Communist China was enthusiastic, sober reflection indicated that Marshal Chiang Kai-shek was not yet ready to move any appreciable military strength against the mainland. The Korean stalemate would have to be resolved by diplomatic negotiation within the framework of the arrangements already in force between the UN command and the North Koreans.

Ambassador Lodge indicts the U. S. S. R. for backing Reds in Korea

In the United Nations, the new American ambassador, former Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., was vigorous in his support of the administration's Far Eastern policies. On February 25, 1953, when the Assembly reconvened, he voiced a tenpoint indictment of the Soviet Union for its alleged backing of the Chinese Communists in their intervention in the Korean war. 63 The debate in the Assembly on the Korean truce proposals was inconclusive, but that body did vote on March 11th to approve efforts to rebuild the Korean economy when peace was established.64 Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California, a frequent spokesman in behalf of Nationalist China, March 16th asked for a total blockade of the Red China coast and for condemnation by the UN of Soviet Russia, declaring that the U.S.S.R. was responsible for Red China's in the Korean war. part When Senator Knowland had proposed a "go it alone if necessary" blockade of Red China a month before, on February 7th, Secretary Dulles had told a press conference that the administration had no plans for such an action. This time the administration took no public notice of the Senator's demand.

Senator Knowland

asks for a

a

blockade of Red China

on

President Rhee opposes UN terms

they affected sick and wounded personnel. Agreement on these prisoner exchange procedures was reached on the 11th and Secretary Dulles stated on the 20th that the arrangements held promise for a solution to this vexing problem.65 By May 3rd the first round of prisoner exchanges was completed. The UN forces submitted what they called their "final" offer of armistice terms to the Red command in Korea on May 25, 1953. At this juncture, the UN position was seriously jeopardized by the stand taken by President Rhee of the Korean republic. He objected to the proffered terms on the score that they did not assure the complete unification of Korea under the control of his government. President Eisenhower wrote Mr. Rhee on June 6th, urging him to accept the armistice terms.66 Before a reply was received from the ROK president, the North Koreans accepted the latest prisoner of war exchange agreement to which the South Koreans had objected. While arrangements were going forward to facilitate the prisoner exchange, President Rhee instructed. South Korean guards to allow 25,000 anti-communist POWs to "escape" from four prison camps in which they were being held awaiting determination of exchange procedures. This action. embarrassed the UN command and brought angry outbursts from the Reds.

Rhee aids anti-Red prisoners in "escape" plot

5 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:655, May 4, 1953, for Sec. Dulles' remarks at a press conference on this date. 66 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:835-36, June 15, 1953, for the text of the Eisenhower letter. See also ibid., XXIX: 13-14, July 6, 1953, for Mr. Rhee's reply of June 19th.

67 Mr. Robertson took part with Sec. Dulles in a radio report to the nation on the results of his trip to Korea, July 17, 1953. See ibid., XXIX:99, July 27, 1953.

Secretary Dulles hailed the achievement as a milestone on the way to peace in the Far East.68 The armistice was signed the following day, and by July 31st withdrawal of the opposing forces to the agreed upon truce lines was completed. The armistice terms are too lengthy and too detailed for reproduction here but they provided for an end to hostilities, set up procedures for policing the truce line which followed irregularly the existing battle lines, and called for a political conference to establish peace in Korea.

The fighting, which had been sharply curtailed since the cease-fire in 1951 was officially over. The North Koreans had failed in their attempt to take over the whole peninsula. The Red What had the Chinese "volunteers" had not turned Korean War the tide in favor of the communists. accomplished? The Republic of Korea had been rescued and set on the road to rehabilitation and strength by the forces of the 16 UN allies who answered the call of that organization to stem aggression. And, for thousands of American families with members in the American forces, "the war in Korea was ended." Questions of whether the armistice was a "victory" for the UN coalition, or whether the tremendous cost in lives and money had been worth the result could not be answered. Certainly, the nations which contributed manpower or other resources to the

Collective

Korean conflict in behalf of the UN action could draw some satisfaction action prevails from the knowledge that for the first over aggression time in the world's history, collective

methods had prevailed over the forces of aggression. The United States, as the principal contributor of men and money, was most entitled to count the cost. But it is doubtful if a balance could ever be struck. Suffice it here to say simply that the news of the Korean armistice as it was received in the United States evoked no such wild demonstrations as were seen on November 11, 1918 and August 14-15, 1945. The sober realization by the American people that the close of the war in Korea marked not an end to trouble in the Far East, but probably only a way-point on the road to further difficulties was enough to discourage any emotional celebration.

