was announced that 28 UN memDiscussions of bers had rejected the request of Korean peace Madame Vijayalakshmi Pandit,79 problem General Assembly president, that the Assembly hold a special session on Korea February 9th. The United States was among those opposing the session, while 22 nations favored Madame Pandit's plan. Ten member nations did not reply to her proposal. Korea as well as Indochina came into the discussions of the conference of foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union held in Berlin, January 25 to February 18, 1954. At this meeting the Big Four agreed to hold a conference at Geneva on Far Eastern problems in April with Communist China invited as one of the principal conferees. The invitation to the Red Chinese raised some objections from American Congressmen, but Secretary Dulles defended the invitation as a recognition of the realities of the situation and declared that the United States had won 100% of what it wanted for the proposed Geneva meeting.80 On February 26th the United States sent invitations to 14 nations to take part in the Geneva talks. 81 Earlier in February, on the 6th, it had been announced in Washington that the United States was sending a number of Air Force technicians to 1 Mme. Pandit's maiden name was Swarup Kumari Nehru. She is a sister of the Premier of India, Jawaharlal Nehru. 8 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:343-47, Mar. 8, 1954, for Sec. Dulles' statement on his return from Berlin, Feb. 19. 81 Actually only 8 nations took part in the Indochina talks, the Big Four, Red China, and three Associated States of Indochina. South Korea was represented for the discussions on that subject. 82 On Feb. 26, 1954, the U.S. transferred two destroyers to the Nationalist Chinese Navy for use in the defense of Formosa and other Chinese island holdings. On Mar. 22, 1954, Admiral Radford revealed that 22 B-26s had been sent to Indochina in February. Movement for a cease-fire in Indochina fails phasize that the United States had no intention of getting into a "hot war" in Southeast Asia. As the situation in Indochina grew daily more tense Prime Minister Nehru of India, on February 22nd, urged that a cease-fire be arranged between the Viet-Minh and French French Union forces. On March 3rd the French cabinet agreed to accept an immediate cease-fire and after several days of debate in the French parliament, the deputies voted to support their government's truce terms as announced on the 5th. The parliament also approved the Berlin agreement for the Geneva conference on the Far East. The Viet-Minh would not accept the terms offered, so the fighting went on. U. S. already paying 78% of cost of war in Indochina President Eisenhower in an effort to answer questions raised by our growing involvement in the Indochina situation declared on March 10th that there would be no decision by his administration to go to war in Indochina, or elsewhere, without the observance of the constitutional process of a declaration of war by vote of the Congress. How greatly the United States was committed to aid the French government in its fight against the communists was revealed on March 16th when it was announced in Washington that the United States was already paying 78% of the cost of the war through financial and military aid to France in the Indochina venture. Secretary Dulles added, on the 23rd, that the United States would advance still more assistance to the French and that this nation continued to support the Navarre plan for a two-year campaign to end the conflict.88 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Dulles made an important pronouncement on American policy in the Far East. SECRETARY DULLES' ADDRESS ON "THE THREAT OF A RED ASIA," NEW YORK, MARCH 29, 1954: . . . The United States is watching. [the progress of the Associated States of Indochina toward independence] with close attention and great sympathy. . . . We feel a sense of kinship with those everywhere who yearn for freedom. The Communists are attempting to prevent the orderly development of independence and to confuse Secretary * U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:512-13, Apr. 5, 1954. the issue before the world. . . . If the Communist forces won uncontested control over Indochina or any substantial part thereof they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against other free peoples in the area. . . . The United States has. [provided] material aid to the established governments and their peoples. Also, our diplomacy has sought to deter Communist China from open aggression in that area.... Recent statements have been designed to impress upon potential aggressors that aggression might lead to action at places and by means of freeworld choosing, so that aggression would cost more than it could gain. . . . Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that the possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today. chances for peace are usually bettered by letting a potential aggressor know in advance where his aggression could lead him. . . . It is now the policy of the United States not to exchange United States performance for Communist promises. . . . The United States delegation will go to Geneva in an effort to bring about a united and independent Korea. . . . Also, we hope that any Indochina discussion will serve to bring the Chinese Communists to see the danger of their apparent design for the conquest of Southeast Asia, so that they will cease and desist. We shall not, however, be disposed to give Communist China what it wants from us, merely to buy its promises of future good behavior. The siege of Dien Bien Phu ... The 84 As the Secretary spoke, the position of the French in Indochina was rapidly deteriorating. The French Union garrison at Dien Bien Phu, a strongly fortified interior post in northwest Viet Nam, was being gradually surrounded and trapped.8 Fast action by the French forces still able to move was imperative to save the besieged troops. Some Americans argued that the United States should send direct aid to the beleaguered garrison either by air bombardment of the Communist attackers, or by a ground relief column, or by an air-drop of reinforcements at Dien Bien Pres. Eisenhower had praised the gallantry of the Dien Bien Phu defenders in a message to Pres. René Coty of France. See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:542, Apr. 12, 1954. Ample evidence existed to show that the besiegers of Dien Bien Phu were being supplied with munitions and artillery by the Red Chinese. France and Britain fear precipitate American action may lead to global war Phu. Others asserted that any one or all of these actions would bring on a Far Eastern, and possibly a global war. Both France and Great Britain, or at least their governments, became alarmed that precipitate moves by the United States might plunge their countries into a war both in Asia and in Europe. Secretary Dulles thereupon made a hurried trip to London and Paris, April 13-15, 1954. After conferences with the British and French, the three governments agreed that they would initiate a move for a mutual defense alliance in Southeast Asia, committing their nations to act collectively against the communist threat and adding to the security system several of the independent nations of the region so as to extend further the defense ring around the communist bloc. As a step in aid to France the United States announced, April 15th, that American Air Force planes would airlift French troops from Europe to Indochina.85 Following this announcement, Vice-President Nixon was quoted as saying that the United States would send troops to reinforce the French in Southeast Asia. When publication of these views roused apprehensions in certain sectors of the American public, the State Department hurReport riedly declared that Mr. Nixon's Vice-President remarks had not been fully preNixon says sented and that no immediate U. S. troops change in the American policy of will go to non-involvement with military forces Indochina was indicated or contemplated. Before leaving for Paris and Geneva on April 20th, Secretary Dulles told reporters that it was unlikely American troops would go to Indochina. While the Secretary's statement did not rule out the possibility of future American military action in Indochina, the chances of American forces having to fight in that far-off land were viewed as much less likely. Secretary Dulles says Nixon misquoted In this atmosphere of confusion and of impending defeat for the French Union forces the 85 On Apr. 21, 1954, USAF C-124 planes carried detachments of troops from French North Africa to Indochina. Because of protests by the Indian government, which feared the planes would violate Indian neutrality, the airlift bypassed India. SECRETARY DULLES' ADDRESS ON “THE ISSUES AT GENEVA," WASHINGTON, MAY 7, 1954: Far Eastern issues at Geneva [As to The Geneva Conference has two tasks. The first is to try to find a way to unify Korea. The second task is to discuss the possibility of restoring peace in Indochina. The Soviet delegation, however, has. tried to create the false impression that this meeting accepted Red China as one of "five great powers" or conferred on it a new international status. Both of these issues had been fought out in connection with calling the Conference and the Soviets had then conceded that the Conference would not be a five-power affair nor involve any recognition for Red China. Korea] we are pressing the Communists to accept honest elections which will be supervised by responsible outside observers, who will assure a really free election. Whether the Communists accept that remains to be seen. If they would, then I think Korea could be unified. . . .87 [As to Southeast Asia] we sought to strengthen the resistance to communism in Indochina. We sought also to build in Southeast Asia a broader community of defense. . . We had never sought any sudden spectacular act such as an ultimatum to Red China. Our goal was to develop a basic unity of constructive purpose. I feel con fident that unity of purpose persists, and that such a tragic event as the fall of Dien Bien Phu will harden, not weaken, our purpose to stay united. . . vital interests can no longer be protected merely by local defense. The key to successful defense and to the deterring of attack is association for mutual defense. That is what the United States seeks in Southeast Asia. Mr. Dulles' reference to Dien Bien Phu in his radio talk came at the same time news was re * Sec. Dulles visited Rome before returning to Washington on May 4. * For Sec. Dulles' statement on the Korean problem at Geneva see U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:704-707, May 10, 1954. ceived that the garrison at that Fall of fortress had surrendered to the Dien Bien Phu Viet-Minh attackers. When the terms proposed for a peace settlement in Indochina were announced there was a large segment of the American public which