Foreign policy must be dynamic

By the time of the outbreak of the Civil War many of the major patterns of American foreign policy had been revealed. A number of these patterns have been described in the foregoing pages-the right of revolution, the constitutional bases of popular control of foreign policies, the recognition of new governments, isolation from Europe, territorial expansion in its various forms, the Monroe Doctrine and hemispheric integrity, foreign trade, disarmament, arbitration, and others. It should be clear that the roots of American foreign policy extend back into the history of the country and into the heritage its settlers brought with them from Europe. Just as these roots are tangled and at times difficult to trace, so also are the developing trends and directions of the various policies. In the sections which follow, the attempt will be made to point

out such links with the past as appear. And as new patterns or adjustment of older policies make themselves evident, it will be seen that American foreign policy is and must be a dynamic thing, not statically limited to the pronouncements and rules of the past, but free to meet new circumstances with new ideas and new interpretations. In the first half of its history, the United States devoted much of its time and energy to building itself into a nation. In the course of this progress toward full stature it necessarily had to make its way in the world of that day. But, understandably, the major concern of the America of 17761860 was with self-development. Still, while concentrating upon internal matters, the United States could not neglect outside relations. How far the nation progressed in the establishment and execution of its foreign policies in that 85-year period has now been demonstrated.

PART II

In the period between the Civil War and the close of World War I, in 1918, the United States changed many of the old patterns of its foreign policy and adopted significant new ones. However, the basic purposes of that foreign policy remained relatively stable. New conditions, new circumstances, and new responsibilities were met in various ways. But the underlying assumptions against which the events of 1860-1918 are analyzed can be held constant. The design of this part of the study, therefore, is to trace the development of American foreign policy through the tumultuous events of a civil war, a period of overseas expansion, and an involvement in world politics which led to American participation in the first of the great modern global wars.

1. Diplomacy of the Civil War Period

Issues, leaders, battles, and politics of the American Civil War were, of course, primarily the domestic concern of the divided nation. Yet foreign affairs impinged upon the conduct of the war at many points. President Lincoln's Secretary of State, William H. Seward, was perhaps the leading Republican figure in 1860, and he might have been the party's candidate for the presidency had he not made too many enemies within the party. But he developed into an able Secretary despite occasional blunders, official and unofficial.

One of Seward's first blunders came in his advice to Lincoln a few weeks after the President's inauguration. On All Fool's Day 1861, Seward submitted to Lincoln his program for bringing the South back into the Union: a "wrap-the-worldin-fire" policy which he thought would cause the South to rush back to protect the Union.

On April 12, 1861, the Southerners fired on Fort Sumter and a few days later Lincoln called for 750,000 volunteers to put down The blockade the rebellion. One week later Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports, thus raising the conflict from an insurrection to the status of a war. Although never fully effective, the great powers recognized the validity of the blockade.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S PROCLAMATION OF BLOCKADE, WASHINGTON, APRIL 19, 1861: ... Now, therefore, I . . have . . . deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports [of the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas] . . . in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and of the law of Nations. . . . For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. . . . And I hereby proclaim . . . that if any person, under the pretended authority of the said States, or under any other pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy. . . .

Great Britain, then the world's leading seapower, accepted the fact of the blockade and instructed.

Great Britain recognizes the blockade

its naval commanders in American waters to observe a strict neutrality. In maintaining the blockade, the Union followed the doctrine of the continuous voyage. This meant that goods, whether munitions or other items helpful to the support of the South, shipped to islands in the Caribbean or other points where they could be transferred to Confederate blockade runners were regarded as originally destined for Southern ports and therefore subject to seizure by the Union. The British acquiesced in this interpretation, although the London government protested on occasion over the methods used by the United States in carrying out the policy. Some observers believe that the British saw in the blockade and seizure operations a precedent which Great Britain might herself want to follow at a future date, so no great issue was made of the matter.(19)

The United States Supreme Court bolstered the Federal government's policies in three important cases, decided after the close of the war. The cases of the ships Bermuda1 and the Peterhoff2 are substantially the same; the Springbok3 case differs in some respects.

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THE BARK SPRINGBOK VS. THE UNITED STATES, DECIDED, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 3, 1867: . . . We have already held in the case of the Bermuda, where goods, destined ultimately for a belligerent port, are being conveyed between two neutral ports by a neutral ship . . . that the ship, though liable to seizure. [for] the confiscation of the goods, is not liable to condemnation as prize. We think that the Springbok . . . comes within this rule. . . . The case of the cargo is quite different from that of the ship. .. Now if this cargo was not to be carried to its ultimate destination by the Springbok (and the proof does not warrant us in saying that it was), the plan must have been to send it forward by transshipment. And we think it evident that such was the purpose. All these condemnatory circumstances must be taken in connection with the fraudulent concealment attempted in the bills of lading and the manifest, and with the very remarkable fact that... no claim. . . has ever been filed. Upon the whole case we cannot doubt that the cargo was originally shipped with intent to violate the blockade; . . . that the voyage from London to the blockaded port was, as to cargo, ... one voyage; and that

1 Edwin Haigh, Alexander T. Blakeley, and Fraser Trenholm and Company vs. the United States, 3 Wallace, 514-559 (1866). 2 The Steamer Peterhoff vs. the United States, 5 Wallace, 1-28 (1867).

The Bark Springbok vs. the United States, 5 Wallace, 28-62 (1867).

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attached to the

the liability to condemnation cargo from the time of sailing. . . In the Peterhoff case, this principle was extended to cover an instance where the ulterior destination was deemed to be Texas by means of overland transportation.