8 See ibid., XXIX:131, Aug. 3, 1953, for the text of Pres. Eisenhower's message; 131-32 for Sec. Dulles' statement; and 132-40 for the text of the armistice agreement.

It was immediately announced in Washington that Secretary Dulles would go to Korea early in August to seek assurances from President Rhee that the South Koreans would co

Secretary
Dulles

goes to Korea

69

operate in the political talks which were to settle the future of Korea.6 Mr. Dulles left Washington on August 2nd and for several days conferred with President Rhee and his associates. As indicated in an earlier section, the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Korea was one of the products of these conferences.70 After his return from Seoul, Secretary Dulles described the implications of the Korean question in an address to the American Legion's annual convention.

SECRETARY DULLES' ADDRESS ON KOREAN PROBLEMS, ST. LOUIS, SEPTEMBER 2, 1953: ... From... [the Korean War] we learn a lesson which we expect to apply in the interests of future peace. If events

Secretary Dulles assesses the Korean situation

...

are likely which will in fact lead us to fight, let us make clear our intention in advance; then we shall probably not have to fight. . . . It was important to establish the fact [in Korea] that aggressors cannot go on enlarging themselves by the conquest of small nations. . . . This fact has been established in Korea. . . . The terms of the Korean Armistice also established. the right of enemy prisoners to enjoy political asylum. . . . As a result, from now on, the Red Armies will be less dependable as tools of aggression. . . . [The] proposed [mutual defense] treaty [with the Republic of Korea] is another step in the development of a Pacific security system. It will make it unlikely that the Republic of Korea will be subjected to another act of unprovoked military aggression which would again involve the United States. As another deterrent to renewed aggression, the United States and the other 15 members of the United Nations which fought aggression in Korea issued a declaration that, if the armistice should be breached by unprovoked Communist aggression, then the 16 nations would "again be united and prompt to resist." Also that declaration points out that "the consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea." If... the Communists desire to resume the war, they now know that they could no longer count on [the] "privileged sanctuary" [of bases in China, just north of the Yalu]. We are now making plans

...

...

On Aug. 3, 1953 the American Congress voted $200,000,000 in funds to be spent for relief and rehabilitation in Korea. 10 See pp. 217-18 above.

...

...

for a political conference which, we hope, will turn the armistice into permanent peace. We shall not sit in... [this conference] indefinitely... if the Korean conference discusses Korea for 3 months without making genuine progress we shall pause to take stock of the situation. . . . If . . . we conclude that the conference is serving no useful purpose, we shall expect to withdraw from the conference. We believe that, in negotiating with the Communists, we should always have in mind a terminal point. We do not make the mistake of treating Korea as an isolated affair. . . . A single Chinese-Communist aggressive front extends from Korea . . . to Indo-China. ... As President Eisenhower said in his April 16 speech, a Korean armistice would be a fraud if it merely released Communist forces for attack elsewhere. . . . growing out of . . . [the conference on Korean peace] could come, if Red China wants it, an end of aggression and restoration of peace in Indochina. The United States would welcome such a development.

71

The United Nations General Assembly which had convened in special session on August 17, 1953 to discuss the Korean armistice and to plan for the political conference adopted Prisoner a proposal for the composition of exchange the conference, supported by the process in United States, on August 28th and Korea then adjourned. The initial prisoner operates well exchange in Korea ended on Sepunder tember 6th, leaving a number of difficulties loose details to cause later dissension. On the whole, however, the exchange process had been well administered by a force of Indian military personnel led by Lieutenant General Kodendera S. Thimaya. Almost 13,000 prisoners held by the Reds were released to the UN forces; and more than 75,000 were returned to the North Korean and Red Chinese lines. There was a well-founded belief on the part of the UN command that the Reds still held a sizable contingent of allied prisoners in violation of the agreements. Those prisoners who indicated an unwillingness to return to the side of their origin were to be made available to the teams from the respective sides which would attempt to convince the unwilling to accept repatriation. The failure of the Red "persuaders" to "talk back" many of the men who elected to stay on the UN

11 This reference is to Pres. Eisenhower's address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in New York, Apr. 16, 1953, on the subject "The Chance for Peace" in which the President called upon the Soviet Union to demonstrate its desire for peace by performing certain specified actions. See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII: 599-603, Apr. 27, 1953.