thought that the United States had suffered as grevious a diplomatic defeat at Geneva as the French had incurred militarily at Dien Bien Phu. This Secretary Dulles vigorously denied, saying, on May 11th, that out of the Geneva talks would emerge a defense arrangement for Southeast Asia to give added strength to the free nations in their struggle to preserve the area from communist aggression.88 Secretary Dulles denies Geneva marked a defeat for American diplomacy Negotiations for a truce in Indochina occupied the Geneva conferees for most of May 1954, although they also discussed the Korean situation.89 Secretary Dulles works for a Southeast Asia defense alliance Finally on May 29th the conference ordered truce talks in Indochina. Before anything concrete could be accomplished, the communist delegations repudiated the truce plans. Thereupon General Bedell Smith accused the Reds of blocking a settlement in the Far East.90 Meanwhile Secretary Dulles had been laying the groundwork for a Southeast Asia defense alliance. The British government appeared reluctant to commit itself to the arrangements planned by Mr. Dulles and some friction was reported developing between Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Dulles over the situation. Secretary Dulles, on May 25th, had defined United States policy on collective security in the hope of allaying British fears.91 In the first two weeks of June, 1954, Mr. Dulles made a series of important pronouncements in which he further explained the American position on the Far East. Because of the significance of these statements and addresses, excerpts from three of them are reproduced here. The first was 88 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:781-82, May 24, 1954, for Sec. Dulles' defense of American diplomacy at Geneva. 89 For example, on May 22nd, South Korea agreed to a proposal for free voting for all of Korea to settle the form of government after the peace. Gen. Bedell Smith supported this stand on the 28th. Ibid., 915-18, June 14, 1954. 90 See ibid., 942-44, June 21, 1954, for Gen. Smith's statement of June 9th on this matter. 1 See U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:862-64, June 7, 1954. a statement made in Washington, the second an address to a meeting of Rotary International in Seattle, and the third a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. Three important statements by Secretary Dulles SECRETARY DULLES' STATEMENT ON GENEVA CONFERENCE, WASHINGTON, JUNE 8, 1954: I think that the talks about Korea are pretty close to the end of their useful life. . . . Unless . . . there is a radical change in the Communist position, it is not fruitful to go on discussing that problem much more. . . . There has been ... a deliberate dragging out of the negotiations at Geneva while the Communist military effort has been stepped up in Indochina itself. . . . The United States has made a number of suggestions [to meet the Indochina situation] which all fit into a common and consistent pattern. The first . . . was . . . that there should be united action in relation to Indochina. 2. International unity differ most violently from us are the same ones who most violently criticize the fact that we in the United States often differ among ourselves. . . . differences can mount to a point where they become a real danger. . . . Perhaps today there is too much difference between members of the non-Communist world. . . . However, we can rejoice in the fact that we can maintain the lofty goal of fruitful coexistence between difference and unity. . . . We must find ways whereby despite differences, we can cooperate. . . . The most significant cooperative effort is the United Nations. . . . That the United Nations can set forces in motion was shown in Korea. . . . The Korean War had better not been fought if in the end the aggressors and their accomplices succeed at Geneva in besmirching the honor and the prestige of the United Nations. It may be asked why .. [the] situation [in Indochina] has not been brought to the United Nations. I can assure you that this ignoring of the United Nations was not the choice of the United States. Now . . . Thailand . . . has taken . . [this] situation to the United Nations. 92 Thailand has ... our strong support in this matter. . . . It is difficult to see why the negotiations at Geneva would be impeded by the fact that representatives of the United Nations were in the area reporting what was going on. Knowledge has never yet been an impediment to honest negotiation. .. What is going on in Indochina is a classic example of . . . [the] Communist strategy [to encourage agitation and revolt in colonial areas] I can assure you of two things: 1) The United States is pushing for self-government [in colonial areas]. . . . 2) When we exercise restraint, it is because of a reasoned conviction that quick action would not, in fact, produce true independence. . . The United States some time ago outlined the conditions which, in its opinion, would justify the creation of a collective defense of Southeast Asia. At the head of the list... was the stipulation that there must be assurance that the French will, in fact, make good on their July 3, 1953, declaration of intention to grant complete independence. The United States will never fight for colonialism. .. We do not assume that we have any mandate to run the world. . . We recognize that we have a measure of power which carries with it certain responsibilities. . . . We do not accept the view that whenever there is trouble anywhere, that it is the fault of the United States and we must quickly fix it. . . . The possibilities of solution lie primarily with the peoples directly concerned. . . . Our motives are sometimes openly suspected. That makes it hard for us here at home to pursue a steady course. we shall continue in our traditional way. None need fear that we shall develop an unhealthy lust for power. Also . . . we shall persist in helping others to help themselves gain peace and security and better standards of life in larger freedom. 