THE STEAMER PETERHOFF VS. THE UNITED STATES, DECIDED, WASHINGTON, APRIL 15, 1867: The Peterhoff was captured near the island of St. Thomas, in the West Indies, on the 25th of February, 1863. . . . She was fully documented as a British merchant steamer, bound from London to Matamoras, in Mexico, but was seized, without question of her neutral nationality, upon suspicion that her real destination was to the blockaded coast of the States in rebellion, and that her cargo consisted, in part, of contraband goods. We ... [hold] that the mouth of the Rio Grande was not included in the blockade . . . and that neutral commerce with Matamoras, except in contraband, was entirely free.

an ulterior destination to a blockaded port will infect the primary voyage to a neutral port with liability for intended violation of blockade. The question now is whether the same consequence will attend an ulterior destination to a belligerent country by inland conveyance. . . . We must say . . . that trade, between London and Matamoras, even with intent to supply, from Matamoras, goods to Texas, violated no blockade, and cannot be declared unlawful. . . . And this brings us to the question: Was any portion of the cargo of the Peterhoff contraband? . . . We are obliged to conclude that the portion of the cargo which we have characterized as contraband must be condemned.

On May 13, 1861, Great Britain recognized the belligerent status of the Confederacy. This gave the Southerners freedom to send out privateers

The Confederacy wins

the status of a belligerent

and commerce raiders as well as to try to float loans abroad. Several other European powers, as well as other nations of the world, followed the British action. But on June 1, 1861, Great Britain forbade the armed ships of either belligerent to bring their prizes to British ports. This severely limited the effectiveness of Confederate privateering. And Britain's original recognition of belligerency probably lessened the possibility of a later recognition of Southern independence. The quest for this latter recognition was one of the primary diplomatic aims of the Confederacy. The South, overestimating the coercive power of the discontinuance of the cotton trade with Europe, made this threat the main theme of her attempt to gain European recognition. It failed because, at the

beginning of the war, Britain had a 50% oversupply of cotton and because some 1,500,000 bales were run through the blockade. This plan is seen in instructions given by Robert Tombs, Secretary of State of the Confederacy, to three special commissioners destined for Europe, William L. Yancey, Pierre A. Rost, and A. Dudley Mann.

MONTGOMERY, The Confederate

SECRETARY TOMBS' INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMISSIONERS, ALA., MARCH 16, 1861: States have a well-organized Government, instituted by the free will of their citizens in their active exercise of all the functions of sovereignty, and are capable of defending themselves. . . As soon as you shall be received officially by Great Britain you will propose to negotiate a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, and you are accordingly furnished herewith with full powers for that purpose. The principal aim of the Confederate States in their policy with foreign governments is peace and commerce. It will be their constant care to employ every means consistent with honor to maintain the one and extend the other. . . . Import duties for mere revenue purposes, so moderate as to closely approximate free trade, will render their market peculiarly accessible to the manufactories of Europe. . . . The British ministry will comprehend fully the condition to which the British return would be reduced if the supply of our staple should suddenly fail or even be considerably diminished. A delicate allusion to the probability of such an occurrence might not be unkindly received by the minister of foreign affairs, an occurrence, I will add, that is inevitable if this country shall be involved in protracted hostilities with the North.

The Confederate agents, Yancey and Mann, reported to Secretary Tombs on their reception in England in a subsequent dispatch.

contest

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REPORT OF CONFEDERATE AGENTS, LONDON, JULY 15, 1861: . . . We are satisfied that our cause is slowly though surely gaining ground in England. The best informed Englishmen seem to agree that the great principle underlying the is that of self-government. We are more fully satisfied of the correctness of the opinion that the question of recognition of the independence of the Confederate States is considered both here and on the continent as but a question of time. As soon as a favorable military event is officially announced ... we expect to demand an official recognition of our presence here as Commissioners, and to press the question of the recognition of our Government to a determination. If such an event does not occur, we are satisfied that we cannot expect it before the cotton is picked and the supply of that article here is exhausted, and no other means of replenishing it can be found than through treaties with the Confederate States. . . . The blockade question

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we consider to be the greatest lever which will eventually decide the relations between Europe and the South.

Southern diplomacy fails to win formal recognition

The failure of the Southern efforts to achieve recognition rests on more than the question of cotton. Britain and France could not agree on a common policy toward the Confederacy, and the Southerners needed the support of both. The issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863 by President Lincoln and the hard-won Northern victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in the summer of 1863 took some of the wind out of the sails of the interventionist element in England. Crises in Europe diverted attention from the war in America. Briefly, cautious British leaders never saw a time during the four years when Southern victory was certain; and, rather than support a doubtful cause, the British preferred to await the final outcome. Then, if the Confederacy won, recognition would be proper and practically automatic. If the Union survived, then Britain would not have forfeited the friendship of a nation with ideals and purposes much like her own. The Confederacy, disappointed in the efforts of its commissioners abroad to secure recognition,

The "Trent" affair

decided to send two of its ablest men, James M. Mason and John Slidell, to Europe in the autumn of 1861. The two agents ran the blockade and at Havana boarded a British steamer, the Trent. Captain Wilkes of the Union sloop San Jacinto learned of the plan and, on his own responsibility, stopped the Trent at sea on November 8th. A boarding party from the San Jacinto removed Mason and Slidell, with their secretaries, from the Trent and allowed the British vessel to go on its way. The Confederate agents were brought to Boston as prisoners. Captain Wilkes was hailed as a hero, and popular jubilation in the North reached great proportions.

Relations between the United States and Britain were strained severely by this extraordinary example of search and seizure. For a time it appeared as though the aroused Britishers might use the incident as an excuse to make war on the United States. In fact 11,000 first-line British troops were sent to

The North repudiates an example of search and seizure