UN condemns Red atrocities

win freedom from communist control could come to but one conclusion: Thousands of Chinese and North Koreans who had seen communism in operation had no wish to live again in the atmosphere of oppression which characterized Red rule. On September 13, 1953 Communist China rejected the suggested plan for the Korean political conference, asking in its stead for a roundtable discussion to include several more nations than took part in the Korean war. The American government named Arthur H. Dean, a prominent international lawyer, to serve as deputy to Secretary Dulles for the forthcoming conferences and planning went ahead in the State Department in the hope that the Korean peace could be arranged with a minimum of delay.72 Meanwhile, the United States pressed its campaign to get the UN to condemn North Korea and Red China for atrocities committed against UN troops during the war. On December 3rd the General Assembly voted 42 to 5 (with 10 abstentions) to adopt a resolution of condemnation as introduced by Ambassador Lodge. As the year 1953 ended, the Korean peace settlement was not much nearer achievement than it had been at the time of the July armistice. Talks between the UN representatives and the Reds at Panmunjom had been broken off on December 12th when Mr. Dean accused the Reds of using insulting language and impugning the good faith of the UN negotiators. But the prisoners were mostly repatriated. The fighting was mostly over a few patrol clashes were not enough to cause more than momentary alarm. And the United States announced, December

U. S. withdraws

2 army divisions from Korea

12 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX:877-78, Dec. 21, 1953, for a series of proposals advanced by Mr. Dean for the consideration of the political conference.

26th, that it was withdrawing two army divisions from Korea as they were no longer needed in that now "peaceful" theater.73

Indochina succeeds Korea as a Far East problem area

As the Korean question became less frightening a new problem arose in the Far East to bedevil American planners. Actually, it was an old problem, but its effects upon American policymaking were becoming more evident in 1953. This was the situation in French Indochina where a costly and indecisive war had been in progress since 1946. The fighting was between the French government forces (largely loyal natives, Foreign Legionnaires, and French North African troops) and the native Indochinese nationalists. The nationalists had had a short taste of independence in 1945 between the expulsion of the Japanese occupying armies and the restoration of French rule. In 1946 they rebelled against the French and set up a Viet-Minh regime under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh who had received his revolutionary training in Moscow. Under Ho Chi Minh's guidance the independence movement became communist directed and controlled, although not a very large proportion of the nationalists were convinced communists.74

Background of the Indochina crisis

Indochina campaign a drain on French defense effort in Europe

From 1946 onward the French granted some measures of freedom to the three component states of Indochina-Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia-but never enough independence to satisfy the Viet-Minh. So the warfare went went on-pinning down great numbers of the regular French army and especially its officer corps who trained and led the native and overseas troops. The French government in Paris was forced to spend huge sums of money on the war and to transport troops and supplies from Europe and Africa to Indochina. Every such expenditure and shipment lessened the contribution France could make to European defense and the Indochinese war was rapidly reducing the French economy to a dangerously low point. By 1953 the French were asking the United States for substantial aid to

13 See ibid., XXX:14, Jan. 4, 1954, for the State Dept. press release on this withdrawal.

74 The Viet-Minh administration was recognized as a government by the U.S.S.R. and Red China in 1950.

keep the three Associated States afloat. The question soon became one of a kind that had plagued the United States elsewhere in the postwar world-Do we support a valuable European ally in an overseas venture at the cost of opposing native nationalism? While "colonialism" as such was not too clearly the issue in Indochina, since the French had granted some independence and had promised more, the colonial peoples of the world saw it that way. More alarming in the case of Indochina was the advance of communism into Southeast Asia. The methods were slightly different than in Korea, but the effect would be the same (or even more disastrous) if the communists could gain control of the most valuable French possession in the Pacific area. So, the Indochina situation posed a real problem for the Eisenhower administration. Only the fact that it could be faced without the political heritage of the China question or the implications of the partisan tag of "Mr. Truman's War" (as some opponents called the Korean action) afforded a little comfort. Although it was not exactly a "new" problem, the United States had not been deeply involved in it before 1953, as it had in the loss of the Chinese mainland to the communists and in the 1945 division of Korea.

