in the UN and that our government felt that the Peiping regime could not get the necessary twothirds majority that would be necessary in the Assembly to secure membership in the UN.96 The French and Viet-Minh officials had opened preliminary truce talks in Indochina on July 4th. On the 12th Secretary Dulles flew to United States Paris from Washington. In the not to sign French capital he came to agreeIndochina ment with the new French Premier armistice terms Pierre Mendès-France on the American position with respect to the armistice terms. The Secretary then returned from Paris and announced he would send General Bedell Smith to Geneva to sit in on the final conferences there. General Smith, however, would not sign the armistice terms, for the United States did not care to be a party to the transfer of Indochinese territory to the communists. Truce in Indochina On July 21st the truce agreements were signed at Geneva, ending the seven and a half years of war in Indochina. The armistice terms were largely in favor of the Viet-Minh, the French surrendering to Ho Chi Minh's control some 60,000 square miles of territory from the 17th parallel north to the China frontier. The 14,000,000 people in this area were to have an opportunity to evacuate the area if they desired. Agreement was also reached on elections to be held in VietNam in 1956 for the purpose of determining the choice of those remaining in the zone. Laos and Cambodia were to continue as semi-independent states of the French Union.97 The United States issued a unilateral declaration from Geneva, excerpts from which are given here. tions in Viet-Nam . . . "we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations. . . ." "98 the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. This declaration in opposition to the handing over of Indochina territory and peoples to the communist Viet-Minh did not lessen the feeling in the United States that an end to bloodshed in the area was a good thing. President Eisenhower so expressed himself in explaining the position of the United States, saying that the American government was glad the fighting had been ended. He added that the United States was planning to send diplomatic representatives to Laos and Cambodia, and pointed out that we were already represented in Viet-Nam.99 Efforts to build Southeast Asia defenses redoubled With the Indochina war virtually at an endthe fighting in North Viet-Nam ceased on July 27th100 the attention of the State Department was turned to efforts to strengthen what remained of free, non-communist territory in Southeast Asia. Mr. Dulles called for early action to build a security bloc in the far Pacific on July 23rd.101 Thereupon he set about doing what he could to bring this project into realization. The following section will detail his endeavors along this line, as well as review the American position in the Far East as it developed during the last half of 1954. 12. Enlarging the Area of American Responsibilities in the Far East: The As the events in Indochina directed world attention toward that troubled region, other happenings in the Far East called for serious study by American policymakers. No respite from the tensions caused by the threats of communism in various regions of the Orient occurred to allow our State Department to turn its thoughts completely to other areas of the globe where crises developed with monotonous Far Eastern problems interrelated 98 Quoted from declaration by Pres. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill at close of Washington meetings, June 29, 1954. See Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:49, July 12, 1954. See ibid., 162, Aug. 2, 1954. 100 The full truce in Indochina was effective Aug. 11, 1954. 101 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:163-64, Aug. 2, 1954. regularity-Western Europe, North Africa, Central America, the Middle East, the United Nations, etc. While the immediacy of these problems could not be denied, the Far East provided the most baffling, the most complex, and the most dangerous situations confronting the American government at this period. The question of Japanese rearmament Before we discuss the building of the defense system of Southeast Asia it might be well to review some other problem areas of the Far East, since they contributed in a measure to the need for an enlarged defense arrangement. Japan is one of these regions which we have not touched on for some pages. The situation with respect to that nation has been described up to the point of the ratification of the 1951 treaty with Japan.102 As affairs in the Far East became more serious, it was clear that an unarmed Japan provided both a burden to the United States which might have to defend the islands against communist aggression and a tempting prize should the communists, principally Red China, decide to move in on the vulnerable nation. During the course of 1952-53 much sentiment was indicated in Japan for an amendment of the 1947 Japanese constitution which forbade the maintenance of armed forces by the Sentiment Tokyo government. On September for rearmament 27, 1953 it was revealed that Prime increases in Minister Shigeru Yoshida, who had Japan been publicly opposed to Japanese rearmament, had changed his view