3. Security in the Pacific must . ... SECRETARY DULLES' ADDRESS ON "SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC," LOS ANGELES, JUNE 11, 1954: . . Today the vast Pacific is a friendly ocean only because the West Pacific islands and two peninsula positions are in friendly hands. . . . Japan trade to live, and if the free nations fail to make it possible for Japan to earn its way, then . . . her people would turn elsewhere. . . . The free world must shun economic policies which would press Japan into becoming the ally or the tool of Communist China and Soviet Russia. . . . [as regards Indochina] Last March . . . I renewed President Eisenhower's proposal [of April 27, 1953] that we seek conditions which would permit a united defense for the area. I went to Europe ... and it seemed that there was agreement on our proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps to create a The Security Council, June 3, 1954, by a vote of 10 to 1 placed the question on its agenda. ... united defense should await the results of the Geneva Conference. [The] task of pacification [in Indochina] cannot be successfully met merely by unilateral armed intervention. . . . the United States has made clear the conditions which . . . might justify intervention. These . . . are (1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won. Only if these conditions were realized could the President and the Congress be justified in asking the American people to make the sacrifices incident to committing our nation, with others, to using force to help restore peace in the area. . . . If the Chinese Communist regime were to show in Indochina or elsewhere that it is determined to pursue the path of overt military aggression, then the situation would be different and another issue would emerge. If such overt military aggression occurred, that would be a deliberate threat to the United States itself. . . . There are some, particularly abroad, who seem to assume that the attitude of the United States flows from a desire for a general war with Communist China. That is clearly false. . . . Your Government wants peace, and the American people want peace. But should there ever be openly launched an attack that the American people would clearly recognize as a threat to our own security, then the right of self preservation would demand that we-regardless of any other countrymeet the issue squarely. . . . Your Government does not propose to buy peace .. [at the price of surrender].... ... As the Geneva Conference proceeded, the impossibility of reaching agreement on the Korean question became obvious. On June 15 the nations Korean peace talks broken off at Geneva which had opposed the Reds in the Korean war broke off that phase of the talks and issued a 16-nation declaration defending their action.93 That same day London announced that Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden were flying to Washington to confer with President Eisenhower on the vexatious Far Eastern situation on June 25th. Just before his departure for America, Sir Anthony Eden proposed that a Far Eastern Locarno be created to guarantee the peace in Asia on the plan of the Locarno agreements of 1925. The British Foreign Secretary's plan would have contained mu 93 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:973-74, June 28, 1954, for the text of the declaration. United States opposes Eden's "Far Eastern Locarno" plan tual assurances by both the communist and free world sides to respect each other's territories and would throw the balance of the strength of the signatories against any nation or bloc which broke the agreement by attacking any one of the countries or areas involved. Sir Anthony also proposed the creation of a Far Eastern alliance of free nations to forestall communist aggression. This proposal met with widespread opposition in the United States and the House of Representatives, on June 30th, voted 390 to 0 for a resolution barring the United States from entering any such plan as a Far Eastern Locarno.94 U. S. S. R. vetoes peace observation commission for Indochina Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. had employed its 59th veto in the UN Security Council on June 18th to prevent Thailand from carrying its proposal for sending a peace-observation mission to Indochina. From June 25th to the 29th Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower met in Washington to discuss the Far Eastern question. At the close of their talks a joint statement was issued declaring that the conversations had been informative and agreeable.95 But no note of great encouragement came out of the meetings. Sir Winston and Sir Anthony left Washington on July 1st and later reports from London said that the British leaders had been unable to reconcile their basic differences over the problem of recognition of Red China with the stand of the United States. Senator Knowland declared on July 1st that he |