instead they were tossed out of the frying pan and into the fire. The Russians, entering the war against Japan at the last minute, advanced on Korea from the north, and General John R. Hodge's American 24th Corps proceeded from Okinawa to the southern coast of Korea where they landed on September 7, 1945. By a pre-surrender arrangement reached at Potsdam in July, the Korean peninsula was split horizontally at the 38° parallel of North

'See pp. 189-95 below.

Latitude. Above this marker, the Russians were to accept the surrender of Japanese forces and occupy the area; to the south of the 38° line the United States would be the occupying power. The original purpose of this division of Korea was to simplify the problems of disarming the Japanese forces in the peninsula. United States policy did not foresee a prolonged occupation, but rather an early determination of the means for achieving Korean independence. But many factors complicated the situation.

Division of Korea to the disadvantage of

Economically the division of Korea was hard on the South Koreans for almost all the industrial development in the peninsula was in the north near the Manchurian frontier. Politically things were not much better. The communists in each zone were well organized and in the Russian area were early recognized by the Soviets in the guise of the "People's Republic." In the American zone the occupying authorities maintained an attitude of official impartiality toward the more than fifty political parties, or factions, clamoring for leadership of the "Provisional Government" being set up in that region.

South Koreans

At the meeting of the foreign ministers in Moscow in December 1945 a declaration on Korea was issued by Secretary Byrnes, Foreign Secretary Bevin, and Foreign Minister Molotov.

THREE POWER DECLARATION ON KOREA, MOSCOW, DECEMBER 27, 1945: ... With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state there shall be set up

Big 3 policy on Korea, 1945

a provisional Korean democratic government.... to assist the formation [of this government] . . . there shall be established a Joint Commission . . . of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. . . . The recommendations [of] ... the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of . . . [Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States] prior to a final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission. . . . The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted . . . for the consideration of . . . [China, Russia, Great Britain and the United States] for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years. For the consideration of urgent problems . . a conference of the representatives of the United

States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened in a period of two weeks.

The Korean communists accepted the plan for the trusteeship, but the south Koreans, led by Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee, leaders returned

Soviets and
Americans

disagree on unification of Korea

from exile, protested vigorously. Secretary Byrnes thereupon announced, on December 30, 1945, that the Soviet-American commission might be able to reach an agreement dispensing with the trusteeship idea. In January 1946 the commission met but disagreements hampered progress from the start. The two occupying powers could not reach satisfactory arrangements for economic relations between the zones. On February 5, 1946 the meetings were ended with practically nothing accomplished. Later sessions at Seoul in March were even less fruitful. No way of establishing a provisional government for all Korea seemed possible of achievement in face of the Soviet demands that the Korean leaders opposed to the Moscow decision be barred from the future government. The Soviet-American commission broke off its meetings on May 8, 1946. There, for the time being, the Korean question rested. American policy favoring an early establishment of a democratically chosen Korean government was not likely to be realized so long as the Soviet Union persisted in its attitude of obstructionism. In a later section we shall see how this Soviet position led to the unhappy perpetuation of the division of Korea with the results that were to cause the war in June 1950.2

The American policy toward China in 1945 is of such significance that the discussion of this topic is left to the portion of this study which follows. At this point it will be well to summarize briefly several other aspects of American Far Eastern policy as they appeared at the close of the war in 1945.

Under the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 which established the Philippine Commonwealth,

the islands were to be completely Civil freed from American control on July government 4, 1946. The war intervened, but restored in the the determination of the American Philippines government to accord independence

2 See pp. 195-99 below.

See pp. 180-89 below.

to the Philippines prevailed throughout the conflict. In fact, by a joint resolution on June 29, 1944, the American Congress authorized the President to grant freedom to the islands even before 1946 if circumstances warranted such action. With the liberation of Manila and the defeat of the Japanese forces in the islands, civil government was restored to the Commonwealth on February 27, 1945.

United States pushes plans

for Philippine independence

Following the presidential elections of April 23, 1946, in which the Nationalist Party of Manuel Roxas was victorious, preparations for granting full independence to the Philippines went forward. The American Congress passed, on April 30, 1946, a Philippine Trade Act, a somewhat controversial measure which some authorities believed tied Filipino trade and commerce too closely to that of the United States in direct contravention to announced American policies of fostering reciprocal trade and international economic intercourse. The Congress also passed a rehabilitation act appropriating $620,000,000 for various forms of aid and compensation for damages received during the war. On the appointed date, President Truman proclaimed the independence of the Philippines, thereby keeping a promise which the United States had given as evidence of its opposition to imperialistic domination of Asian peoples.

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PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S PROCLAMATION OF PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE, WASHINGTON, JULY 4, 1946: .. Whereas it has been the repeated declaration of the legislative and executive branches of the Government of the United States... that full independence would be granted the

Philippines granted independence Philippines as soon as the people of the July 4, 1946 Philippines were prepared to this obligation; and Whereas the people of the Philippines have clearly demonstrated their capacity for self-government. The United States

assume

hereby withdraws and surrenders all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty now existing and exercised by the United States of America in and over the territory and people of the Philippines; and, On behalf of the United States of America, I do hereby recognize the independence of the Philippines as a separate and selfgoverning nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the government instituted by the people thereof, under the constitution now in force.

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