and now favored amending the constitution to allow Japan to raise an army and navy once again. Two days later came the announcement that the United States and Japan had signed an arrangement for the continuance and administration of American forces in Japan.103 At the end of October the United States and Japan issued a joint statement in which the American government supported the rearming of Japan as a necessary measure to safeguard peace in the Pacific region.104 Close upon this statement came the declaration by Vice-President Nixon, then touring the Orient, U. S. and Japan sign defense assistance agreement Until the Japanese constitution could be changed to accommodate rearmament, the best that could be done was to formalize the defense assistance provided by the United States. This was accomplished through a mutual defense assistance agreement signed by the two powers at Tokyo on March 8, 1954.106 Internal politics in Japan prevented any further movement toward rearming the Japanese through the remainder of 1954. Premier Yoshida's hold on his leadership became more and more tenuous as the year went on. Although the Premier made a trip to the United States in the autumn of 1954 and spent four days in Washington, November 7 to 10, he was far from being the strong figure he had been during the earlier years of the postwar era. Following his meeting with President Eisenhower on November 9th the two men issued a joint statement recording the mutual friendship of their nations and outlining plans for a Japanese-American trade agreement, 107 Premier Yoshida returned home to find himself without support enough to retain his position. On December 7th, he resigned the premiership. Ichiro Premier Yoshida resigns after trip to United States Hatoyama, a veteran politician, was named to the office on the 8th. While he had had a record of opposition to the United States and had expressed himself in favor of entering into trade relations with the U.S.S.R. and Red China, the new 105 Ibid., XXIX:788, Dec. 7, 1953. 196 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXX:520-21, Apr. 5, 1954, for the text of this agreement. The annexes giving details of the program are contained in ibid., pp. 521-25. 107 Ibid., XXXI:765-66, Nov. 22, 1954. The United States had announced Oct. 27, 1954, that it would again support Japan's application for membership in the UN. Another Soviet veto was expected. Premier was reported as saying that he would work along with the Americans in an attempt to achieve the objectives of the free world in the Orient. It is too soon to tell whether the change in leadership of the Japanese government will materially complicate the efforts to get the constitution amended. For the time being, at least, Japan still affords a tempting target for the communist bloc-mainly because Japan must trade to live and unless markets elsewhere are opened to Japanese manufacturers they will be forced to depend upon Red Asia for much of their business. The communists, therefore, Japan must trade to live are likely to woo Japanese businessmen while they attempt, at the same time, to subvert any campaign for Japanese rearmament. The United States, on the other hand, has to carry the burden of Japanese defense until rearmament has raised the Japanese military strength to the point where the Japanese can not only defend themselves, but can contribute to the defense of the Western Pacific as well. President Magsaysay of Philippines a firm friend of the U. S. With respect to the Philippines, another area vital to the defense of the Western Pacific, very little of significance developed during the years 1953 and 1954. Our mutual defense treaty of 1951 with the island republic stood ready for use if aggression threatened in that region. On November 10, 1953, after a spirited political campaign, Ramón Magsaysay was elected President of the Philippine Republic by a margin of 2 to 1 over Quirino, his chief rival for the office.108 As Señor Magsaysay promised reforms in the island's government and was well known as a friend of the United States, there was every reason to believe that the Filipino nation would stand firm in its opposition to communist expansion, either by overt means or through subversion. Trade relations between the Philippines and the United States, which at times since the liberation of the Filipinos had threatened to disturb friendly attitudes between the two countries, were improved by the extension for eighteen months, on March 22, 1954, of the 1946 U. S.