Indochina confronts U. S. with a policy dilemma

The Indochina situation received direct consideration in late March 1953 when René Mayer, the French Premier, conferred with Secretary

Premier Mayer confers in Washington

Dulles and President Eisenhower in Washington. It was agreed at these meetings that the fight against communism in the Far East involved Indochina as well as Korea and that the two western allies would coordinate their efforts in both Far Eastern areas.75 In early May it was revealed that American military cargo aircraft had been sent to Indochina for the use of the French Union forces there, the first planes reaching Hanoi on May 5, 1953. The next day Secretary Dulles said that the State Department was considering the possibility of requesting UN action to forestall a communist invasion of Laos and also of Thailand. A month later Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel was named to

75 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXVIII:491-92, Apr. 6, 1953, for the text of the communiqué issued at the close of these conferences on Mar. 28, 1953.

head a United States military mission to Indo

U. S. sends a military mission to Indochina

china. This mission, announced June 20, 1953, was to help the French with advice and expert assistance, as well as to report back to the United States government on the status of the communist military threat to Southeast Asia.76 In his report on his Asian trip, on July 17th, Secretary Dulles touched on the question of Indochina, saying that the United States believed that the plan devised by General Henri-Eugene Navarre, the French commander in Indochina, for a two-year war program to eradicate the Viet-Minh menace was a feasible one." 77

Indochina was again a subject for discussion when Secretary Dulles conferred in London, October 16-18, 1953, with Georges Bidault and

American awareness of the Indochina situation increases

Anthony Eden, French and British Foreign Ministers respectively. When Vice-President Richard Nixon was in Hanoi, on November 4th, on his trip to Asia, he declared that the United States was opposed to a negotiated peace in the sevenyear-old war. And a month later Secretary Dulles was deprecating the communist gains in the fighting. But the indications were that if peace was to be attained the Viet-Minh forces under Ho Chi Minh would likely have the upper hand at the peace conference. And, unless peace was soon achieved on whatever terms the French could possibly accept, the communists would inflict a serious political blow on French prestige as well as a military defeat on the French armies. The United States was not yet fully involved in the Indochina quarrel. But the danger had been brought to the attention of the State Department-the French economic situation was alarm enough-and 1954 came into view with Indochina succeeding Korea as the principal Far Eastern trouble spot.

11. The United States Faces New Far Eastern Crises: The Geneva Conference and Truce in Indochina The year 1954 proved to be one of the most fateful of the decade following the end of World

1 At about the same time the government of Laos established its first legation in Washington. Laos became fully sovereign Oct. 22, 1953.

1 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXIX:99, July 27, 1953.

1954

War II. The American newspaper reader was seldom allowed a respite from headlines reporting grave events or forea fateful year casting dire developments at home in the and abroad. While the main purFar East pose of headlines is to sell papers, they cannot be disregarded as a reflection of the seriousness of the times. On occasion, domestic political squabbles and sensational revelations from Congressional investigations monopolized the attention of the reading public. And events in Europe-especially the failure of EDC and the subsequent negotiation of an arrangement to succeed it-received wide publicity. However, the problems of the Far East kept coming to the fore. As soon as one situation seemed in hand another got out of hand. At the end of the year it would have been almost impossible to find a literate American-or even one who was not a reader, but who depended upon radio or television for his knowledge of events-who was not aware of the gravity of America's position in the Far East.

In his second annual message to Congress, on January 7, 1954, President Eisenhower reviewed the world situation. Concerning the problems of Asia, and the Western Pacific area he set forth his understanding of the conditions as the year opened.

President Eisenhower's second "State of the Union" message, 1954

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S "STATE OF THE UNION" MESSAGE, WASHINGTON, JANUARY 7, 1954: . . . In the Far East, we retain our vital interest in Korea. . . . We are prepared to meet any renewal of armed aggression in Korea. We shall maintain indefinitely our bases in Okinawa. .78 I shall ask Congress to authorize continued material assistance to hasten the successful conclusion of the struggle in Indochina. . . . We shall continue military and economic aid to the Nationalist Government of China. . . . In . . . [their] continuing efforts [toward "progress through democratic methods"] the free peoples of South Asia can be assured of the support of the United States.

On January 9th Chou En Lai, the Red Chinese Foreign Minister, asked that the suspended talks at Panmunjom be resumed. And on the 30th it

18 On Dec. 24, 1953 the State Dept. had announced that the U.S. would retain Okinawa, Iwo Jima, the Bonins, and other small islands taken from Japan. The Amami Oshima group of the Ryukyus, it said, would be returned to Japanese control. U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:17, Jan. 4, 1954.