-Filipino trade pact extended 108 Pres. Magsaysay was inaugurated as third president of the Republic, Dec. 30, 1953. reciprocal trade pact. Talks on the future of Filipino-American trade were opened in Washington, September 20th and the two nations reported that agreements were reached on December 15th whereby American restrictions on Philippine products would be eased to increase the flow of goods. As 1954 ended, Filipino-American relations were regarded as being on the most satisfactory basis in many years. Korean dilemma remains unsettled The post-Geneva story on Korea has been inconclusive. The political conference provided for in the 1953 armistice did not materialize out of the Geneva meetings.109 Following these meetings, President Rhee made a trip to Washington where he talked with President Eisenhower on July 29th and 30th.110 Mr. Rhee then went on to Philadelphia and New York where in a number of speeches he called for an early unification of Korea. Some American observers felt that Mr. Rhee's demands were unrealistic and Mr. Dulles was reported, on August 3rd as terming the Korean president "petulant." In mid-August the Defense Department announced that four of the six American divisions still in Korea would be withdrawn, either returning to the United States or being sent to American American divisions being withdrawn from Korea outposts in the Pacific Islands.111 The amount of American military aid to the Republic of Korea was scheduled to be increased from $600,000,000 to $700,000,000 according to an announcement on September 21st. As the year ended, the UN General Assembly, voting on December 11th, approved the declaration and report issued in June by the nations at Geneva who had fought for the UN in Korea. Thus the UN recognized that the failure to reach agreement on the Korean political conference had been caused by the opposition of the communists to any reasonable settlement. One more bit of unfinished business, therefore, hung over from the Korean war. And it did not seem 109 At the suggestion of Pres. Eisenhower, Feb. 11, 1954, three governors of American states made an observation trip to Korea, leaving on May 21st and reporting back to the President on July 9th. The governors were Dan Thornton (Colorado), John S. Fine (Pennsylvania), and Allan Shivers (Texas). 110 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:197, Aug. 9, 1954, for statements issued at the close of these talks. 111 The 1951 mutual defense treaty with Korea became effective Nov. 17, 1954. likely that a new year would see an early solution to this vexing problem. An achievement which did cast credit on the efforts of the United States in the last half of 1954 was the negotiation of a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to extend Construction the defense perimeter around Red of a Southeast Asia. Several days after the close of Asia defense the Geneva conference Secretary alliance Dulles had advocated the creation of a security system in the region.112 On August 14th it was announced that talks had been scheduled to start at Baguio, the Filipino summer capital, on September 6th. The State Department revealed on August 20th that Senators H. Alexander Smith (New Jersey, Republican) and Mike Mansfield (Montana, Democrat) would accompany Secretary Dulles to the conference. India's Premier The SEATO pact ... SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY, MANILA, SEPTEMBER 8, 1954: . . . I. The parties undertake . . . to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means . . . and to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. . . II. the Parties . . . will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability. . . . IV, 1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accord 112 See pp. 226-28 above, and U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:163-64, Aug. 2, 1954. 113 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:391-92, Sept. 20, 1954, for Mr. Dulles' remarks at the opening of the meetings, and ibid., 392-93 for his statement at the close of the sessions. 114 The signatory nations were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, The Philippine Republic, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. with its constitutional processes. . . 2. If ... the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 ... apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack... the Parties shall consult immediately on the measures . . . for the common defense. V. The Parties hereby establish a Council organized as to be able to meet at any time. VII. Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. . VIII. As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. . . . IX . . . The treaty shall enter into force as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited [with the government of the Republic of the Philippines]. . . X. This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation. . . . The United States in executing the present treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2. . . .115 ... SEATO links many nations in defense against aggression The creation of SEATO brought into the defense system of the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia areas such nations as Pakistan and Thailand which were directly concerned with any threat from Red Asia, either from China and Indochina in the case of Thailand, or from the Soviet Union in respect to Pakistan. It also linked France and the United Kingdom to the Southeast Asian plan because of their interests in colonies and otherwise associated political units in the region.116 Thus, the interlocking defense arrangements now involving the United States ran from Korea on the Northeast around to Pakistan on the Southwest. Not every non-communist country or dependency is included-Burma, Indonesia, 115 The treaty was sent to the Senate for approval on Nov. 10, 1954. It was ratified Feb. 1, 1955 by 82 votes to 1. 116 France was included primarily because of Indochina. Great Britain has ties with Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Australia, and New Zealand--as well as the colonies of Hong Kong, Malaya and North Borneo. Both France and Britain have interests in other islands on the periphery of the Southeast Asia area. and India are conspicuous omissions-but the chain is almost complete. Before the close of 1954 another link was added, as will be noticed a few pages later. This was the Nationalist Chinese territory of Formosa, or Taiwan. Secretary Dulles visits Formosa and Japan, On his way back to Washington from Manila, Secretary Dulles visited Marshal Chiang in Taipei, Formosa, and Premier Yoshida in Tokyo. He reported to President Eisenhower at Denver where the President was continuing his vacation. There, on September 13th, the National Security Council, summoned to the Colorado mountain capital by the President, heard Secretary Dulles gives his observations on the Asian situation.117 Two days later Mr. Dulles made a radio report to the nation, indicating that he believed the SEATO arrangement would preserve Southeastern Asia from further communist encroachments.118 then reports to President Eisenhower and the National Security Council On September 21st the Ninth General Session of the UN General Assembly opened in New York. Mr. Dulles appeared before the Assembly on the 23rd to deliver an address called "Partnership for Peace." Excerpts relating to the Far East follow.119 SECRETARY DULLES' ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 23, 1954: . . Secretary Dulles addresses the UN General Assembly When [the Korean political conference] occurred at Geneva, the United Nations side proposed the unification of Korea on the basis of free all-Korean elections to be supervised by the United Nations. This proposal was rejected by the Communist side. They insisted that the United Nations must itself be treated as an instrument of aggression and be debarred from any further activity in Korea. This counterproposal. . . was unanimously rejected. . . The United States does not believe that the unification of Korea must await another war. . . . In . [the] case [of Indochina] an end to the fighting has been bought at a heavy price, and the final result is still obscure. One result, however, has been the driving home to the nations interested in Southeast Asia of the importance of a collective organization for defense against further aggression. The Manila 111 This was the first time the NSC had ever met outside Washington. 118 See U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:431-33, Sept. 27, 1954, for text of this radio address. 119 The entire text will be found in U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:471-77, Oct. 4, 1954. Pact... recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. . . . the Pacific Charter120 [adopted at Manila] should serve once and for all to end the myth that there is inherent incompatibility between East and West. Red China sentences captive American airmen as spies In many minds, however, the incompatibility prevailed. This was especially true among the rulers of Red China.121 With callous indifference to the rules of international conduct and in definite violation of the Korean armistice terms, Peiping announced on November 22nd that the government of Mao Tse-tung had sentenced thirteen American airmen to various terms up to life imprisonment on charges of espionage.122 These men had been captured on Red Chinese soil after their plane was downed during the Korean war. The communist charge was denied by the American government, but the airmen were reported by the Reds to have revealed their mission as one of spying and contemplated sabotage. Public opinion in the United States, and in the free world at large, was outraged by the action of the Chinese Reds. For several days the United United States protests to Red China States government was unable to get its protests into the hands of any Red Chinese official. On November 26th the State Department sent a formal note through the British Foreign Office for dispatch to the British mission in Peiping. 123 And on the 29th the American Consul General at Geneva was finally successful in obtaining a meeting with the Red Chinese Consul there to demand release of the prisoners. Meanwhile the wrath of the American people increased. The immediate clamor, beyond the cries for the release of the airmen, was for a blockade of the Red China coast to force the Peiping authorities to give up the men. Secretary Dulles, in an insertion in a prepared speech at Chi Many Americans demand blockade of Red China coast 120 This was a general statement of principles signed by the eight nations taking part in the conference. See ibid., XXXI: 391, Sept. 20, 1954. 121 On his visits to Burma, Hanoi, and Peiping in Oct. 1954, Premier Nehru gave evidence of believing that the East and West could not agree on basic relations until the West accorded more recognition to the Reds. 122 Two of the prisoners were civilian employees of the U. S. Army. One of the civilians was sentenced to life imprisonment, the other to 20 years. The 11 Air Force personnel were given sentences ranging from 4 to 10 years in prison. 123 U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, XXXI:856-57, Dec. 6, 1954, has text of note. |